



Issue Brief

KOREA'S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE : A NEW PERSPECTIVE



With the upcoming Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan HLF-4), to be held in Busan, South Korea, from 29th November to 1st December, 2011, expectations are rising with regard to Korea's role both from within the country and from abroad. Once considered the poorest country of the world, Korea is now a valued member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Korea's rise offers a valuable example to developing countries around the globe, many of which are showing great interest in learning from the country's experience.

Until now, however, the Korean Government has portrayed a picture unduly biased towards economic growth rather than presenting a more balanced viewpoint to include other very important aspects of the country's development. For this reason we, the members of the Aid Effectiveness and Development Effectiveness Subcommittee of Korea Civil Society Forum on International Development Cooperation (KoFID), are expressing concern over the unilateral attempt of Korean government to promote its development experience to partner countries without presenting a balanced analysis and evaluation. It is our view that reinterpretation of Korea's development experience from the perspective of the civil society is therefore required.

1. KOREA AS AN EXEMPLARY MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY.

In the aftermath of the Korean War, Korea was one of the world's poorest countries, with only \$64 per capita income. However, within only about 50 years, Korea has been transformed into an advanced donor country and has joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This remarkable feat has drawn the world's attention. Many partner countries¹ expressing their intention to benchmark Korea's development experience, while advanced countries and international organizations, such as the OECD and the UN, expect Korea to act as a bridge between developed and developing countries in the future development cooperation architecture.

The Korean government, which clearly demonstrated its country's success in development aid in the 20th century, has now become the most preferred development model for developing countries of the 21st century. In 'ODA Strategy (2011-2015)', strategies were set down whereby Korea's successes in the field of development cooperation could be systematized for the purpose of creating development cooperation to be shared with partner countries. In accordance with such strategies, both the Ministry of

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¹ This issue briefs used the term 'partner country' instead of recipient country.

Strategy and Finance and the Korea Development Institute (KDI) are engaged in planning a program entitled 'Knowledge Sharing Program' (KSP), aimed at offering policy consultation to partner countries based on Korea's experience of economic growth. KDI is planning to modulate the development experience of Korea through the KSP, presenting a total of 100 case studies by 2012. This is augmented by other projects aimed at disseminating knowledge gained from Korea's development experiences, such as rural development projects based on the 'New Community (*Saemaul Undong*) Movement,' training in agricultural skills, and human resource development through vocational training.

Since the Seoul G20 summit of 2010, the Korean government has become more involved in presenting Korean-style development experiences to developing countries. The presentation of a new development model at this HLF-4, aimed at improving the effectiveness of international development cooperation will greatly add to Korea's national prestige. However, its emphasis is mainly on economic development and growth. It fails to reflect other aspects of development in Korea, and there is little reference to the numerous social phenomena accompanying this economic growth. In addition, little has been analyzed with regard to the importance of historical context (both internal and external) in explaining Korean successes. In the light of this unbalanced picture regarding Korea's development experience, the intention to impose such a limited scope of experiences on partner countries needs to be carefully reconsidered.

This article will examine the background to Korea's development and consider the effects of this progress on Korean society at each stage. It will also discuss whether the factors of the development experiences of Korea can be applied to the contemporary context of international development cooperation. This reinterpretation of

the Korean experience and its conclusions will be useful not only for the traditional development players, but also for the many participants which include members of civil society organizations, private foundations and enterprises.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF KOREA AND ITS HISTORICAL PARTICULARITY

[1] A wider holistic approach to understanding Korea's historical development.

There are various answers to the question of what made Korea's rapid development possible.

The Korean government has mainly focused on the role of its presidential leadership which fostered strong economic development according to effective economic policies and run by efficient state bodies. The critical factors behind Korean development were seen to be industrialization-oriented policies and economic doctrines of 'Growth before Distribution', as well as heavy investment in national infrastructure based on the rationale of 'Selection and Concentration'. It is claimed that if partner countries can emulate these factors, they too, can achieve national development. But little has been mentioned either about Korea's specific history or the impact of external events on the country's successful development.

