

## Balkan Civic Practices # 8




BALKAN  
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# DONORS' STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES IN CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT IN THE BALKANS

**CIVIL SOCIETY: LOST IN TRANSLATION?**





Balkan Civic Practices # 8

# **Donors' Strategies and Practices in Civil Society Development in the Balkans**

## **Civil Society: Lost in Translation?**

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## List of abbreviations

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ADA	Austrian Development Agency
BTD	Balkan Trust for Democracy
CSDev	Civil society development
CS Mott Foundation	Charles Stewart Mott Foundation
CSO	Civil society organization
DFID	Department for International Development
EC	European Commission
EFB	European Fund for the Balkans
EU	European Union
EUD	Delegation of the European Union
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
KAS	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
MS	Member State
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NDI	National Democratic Institute
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSI	Foundation Open Society Institute
OSI TTF	Open Society Institute Think Tank Fund
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
QMUL	Queen Mary, University of London
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme

## 1. Introduction

International donor involvement in the Western Balkans began two decades ago in response to the rapid and often violent transitions in the region from authoritarian socialist regimes to states gradually developing political and economic systems similar to their neighbours in Western Europe. During this period, there have been attempts in every country to co-ordinate the activities of international donor agencies and host country governments, including civil society support. However, as in other sectors, there is a gap in the substantive participation of local stakeholders, i.e. civil society organisations (CSOs) and other actors in shaping priorities for civil society development (CSDDev) in their countries.

With donor activities gradually directed to other parts of the world, compounded by the global financial crisis, and local apathy and distrust of CSOs, CSDDev in the Western Balkans has become particularly challenging. While general studies<sup>1</sup> on donor strategies and practices in civil society development exist, there is no overarching study till this day looking at donor strategies and practices in CSDDev in the Balkans. At this critical time, it is important to take stock of the past and current strategies, practices and priorities of international donors to provide an accurate regional description of donor-led CSDDev in the region, to identify lessons learnt and not learnt, and to suggest ways to improve the current situation to foster long-term sustainability of the civil society sector in the Western Balkans.

<sup>1</sup> Janice Giffen and Ruth Judge, *Civil Society Policy and Practice in Donor Agencies*, May 2010, INTRAC, <http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/681/Civil-Society-Policy-and-Practice-in-Donor-Agencies.pdf>

The following chapter will describe the specific research aim. Chapter 3 describes the methodology used in the research. Chapter 4 presents the research findings steaming out of the survey and the interviews. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and recommendations and the last Chapter 6 outlines the specific implications and challenges for the EU.

## 2. The research aim

This research started off with a very general and modest endeavor at verifying some of the most pertinent issues preoccupying CSOs in their daily work and based on that attempt to lay out the main arguments to CSDDev donors on the state and needs of support to the work of CSOs in the Western Balkans.

The research attempted to answer the following questions:

- What is the donors understanding of CSDDev? Are they supporting it as a value in itself or is this used as a method to address other reform areas and issues?
- What is the proportion between supporting watchdog activities, capacity-building, networking?
- What is the most common methodology used for support (i.e. project grants, tenders)? How often is re-granting used/ allowed?
- What overlaps, duplications or even conflicts between donors funding CSDDev exists? Are there any synergies and best practices, esp. in the role of small donors, “pooled funding”?
- Is there real collaboration between donors and local stakeholders, esp. local CSOs? If so, in which phase is it (i.e. design, implementation, evaluation)?
- Assess donor strategies from the point of view of how they value the networking, knowledge (know-how) value of CSOs.

## 3. Methodology

This research started off with the most overwhelming sources of information on the issue available to the public, i.e. donor databases<sup>2</sup> run either by Governments or in some cases by CSOs. However, the donor databases do not provide an overarching access and same methodology of data collection<sup>3</sup> concerning funding for CSDev. Therefore, the research team employed standardized questionnaire and interviews as the most appropriate methods of gathering data for the needs of this research.