[2] Korea's development is tied to US foreign and domestic policy

Academics studying the earlier phase of Korea's development emphasize that a discussion of Korean economic growth is meaningless without proper consideration of the complex relationship between Korea and the United States of America: in other words, Korean development has been inextricably linked to the military, economic and internal policies of America.² The United States has traditionally been the biggest donor to South Korea, offering approximately 60 billion dollars during the period from 1946 to 1978 in the form of

2 Kim, J. H. (1998) US aid to Korea and Korea's Fiscal and Monetary Policy in 1950. *Economy and Society*: Vol. 1. Page(s): 7-249
 Rhyu, S. Y. (2002) Korea's Economic Development and Korea-U.S Relations in the 1960s: The Triple-Layered Mechanism. *Journal of Korea political science Association*: Vol. 36. No. 3. Page(s): 223-244
 Hong, S. K. (2000) Korean Economy and economic order of Neo-liberalism. *World Politics and Economy* 7
www.usc.or.kr/iwpe

both grant aid and loans.³ (In the same period, the total amount of aid provided by the United States was 68.9 billion dollars to nations on the African continent and 140.8 billion dollars to countries in Latin America. A comparison of these figures shows the enormous sums offered in aid to one single small country: South Korea.)⁴

One of the most critical factors behind this American support was South Korea's geopolitical significance during the Cold War as a result of its location between China, North Korea, and Japan. The Cold War period following World War II and the US failure in the Vietnam War both determined the US policy of defending South Korea against communism. This was the major drive behind American support and as a result, South Korea was the biggest beneficiary of Cold War aid.

[3] The impact of the Korean-Japanese relationship: claim funds in reparations from Japan.

Another important factor impacting on Korea's growth was the complex relationship between Korea and Japan. With the decline in aid from the US in the mid-1960s, the Korean government urgently needed to find alternative sources of funding. This led to the push for normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965, as well as to property claims against Japan as compensation for Japanese colonial rule during 1910-1945. Japan became the second largest donor to Korea after the United States. It offered the total sum of 50.5 billion dollars in the form of grants and loans, much of which funded the establishment of the country's social and economic infrastructure.⁵

Korea's claim funds against Japan consisted of 300 million dollars of long-term loans at low interest rates and 200 million dollars in grant aid funding. Originally, these funds were intended to be invested in primary industries such as agriculture and fisheries. However, much came to be used to salvage large national operations such as the *Pohang Steel Mill* and *Kyungbu Highway* when

these suffered financial difficulty. (119.5 million dollars, accounting for 24% of the total property claim fund, was invested in the first phase of building the *Pohang Steel Mill*. Building the *Kyungbu Highway* also took another 6.9 million dollars from the fund.⁶) The Korean government's use of the extensive compensation funds provided by the Japanese government to finance the two symbols of Korean economic development, *Pohang Steel Mill* and *Kyungbu Highway*, has so far received little mention.

[4] Korea's situation regarding the receiving of aid and its allocation

The combined aid from the US and Japan accounts for 90% of total aid received by Korea⁷ and as a result of such a degree of concentration, very little mediation was required between Korea and the donor countries. This is very different from the situation of partner countries which receive aid in various forms from numerous donor countries and multilateral aid agencies.

In the early stage of economic development, few civil society organizations or agencies existed to receive the aid, leaving its allocation exclusively to the government. As a result, economic development focused on industrialization, the emphasis being on heavy industry and the establishment of infrastructure.

This article wishes to emphasize the fact that the situation in Korea at that time was very different from that of partner countries in the present context of international development cooperation. Currently, there are many government departments, agencies, civil society organizations and enterprises offering sporadic aid in each particular country. Channels for receiving and utilizing aid in partner countries are becoming more diversified, aggravating the problem of aid fragmentation. Thus, the opinion expressed in this article is that without a proper understanding of the historical background which allowed the Korean government to successfully

3 Lee, K. K. (2004) Development aid and cooperation for South Korea-Study on the scale, sector and effect of aid, KOICA. Page(s): 75

4 Giovanni, A. (2002) The African Crisis: World Systemic and Regional Aspects. *New Left Review* 15. Page(s): 5-36.

5 Lee, K. K. (2004) Page(s): 63

6 Lee, K. K. (2004) Page(s): 89-90

7 Lee, K. K. (2004) Page(s): 75

utilize the aid it received, unilateral imposition of the Korean experience on partner countries is dangerous.

(5) The security threat from North Korea and the need to build up a wealthier and more powerful South Korean nation

Another important factor that needs to be considered in addressing the development process of South Korea is that of national security with regard to the relationship with North Korea. Immediately after the Korean War, South Korea was socially and economically behind North Korea. National unity was required for the country to catch up with its northern neighbor. With the discovery of the 1st and 2nd underground tunnels in 1974 and 1975, built by North Korea for the purpose of infiltration and ambush attacks against South Korea, the threat from North Korea received serious attention.⁸ International concerns intensified following the fall of Vietnam and Cambodia to the communists, triggering the very real fear of the 'Domino Theory', by which countries would fall to the communists one after another.⁹ In the worsening security situation and the threat of confrontation with North Korea, President Park, Jung Hee's regime established a policy of state-led development under the banner of anticommunism, national prosperity and military power.

(6) How the current situation differs from past Korean development.

As mentioned previously, Korean development fostered by a strong centralized government was a consequence of its domestic history, its international ties with the US and Japan, and the complex relationship with North Korea. As mentioned above, this was very different from the current social, economic and political situations of the partner countries. Thus, the impact of historical

events and international ties with the US, Japan and North Korea on Korean development should be comprehensively studied when considering Korea's successful development, and its designation as a model for partner countries needs to be carefully reviewed.

3. THE SHADOW OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH

(1) Beneath the industrialization-oriented, unbalanced growth strategy

Following the 2010 G20 Seoul Global Summit and the 2011 G20 High Level Development Working Group, it was thought that Korea's successful economic development model could be an excellent example for developing countries, particularly the features of export-driven, growth-oriented policies and a development economy.¹⁰ The majority of studies have pointed out that the main thrust of Korea's rapid economic growth was its concentration on export-oriented industrialization, heavy industry and growth strategies that put the conglomerate and the large company first.¹¹ Such characteristics can be connotatively expressed as "outside-oriented, industrialization-centered imbalanced growth strategy." But such a strategy has had many negative impacts which are still continuing today.

(2) Korea's industrial imbalance

In the early stages of Korean development, the overnment's development strategy focused mainly on export-driven light industries already in existence thanks to American aid. These were the so-called 'three white (wheat flour, sugar, cotton) industries' which were labor intensive and paid low wages. During President Park, Jung Hee's regime, the economic focus changed to the establishment of heavy industries such as steel, machinery,

8 Kim, C. R. (2006) From Despair to Hope. Economic Policy-making in Korea. 1945-1979. Random House Korea. page(s):427-472

9 Bae, G. C. (1988) The Nixon Doctrine and the appearance of Eastern Asian Authoritarian System - Comparative Analysis between South Korea, Philippines and Indonesia' Korea Political Science Journal 22. No.2. page(s): 7-367

10 In the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit, the Secretary-General of the World Bank, Mr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala said 'Korea's economic development model can be a good example for low income countries', expressing his opinion that the Korean development model could be shared with developing countries. On the same day in a joint press conference with the G20 Preparatory Committee and the World Bank on development issue, he summarized three characteristics of Korean development model as following: promotion of export-driven industry, open economic system, and enormous investment (Dong-A Economy, 2010.06.04, <G20>. 'Korea's development experience is a lesson for developing countries')