### 3.1. Questionnaire

A standardized web-based questionnaire<sup>4</sup> addressed to donors was developed. The aim was to collect both quantitative and qualitative comparable data from main donors present in the region supporting CSDev. The questionnaire was divided into 4 sections:

- Respondents profile and experience in the donor organization since the attitudinal questions asked in the following sections were assumed to be related to the person's role within the donor organization, and the amount of experience he/she had in the region;
- Information about activities of the donor organization, years of operation in the region/country, annual budget by country and year, types of assistance (e.g. financial, technical, etc.), and attitudes/experience in working with CSOs in the region;
- Information about the relationships with other donor organizations; and

- Experience and relationship with CSOs in the region.

Although most of the questions were not open-ended, several of them allowed for several answers to be chosen and two open questions on best practices and needs and priorities were included to allow for a more narrative or expository response.

The questionnaire was administered to the headquarters and in-country offices (if existent) of main international donors active in the Western Balkans countries. The initial database contained 62 contacts from different multilateral donors, 57 bilateral development agencies, 78 private foundations, and two pooled donors. Donors present in at least one of the countries of the Western Balkans, i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, either through an in-country office or headquarters outside the region, were targeted. The first cycle of survey requests were sent via e-mail on 15<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> June, 2011 with regular reminder e-mail messages to potential respondents every 10-15 days till beginning of September 2011. The final list of respondents includes 48 main multilateral (EU, UNDP, OSCE), bilateral (USAID, SIDA, DFID, GIZ), private and pooled (OSI, ERSTE Foundation, Robert Bosch Stiftung, CS Mott Foundation, King Baudouin Foundation, EFB, NED, BTM, Westminster Foundation for Democracy) donors, which were then used for analysis presented in Chapter 4.1..

### 3.2. Interviews

The aim of the interviews was to enable gathering of additional qualitative data or data not shared by donor organizations participating to the web survey such as annual budgets and specific activities and methods used to support CSDev. Also, the

<sup>2</sup> See [www.balkancsd.net](http://www.balkancsd.net) for an overview of existing donor databases.

<sup>3</sup> Full analysis and problems of comparing donor database is available on [www.balkancsd.net](http://www.balkancsd.net).

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.ecobhas.qmul.ac.uk/BCSDN/donorquestionnairebtdproject.html>



interviews targeted to reach those donor organizations that did not participate to the survey, but were of importance to the research. The information was gathered on the overall amounts of funding, the proportion of funding allocated to civil society development; specific initiatives and issue focus; and target recipients.

Respondents were asked to provide budget information for the period 2010-11, but to forecast changes and to identify initiatives that had ceased or were about to end. Data was checked and cross-referenced with published information from websites and annual reports. Respondents were asked whether their organization prioritized various themes and strategies, and to answer “Yes” or “No”, or to state that a theme or focus was “cross-cutting” (CC), i.e. was an outcome of other assistance initiatives, or was an objective that ran through all strategies (e.g. gender mainstreaming, concern for the environment, youth etc.)

Drawing on Carothers<sup>5</sup> conceptualization of a political vs. developmental approach, the activities reported in interviews were classified into donor maps<sup>6</sup> for each country. A *political* approach is defined as assistance geared towards ensuring that democrats are securely in power and to consolidate their power vis-à-vis non-democrats, and to achieve this by directing aid towards key political institutions and processes, including advocacy-oriented CSOs<sup>7</sup> - the following priorities are classified as specifically characteristic of a **“political” approach**:

- (i) institution building (including support for political elites and political parties);
- (ii) capacity building and technical

assistance for government and state agencies.

Drawing also on Carothers’ conceptualization of a *developmental* approach “look(ing) beyond an exclusively political definition of democracy to broader conceptions that incorporate socioeconomic concerns”<sup>8</sup>, and based on the notion that support channeled through civil society rather than elites is essentially characteristic of a developmental approach to democracy promotion that sees change as “a slow, iterative process, measured in decades and marked by the gradual accumulation of small gains”<sup>9</sup>, the following priorities are classified as specifically **“developmental”** insofar as they focus either on longer-term socio-economic development, on local community development, or aspects of democratic consolidation:

- (i) economic and private sector development;
- (ii) assistance for local community organizations/CSOs and CSO networks;
- (iii) strengthening civil society – core funding, institution building (block grants rather than just project funding);
- (iv) environment;
- (v) minority rights and inter-ethnic co-operation;
- (vi) infrastructure development;
- (vii) youth and education and
- (viii) service provision.

Regional co-operation and development; media development and support are deemed to be potentially a mix of political, developmental and governance-oriented approaches insofar as they may involve support for elite institutions and/or civil

5 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental”, in *Journal of Democracy* vol.20, no.1, January 2009 pp.5–6.

6 Donor maps and their analysis are presented in Chapter 4.2.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 6–8.

8 *Ibid.*, p.8.

9 *Ibid.*

society assistance, or focus on building the relationship between sectors across the region. Information relating to the specific activity being supported were included, where available, in the footnotes of the donor maps.

### **Governance-oriented strategies**

include measures and initiatives designed specifically to build the partnership between sectors and to deliver a shift in hierarchies and the augmentation of the roles of non-state actors so as to increase their deliberative power and influence. In terms of categories for this research, governance objectives are deemed to include:

- (i) training ministries to engage non-state and private actors; and
- (ii) training civil society to engage state agencies.

Wherever possible donors were asked to elaborate on their initiatives in order to better identify the nature and focus of the provision and qualifying information is presented below the donor maps in footnotes.

Categorizing initiatives is not straightforward: some funding initiatives are ambiguous in terms of what they seek to achieve, others are interpreted and understood differently by certain donors, or are not easily categorized. For example, technical assistance for civil society may involve advocacy training to enable elite-focused CSOs to lobby parliament (*political*), or result in building the basic capacities of enmeshed local networks and nascent organizations to facilitate social and economic development (*developmental*); the impact may also help support the interaction between CSOs and

state ministries (governance-oriented). Again, it is only through qualitative interviews that such information is revealed and thus, the exact focus iterated and the qualifying information, where appropriate and necessary, is provided as a footnote.

Finally, the respondents were specifically asked to elaborate on their organization's provision of support for civil society so as to identify whether this involved working with political parties (*political*), with citizen organizations (*developmental*), or directly with government/state agencies (*governance-oriented*). Similarly, more information was sought with regard to regional co-operation initiatives insofar as it is acknowledged that these may involve government-to-government initiatives (more *political*), CSO to CSO co-operation and networking (*developmental*), or multi-level interaction around specific policies and initiatives (*governance-oriented*).

**Table 1: Categorization of donor activities**

Environment	Funding for environmental clean-up programmes; education and awareness campaigns; environmental organisations working on “green” projects	<b>Developmental focus</b>
Assistance for local community / CSOs / CSO networks	Specific assistance made available for local (as opposed to national level) organisations and networks – training, project funding, facilitating co-operation etc.	<b>Developmental focus</b>
Capacity / technical assistance for civil society	Training specifically for CSO / NGOs; network development at local or national level.	<b>Developmental focus</b>
Economic and private sector development (incl. rural development)	Programmes designed to boost employment, engender entrepreneurialism and support trades, crafts and other economic sectors.	<b>Developmental focus</b>
Minority rights and inter-ethnic co-operation (including Roma)	Support for NGOs/CSOs working with ethnic minority communities; support for advocacy; training and the facilitation of dialogue	<b>Developmental focus</b>
Youth and education (including funds for NGOs and training schemes)	Programmes designed to engage young people in a range of activities from sport to political leadership.	<b>Developmental focus</b>
Service provision	Direct provision of financial assistance for social and economic services such as credit facilities, health care, schools etc.	<b>Developmental focus</b>
Infrastructure (water, energy, transport)	Direct provision, or funds channelled through intermediaries, for the development of physical infrastructure	<b>Developmental focus</b>
Strengthening civil society – core funding, institutions	Assistance for the institutions of civil society, usually in the form of core funding for organisations (as oppose to short-term project grants); resources not targeted towards particular projects and money that can be used to build the organisation (salaries, rents, equipment)	<b>Developmental focus</b>
Training ministries to engage non-state actors (NSAs)	Assistance specifically geared towards engaging government and state actors with NGOs / CSOs / private sector, and building relations between	<b>Governance</b>
Training civil NSAs to engage with ministries and state actors	Assistance specifically geared towards engaging NGOs / CSOs / private sector with government, ministries, state agencies, and building relations between	<b>Governance</b>
Regional co-operation and development assistance	Programmes and initiatives specifically to stimulate and support regional co-operation (all levels)	<b>Developmental / Political / Governance</b>
Media development and support	Vocational and other training; monitoring and capacity building; advising governments and officials. But may also focus on civil society and involve training for NGOs to deliver change in content and production as core democratic institution.	<b>Political / Developmental</b>
Specific initiatives for Serb communities in north (Mitrovica and environs)	Initiatives may include training for political elites, or (more typically) support for NGO/CSO networks.	<b>Developmental / Political</b>
Institution building (including support for political elites)	Mentoring, training and support for political parties, governments (central and local), judges and law enforcement; some high-level non-governmental organisations (trade unions)	<b>Political focus</b>
Capacity / technical assistance for government	Specific aid targeted towards ministries and officials at central and local level.	<b>Political focus</b>