11 Hasan, P. (2011) Korean Development, 1973-84: A World Bank Economist Remembers and Reflects. Korea Development Institute. Working Paper 2011-01; Kim, C. (2011) From Despair to Hope: Economic Policy making in Korea 1945-1979. Seoul: Korea Development Institute(KDI); Lee, K. K. (2004)

automobiles, shipbuilding and petro-chemicals. However, in the latter phase of Park's regime, excessive investment in heavy industry caused shortages of products from light industries, indicating an imbalance between the different kinds of manufacturing. Excessive investment and support for heavy industry also caused over-investment in the industrial sector and prevented efficient use of resources. The problems of imbalance in growth strategy and overinvestment still remain and as such, hinder the country's overall economic development.¹²

(3) Adverse effects of fostering large enterprises and conglomerate-centered industries

The Korean government has strategically pursued policies intended to foster a limited number of enterprises for economic growth. After the Korean War, the Korean government developed the so-called 'three white industries' (based upon the aid in goods offered by the US) as well as establishing and concentrating on heavy industry. Massive financial assistance, certificates of payment for foreign loans and tax privileges were offered for companies that followed its policies. By means of these benefits, some of the companies enterprises expanded rapidly into huge corporate groups or conglomerates (called *chaebol* in Korean). While acknowledging their role in the forefront of Korea's economic growth, one must also recognize that the imbalance resulting from over-reliance on these *chaebols* is a serious problem facing the Korean economy today.

Firstly, some *chaebols* have exploited their monopoly status, leading to increasing economic inequality and a widening of the income gap

between the rich and the poor. Secondly, the close relationship between political and business circles has aggravated corruption and allied problems. Thirdly, economic policies prioritizing the large conglomerates has weakened the competitive power of small and medium sized enterprises, thus diminishing diversity within the economy. Consequently, abnormal relationships in which smaller enterprises are subordinated to large conglomerates have been perpetuated in the economic system.¹³ Such issues are already undermining the growth potential of the Korean economy. The limited domestic market and the encroachment of large conglomerates into territory once occupied by smaller businesses have made it more difficult to find an alternative drive for economic growth in Korea.

(4) Speculation in real estate and unstable price fluctuations

The development policies with their emphasis on growth and heavy investment in building and other facilities gave rise to overheated speculation in real estate and to unplanned development and unstable price fluctuations. Inflation rose with cumulative budgetary expansion, increasing public debt and looser control over financial funds. In the 1960s and 1970s, the consumer price index in the city of Seoul recorded rapid double digit increases every year, causing financial hardship for the average wage-earner. In 1970s, the zigzag trend of economic booms followed by sudden recession escalated inflation and aggravated the balance of payments deficit. Continuing inflation encouraged speculation in real estate rather than savings, resulting in increasing difficulties for those in actual need of housing and undermining the country's

Table 1. Consumer price fluctuation in Seoul, Korea

Inflation rate	'63	'64	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75
	20.7%	26.5%	13.6%	12.0%	10.9%	10.8%	12.8%	15.5%	No Data Available	11.7%	No Data Available	24.3%	25.7%

(Source: Economic Policies of President Park Jung Hee's regime in 1960s)¹⁴

¹² Kang, J. M. (2002) Walking down Korean Modern History - 1970.

¹³ Seok, H. Y. (2008) Reading History of Korean Economy by stories.

¹⁴ Based on the online page; <http://blog.naver.com/koguryou?Redirect=Log&logNo=90004234768>

¹⁵ History Research Institute (2004) Mayday: 100 years of History.

growth potential and competitiveness in the international market. Inflation and speculation in real estate still remain chronic problems in Korea's economy today.

(5) Labor problems and social issues affecting the weaker members of society


The rapid industrialization of the 1960s and the accompanying urbanization (and exodus from agricultural areas) led to labor problems and to social issues affecting the vulnerable members of society. Under the economic rationale of 'Growth before Distribution', implementation of policies based on low pay and long work hours were encouraged. In the 1970s, urban workers had to work 17 hours a day in poor working conditions for which they received low wages (often not paid on time) and inhumane treatment. Public attention was only drawn to their plight when Mr. Jeon, Tae-

il set himself on fire. And despite the rapid economic growth in the 1960s and the 1970s, the net income of workers decreased in relation to the total national income, illustrating the social inequalities within Korea.¹⁵

4. THE ROLE OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Experts on Korean development have pointed to effective development policies and strategies as well as to strong ownership with firm political leadership at the head of a well-run government as critical factors contributing to Korea's success.¹⁶ It is constantly stressed that the role of government with its 'top-down' system was a major factor behind this rapid growth. However, what has been little appreciated is the driving force of 'bottom-up'

Figure 2: Weekly work hours and accident rate in industry



(Source: History Research Institute (2004) Mayday: 100 years of History)

14 Based on the online page; <http://blog.naver.com/koguryou?Redirect=Log&logNo=90004234768>

15 History Research Institute (2004) Mayday: 100 years of History.

16 Hasan, P. (2011); Kim, C. (2011); Yoon, T. (2011); Lee, K. K (2004)

growth, mainly from the civil society, which contributed as much to this success as did government development policies. Approaching the experiences of Korea in a more balanced way to include both economic growth and social development could be useful for partner countries to gain a different, more holistic perspective.

[1] Popular support for democratization

Korea is considered a rare example of a country achieving economic growth simultaneous with democratization. In actual fact, however, during President Park, Jung Hee's regime, the process of democratization was delayed at the expense of advancing industrialization and economic growth. Although this economic growth had many positive effects, the government's repressive measures involved much suffering on the part of workers and farmers who had to wait longer for democratic rights.

Korea eventually became a democracy in 1987, beginning a period of political stability with greater political rights and civil liberties, more efficient and transparent governance in government and society in general. These advances have been praised as the means by which the Korean economy has been able to deal with changes at the international level, both the Korean economic index and political situation showing improvement since Park's regime in the 1980s.¹⁷

Following the financial crisis of 1997, many criticisms were leveled against the Park government's development plans,¹⁸ stating that the Korean model of government-driven economic development (based on the particularities of the Korean context) no longer

fit into the changing international scene. It is suggested that the present approach of emphasizing the success of a government-led economy needs to be re-examined. In sharing Korea's experiences with partner countries, it must be remembered that such rapid economic growth was accompanied by political democratization, which qualitatively improved such growth, in that it made the whole progress more sustainable.

[2] The contribution of the civil society to Korea's development

If the earlier stage of the country's progress can be described as a model of government-centered development, the latter phase after the 1970s and 1980s can be seen as its transformation into a model of social development arising from the process of democratization and the growth of civil society. The contribution of the general population towards Korea's development and the sacrifices they made cannot be emphasized enough.

Korea's civil society developed with the growth of civil society organizations. In the 1960s (see Table 3), activities by civil society organizations were mainly focused on economics. In the 1970s and 1980s these diversified to include religious, labor, local authority and culture. After the liberation from the Japanese rule in 1945 and until the appearance of President Park, Jung Hee's regime, each field of interest formed a separate group. Many academies and societies were formed during this relatively liberal period, specializing in politics, administration, economics, sociology, law, linguistics, literature, stockbreeding and history.

Table 2: Change of income share of each class in total income

	1965	1970	1976	1980	1982	1985
Upper 20%	41.5	41.6	45.3	45.4	43.0	43.6
Middle 40%	38.9	38.8	37.8	38.5	38.2	38.6
Lower 40%	19.3	19.6	16.9	16.1	18.8	17.7

(Source: Dong-A Ilbo, 1987 01. 23)

¹⁷ Lim, Hyuk Baek. 'Democracy of Korea and economic development after democratization' http://www.koreabrand.net/kr/know/know_view.do?CATE_CD=0007&SEQ=937

¹⁸ Buchholz, T. G. (2009) *New Ideas from Dead Economists*, (Translated by Lee, Seung Hwan).