### 3.3. Challenges

There is no reliable, up-to-date and complete directory of donors involved in the region. A combination of sources needed to be used including donor databases, websites, BCSDN member and other CSO contacts to reach out to the widest possible number and multiple contacts as to arrive at the relevant person in each donor organization. This process was hampered by the fact that many of the donor organization have or are withdrawing and the most relevant persons were no longer available to share the information.

Of the respondents who participated, there are three types of reply that are nonetheless of interest. First, there were three potential respondents, all of whom were representatives of large bilateral or private agencies, who said that their organizations did not have the sufficient time and resources to complete the survey. Second, there were five private donors and two multi-lateral donors that indicated that although they were involved in CSDev, they did not do so in the Western Balkans. Third, there were a number of potential respondents who replied that they did not undertake donor activities.

In one case, a potential respondent clarified that this organization provided funding to organizations that would then design and implement donor activities, but the organization itself did not have a direct role in CSDev programming. A few other officials also contacted the research team to indicate that they would not participate in the study, since their activities were based around certain programmatic areas, but that there was no donor activity. Notwithstanding this challenge, 48 main donor organizations, either multilateral, bilateral or private participated to the

survey, thus giving this research an undisputable source of donor trends and practices in the region.

### 3.4. Definition of the donor

The research team has conceived the word in the broadest of terms, by referring to a donor or analyzing donor activity as any transfer of resources from the donor to recipients in the Western Balkans in aid of the development of civil society, whether that assistance is financial or non-financial. Thus, for example, if an agency organizes and leads a series of workshops for CSO capacity-building, this type of knowledge transfer falls within donor activities, even if the agency is not involved in direct financial assistance. The motivation of the donor was not investigated largely, but only by identifying strategic priorities of intervention.

It was difficult to reconstruct any characteristics of the CSDev strategies of the donor organization once it had ceased its operations, even if it was recent. For example, the research team was unable to obtain any information from the GIZ office in Albania, since it had closed in January 2011. Similarly, DFID has scaled back its operations, and currently only has one functioning office in the region, in Prishtina. More generally, with progress in the overall levels of political and social development, and donor priorities shifting to other parts of the world, many of the multilateral donors have left Croatia, and it is for this reason that Croatia is not represented in the survey data. There was no stratification by country when collecting responses, though there were responses from donors active from each country in the region. The research team was directed towards identifying and analyzing trends of different donors and possibly,

between headquarters and in-country office (if existent), rather than their country strategies.

Due to the aforementioned difficulties with collecting survey data, the research team identified and focused on a number of “priority” multilateral donors, such as the UNDP, OSCE, EC (including EUD in each country), and the World Bank. The “priority” bilateral donors included bilateral development agencies that have been most visible in the region, including USAID (USA), SIDA (Sweden), and GIZ (Germany). There were also a number of high-profile private foundations on the “priority” list, including OSI. There were 71 priority donors, of which 32 completed questionnaires. There were 16 additional responses from other organizations contacted by the research team, bringing the total number of responses to 48 (see full list in Annex 1, p. 55).

The 48 respondents were based in each of the countries in the region, as well as offices in EU Member States and the US. Although there was a question about the financial commitment in the region on the survey, many of the respondents indicated that they would not be able to include these data, since they were only available internally. Not surprisingly, the start of the involvement for most of the local offices and regional programmes in the Western Balkans began sometime between 1991 and 1996 for most of the organizations that completed the survey, which coincides with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the various conflicts in the region during this time. There were some replies from private foundations that indicated a more recent start date of operations in the Western Balkans.