Park's regime saw a decline in the number of these organizations, an indication of the president's repressive policy against these groups.¹⁹ On the other hand, there was a marked increase in the number of social groups that were both pro-government and pro-commerce and industry in nature. (Roughly 143 groups were set up, around 36% active at any one time.)²⁰ Rapid economic growth and industrialization during this period had many adverse effects: deplorable working conditions, abuse of power, infringements and social inequality. This led to active involvement by pro-active organizations, particularly those with a religious or progressive background like the Korean Christians who utilized their resources to improve the quality of life, particularly that of the workers. Their open support

of the general population brought them into increasing conflict with the government and served to accelerate the move towards democracy.

The 1970s were characterized by rapid industrialization and urbanization with people migrating from agricultural areas to the cities in the hope of finding work. Urban centers quickly suffered from overcrowding, and limited opportunities for employment and housing led to widespread discontent over the lack of basic living conditions.

The 1980s, during President Chun, Doo-Hwan's regime, saw diversification of their activities by social and civil groups. Whereas the popular movements of the 1970s had challenged the military regime, they now began to deal with the issues of human rights and labor problems, leading the movement towards democracy and the

Table 3: Proportion of civil society organizations founded each year

classification	Civil Society	Community Association	Social Service	Environment	Culture	Education/Scholarship	Religion	Labor	Economy	International Affairs	Total
1940~49	2.02	0	1.83	0.56	0.77	8	2.5	2.43	0	0	1.78
1950~59	1.79	0	13.3	0	2.81	0.8	0	3.64	0	5.13	5.59
1960~69	4.26	0.48	7.42	0.56	7.93	4.8	12.5	8.5	16.7	10.3	5.73
1970~79	6.61	0.48	4.83	2.53	5.88	3.2	16.3	12.2	0	15.4	5.73
1980~89	15.1	7.69	22.1	5.62	18.16	25.6	25	21.5	0	20.5	17.5
1990~99	53	69.7	40.7	66	51.15	47.2	37.5	40.9	66.7	43.6	49.4
2000	7.06	8.65	5.83	11.8	4.86	1.6	2.5	3.24	0	2.56	6.35
2001	6.73	5.29	3.25	8.71	4.86	4	3.75	3.64	16.7	0	5.02
2002	3.36	7.69	0.83	4.21	3.58	4.8	0	4.05	0	2.56	2.88

(Source: Citizen Newspaper '2003 conspectus of Civil Society Organization', '2004 Korean Civil Society Almanac' page(s): 24)

Table 4: Percentage of civil society organizations founded in each specific field

Year of Establishment	Politics	Human Rights	Environment	Civil Society	Gender	Youth	Disabled population
Before 1960	3.9	0	0	1.4	13.3	4.4	5.0
1961 ~ 1970	2.0	3.5	2.8	0	11.1	0	1.7
1971 ~ 1979	3.9	3.5	4.2	1.4	4.5	3.3	5.8
1980 ~ 1986	17.7	13.9	1.4	8.5	11.1	2.2	21.5
1987 ~ 1992	35.3	20.7	37.5	25.4	35.6	40.2	46.3
1993 ~ 1996	35.3	44.8	51.4	62.0	24.5	48.9	21.5

(Source: Kim, H. R. (1997.10) Globalization and development plan for Korean NGOs. Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice Seminar manuscript)

19 Movement for actualizing Christian Ethics (1999.08.16) Theory of Christian Citizen Movement - Growth of Civil Society and Social Movement.
20 Kim, H. R. (1997.10) Globalization and development plan for Korean NGOs. Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice Seminar manuscript.


establishment of a fairer, more open society. With the Pro-democratic resistance movement in June 1987, Korean civil society rapidly entered various fields: socially pro-active, environmental and youth movements which concerned themselves with existing problems and bringing about change. (see Table 4)

Much attention has been paid to a recent study that supports this holistic approach regarding Korean development. In October 2011, Professor Peter B. Evans, (co-author of a joint study by the KOICA and the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) entitled 'Making International Development Cooperation Effective; Lessons from the Korean Development Experiences') presented the results of the study.

He noted that the particularity of Korea's development experiences was derived from the development of civil society and its enhancement by strong human resources. In a comparison of the relative social inequalities in Korea and Taiwan, South Africa and Brazil, China and the US indicated by changes in the Gini Coefficient from 1975 to 2008 (see Figure 3), he concluded that in Korea, social inequality had been reduced due to the development of the country's civil society together with greater accessibility to political power and policy.²¹

The lesson to be learned from Korea's development experience and shared with partner countries is that enhanced capacity and participation from the civil society leads to more effective development.²²

Figure 3: Social Inequality indicated in the changes in the Gini Coefficient from 1975 to 2008



(Source: KOICA&UNRISD (2011)

Making International Development Cooperation Effective: Lessons from the Korean Development Experiences.)

This study provides a more balanced perspective with regard to the Korean development experience which till now has been seen as merely the result of economic growth and strong government leadership.

present its success objectively and with due modesty. For their part, the partner countries should carefully review the Korean success and use it as a reference for their own development.

5. CONCLUSION

As has been pointed out, the development experience of Korea cannot be explained by only one factor. It needs wider, more holistic interpretations. An understanding of the internal and external historical forces that affected the country is essential. So too, is an understanding of the co-existence between 'top-down' developments led by strong government-driven leadership and active 'bottom-up' participation by the local population and civil society in this process. The role of the civil society must not be underestimated in the economic 'Miracle of Han Rive' carried out by an authoritarian regime. Decades of suffering and sacrifice were endured by most of the population: the small business people, laborers and farmers. It was their push for a democratic civil society in Korea that lay behind the stable development of the country.

In the 'KoFID Position Paper' of September 2011, the KoFID defined development as a complicated process embracing the various societal elements of economics, social welfare and human rights, politics, culture and environment under the umbrella of peace and democracy. It also urged the creation of a partner-country-centered development cooperation paradigm based on the multi-faceted aspects of development, yet at the same time taking into account the specific situational context of partner countries.

It is suggested that in order to understand partner countries and to act as a true bridge between the developed and the developing countries, the Korean government should make a comprehensive assessment of Korea's development experience and

21 The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion developed by the Italian statistician and sociologist Corrado Gini. It is used for measuring the inequality of a distribution.

22 KOICA. UN Research Institute for Social Development. (2011) Making International Development Cooperation Effective: Lessons from the Korean Development Experiences, page(s): 62-66

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
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KoFID

KoFID (Korea Civil Society Forum on International Development Cooperation) is a Korean network of civil society organizations to promote effective aid and development cooperation. KoFID works as a steering organization of BetterAid and Open Forum for CSO development Effectiveness. KoFID was established on 29th of September, 2010 by consultation among leading Korean civil society organizations. It has played as local organizing committee for the Global Civil Society Forum at the OECD 4th High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness.

ReDI

ReDI (Re-shaping Development Institute) is an independent think tank in the field of international development cooperation. ReDI aims at developing strategies for sustainable development and poverty eradication, presenting international development cooperation principles based on peace, human rights, equality and global justice, and contributing to global solidarity and cooperation by providing alternative ideas for international development cooperation. ReDI is publicizing "KoFID Issue Brief" series.

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(PSPD: People's Solidarity for
 Participatory Democracy)

CHOI, Jinkyung

(COPION: COoperation and Participation
 In Overseas NGOs)

HONG, Moon Suk

(ReDI: Re-shaping Development
 Institute)

KANG, Hanees

(ReDI: Re-shaping Development
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KIM, Boram (Asian Bridge)

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(GCS: Global Civic Sharing)

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