Respondents were deemed to be focused on a certain country if they represented a country office or a country desk for the donor. Regional offices were deemed to be bilateral or multi-lateral donor headquarters or regional offices for donors (both within and outside the Western Balkans). For the reasons outlined above, there were no responses from Croatia. There were only two responses for Kosovo (both major bilateral donors), two for Montenegro (both major multi-lateral donors), five for Macedonia, six for Serbia, and seven each for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania. The remainder of the responses (n=19) came from offices that focused more broadly on the region. The results are shown in Table 2. Of the respondents, 19 were private foundations, 16 were bilateral development agencies, and the remaining 13 were international or multi-lateral organizations.

**Table 2: Number of respondents by country (n=48)**

Country	Frequency	%
Albania	7	14.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	7	14.6
Kosovo	2	4.2
Macedonia	5	10.4
Montenegro	2	4.1
Serbia	6	12.5
Regional	19	39.6

## 4. Research findings

### 4.1. Survey results

#### Regional consensus on main CSDev donors


There was a strong regional consensus among the respondents on the identification of the most important donors in the Western Balkans, i.e. the EC/EU and USAID. Of the 45 responses to the question of ranking donors in order of importance, 35 identified either the EC or the EU<sup>10</sup> as the most important donor, including 14 out of 18 regional offices/headquarter respondents. Of the remaining respondents, all replies from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro country offices/desk officers identified the EC/EU, and only one respondent each from Albania and Macedonia identified another donor (SIDA). Interestingly, 4 of the respondents, including both bilateral donor country offices in Kosovo, replied that USAID was the most important donor. Although there was a wider set of responses naming the second-most important donor in the region, 17 of the 44 responses identified USAID or other US governmental bilateral donors. Three of the four respondents that identified USAID as most important donor said that the EC/EU was the second-most important donor.

#### Domination of short-term project-related funding

As highlighted in previous studies on donor activities in the Western Balkans and donor-driven development more generally, international donors providing financial assistance tend to do so using competitive calls for proposals for project grants typically lasting 12-24 months. Although several commentaries have indicated that such strategies create project administration capacities instead of competencies directly related to long-term CSDev, over 80% of the respondents to the questionnaire provided short-term project grants. The second most prevalent type of financial assistance was regional/cross-national funding, which underlines donor commitments to building network or transactional capacities<sup>11</sup>. Nearly 30% of the sample funded service contracts and tenders (though it was not indicated whether this assistance was targeting private companies or CSOs). Only 26% of the respondents provided long-term core funding to recipients that were not tied to particular projects. Of the "other" responses, one respondent mentioned that the organization does not provide grants, one organization provided CSOs with opportunities as implementing partners for the organization's projects, and a few of the organizations provided "programme funding" for a long period (e.g. 5 years) which was not core funding.


<sup>10</sup> The distinction between the EC and EU meaning, that funding from EU would include also aid from bilateral development agencies from the EU MS.

<sup>11</sup> The term transactional is used as defined by Petrova and Tarrow (2007), referring to building "ties-enduring and temporary-among organized non-state actors and between them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions".

**Table 3A: What types of funding do you provide?<sup>12</sup> (n=47)****No long-term core funding provided by multilaterals**

If the sample is divided by donor type (i.e. multilateral, bilateral or private), the lack of core funding, particularly from multilateral donors is evident, whilst around one-third of the other donor types provided financial assistance not linked to specific projects.

On the other hand, nearly one-half of the multilateral respondents offered service contracts, which was higher than the proportion for private and bilateral donors. The three types of donors in the sample of respondents provided short-term and regional grants in similar proportions.

**Table 3B: What types of funding do you provide (by donor type)?<sup>13</sup>**

<sup>12</sup> Note that respondents could select as many as they felt were relevant.


<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

### Balanced prioritization between political, developmental and governance-type activities

The focus of strategies on building networking or transactional capacities is also clearly evident in responses regarding types of activities supported by donors. Over 80% of the respondents had funded network building activities, and over 85% have provided support for activities related to building stronger engagement between

CSOs and governmental institutions, i.e. policy advocacy. However, the most popular activity funded by donors remains more basic, fundamental training and capacity building for CSOs in the target countries. Some of the respondents also identified "other" areas, such as media, cultural activities, and watchdog activities.

**Table 4A: Which of the following activities have you funded?<sup>14</sup>**




In line with the findings in Table 3A and Table 3B, multilateral donors from the survey funded activities related to service provision compared to their bilateral and private donor counterparts. Interestingly, bilateral donor respondents did not

support educational activities as much as other types of donors. There were similar high levels of activity for the three other categories amongst the different respondents: training, networking and policy advocacy.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.



**Table 4B: Which of the following activities have you funded (by donor type)?<sup>15</sup>**




**Even focus on democracy-building and socio-economic reconstruction**

Donors continue to address fundamental issues of social and economic reconstruction, whilst post-materialist concerns such as nature protection are secondary. To most donors the development of capacities through training and technical assistance is of paramount importance. Democracy-building and citizen participation receive a similar level

of focus from donors. Due to the legacy of the authoritarian past and recent conflicts, the topic of marginalized groups was also indicated by two-thirds of the sample of donors. Amongst the responses for “other”, respondents identified priorities such as local development (including rural development), justice, gender/women’s issues, and transnational co-operation.

**Table 5A: What are your main funding priorities?<sup>16</sup>**




<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

Variations between different types of donors and their priorities for funding exist. Although less than one-half of the multilateral donors financially supported environmental protection, this was higher than for other types of donors. Private foundations seem to have slightly less focus on capacity building compared to the other types of donors, which could be a

function of overall capacities to implement such programmes. Although the level of support for marginalized groups as a priority seems higher for multilateral respondents, many of the “other” responses for the other types of donors mentioned women’s issues and justice, so the differences between the three types of donors is not as pronounced.

**Table 5B: What are your main funding priorities? (by donor type)<sup>17</sup>**




**Difference in perception in driving the donor priorities**

Donor priorities as summarized in Table 5A and 5B are determined, for the most part, by offices located in the region, or through a dialogue with the headquarters outside of the region. Other mechanisms for decision-making also exist: three donors rely on a board or steering committee; one on a

joint decision-making process between the donor and local partners; and one donor programme office based in the region sets priorities with the headquarters of the bilateral development agency. Just over 25% of the respondents revealed that the priorities are set by the head office.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.


**Table 6A: Who leads the development of priorities and funding in your donor organization? (n=47)**



The difference in determining donor priorities is only for private donors. This could be due to the fact that many of the foundations that participated in the survey

have headquarters offices outside the region, but do not necessarily have country offices.


**Table 6B: Who leads the development of priorities and funding in your donor organization (by donor type)?**



There are differences in answers and perceptions between country- and regional-offices respondents in setting priorities. For regional offices, the headquarters/regional office set the priorities more than the country offices. However, by contrast, officials working at the country offices and country desks

who replied to the survey largely believed that the agenda for civil society was set evenly by regional/headquarter offices and the country offices/desks. It remains to be researched what is the background for quite different perceptions and whether these create possible conflicts, or disputes over decision-making powers etc.

**Table 6C: Who leads the development of priorities and funding in your donor organization? Frequencies and column percentages are displayed. (n=47)**




**Moderate donor interaction exists, but no structured donor relationship**

Whilst respondents seem to indicate a strategy of building governance networks of CSOs and governmental institutions, both within the countries and across the region, co-operation and networking between and amongst donors is still undeveloped.

Moderate amount of donor coordination exists, but majority of them do not have a direct, structured relationship. A sizeable

proportion of the agencies that participated in the survey reported that they do not have regular contact with other international agencies working on CSDev. Although approximately 60% of respondents have regular contact with other donors (the response of “other” was by a donor that tended to meet with other donors every three months), the other 40% did not have regular interaction with other donors.


**Table 7A: Frequency of contact with other donors (n=47)**



There is some variation between the different types of donors in the sample

from the survey, but the responses are largely similar.


**Table 7B: Frequency of contact with other donors (by donor type)**



Overall, respondents indicated a moderate amount of interaction with other donors working on the Western Balkans, with none admitting that they have “no idea what other donors are doing”. However, only 34% work closely with other donors,

whilst a majority of respondents (over 60%) have some knowledge about the activities of other donors in the country and in the region, but do not have a direct, structured relationship.


**Table 8A: How would you describe your relationship with other donors? (n=47)**



If the data are now examined for the different types of donors, the proportion in the sample working closely with other donors is slightly higher for bilateral (governmental agencies), whereas a slightly higher proportion amongst multilateral donors have a good idea compared to other types of donors. This may be evidence of minor differences between multilateral and bilateral donors in the way each views and implements inter-donor coordination, i.e. higher degree of interaction and coordination between

multilateral and bilateral donors. It is possible that a pattern of interaction and coordination differentiates for EU-related donors (EC and bilateral agencies from EU MS) versus other (i.e. US-related and UN agencies). Private donors, compared with governmental and multilateral institutions, have less overall capacity, and higher proportions of these respondents know roughly or do not know the activities of other donors, compared to respondents from bilateral and multilateral donors.

**Table 8B: How would you describe your relationship with other donors (by donor type)?**




### Donor coordination is possibly functional on country level

Perceptions about inter-donor coordination also seem to vary between representatives from regional offices and those working at the country level in the sample of donors surveyed for this research. From the respondents from country offices or desks, a higher

proportion believed that donors work closely together, compared to their counterparts working in regional donor offices. This might indicate a higher degree of donor coordination and exchange on country-level.

**Table 9A: How would you describe your relationship with other donors? (n=47)**




**Positive but cautious perceptions about CSDev**

The general donor perception of the civil society sector is moderate. There were only three respondents who said that civil society was effective in the region, and no responses that civil society is non-existent. The most popular response (73%) was that civil society was donor-dependent, but that it can represent interests, and nearly two-thirds of the survey responses (63%) noted that civil society is unevenly developed and

unsustainable. Of the respondents that provided “other” responses, two mentioned that the civil society sector is divided and politicized, another response underlined that the civil society sector is constantly evolving and beginning to engage with governmental institutions in some places, and one respondent mentioned that the situation varies significantly amongst countries in the region.

**Table 10A: How would you describe civil society in the region?<sup>18</sup>**




<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

There is a higher degree of variation in attitudes amongst private foundation donors compared to other types of respondents. Over one-fourth of the private donor respondents believed that civil society is very weak, with lower proportions for the other types of donors.

However, private foundation respondents were also more positive than other types of donors, with nearly 90% answering that “civil society requires support from donors, but is able to function and represent interests” and around 16% replying that civil society is effective.

**Table 10B: How would you describe civil society in the region? (by donor type)<sup>19</sup>**



### **CSOs are learning to be effective, but are still donor dependent, with smaller private donor more positive about the situation**


When it comes to capacity of CSOs, donors see organization as moderately developed, gaining influence, but still donor-dependent. More precisely, 90% noted that local organizations were dependent on donors. Half of the donors said that CSOs function but lack capacity, whilst over 60% had a more positive evaluation, believing that CSOs are developing and

gaining influence. Donors providing “other” responses also noted that CSOs need to spend more time fostering relationships with local communities and governmental institutions instead of pursuing donor priorities. Several respondents also wrote that the situation varies greatly in the region, depending on the donor presence and CSO-governmental relations.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.




**Table 11A: How would you evaluate CSOs in the country/region?<sup>20</sup>**



Private donors in the survey sample also seem more positive towards CSOs, with nearly one-fourth of these respondents believing that local CSOs are effective

and have capacity. A lower proportion of bilateral donor respondents believing that CSOs function but lack capacity compared to multilateral and private donors.

**Table 11B: How would you evaluate CSOs in the country / region? (by donor type).<sup>21</sup>**




Respondents to the questionnaire refrained from giving overly negative opinions about their interaction with local CSO partners. Of the remaining options, donors in the sample did indicate that there was a partnership, but less than 30% said that

CSOs are proactive and take initiative in designing/proposing activities. In other words, there may be a partnership, but it is one that is still led largely by the international agencies in the Western Balkans.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.


**Table 12A: How would you describe your relationship with the organizations you support? (n=47)**



Private foundation respondents to the questionnaire see their interaction with local CSOs more as a partnership, with 68% of this type of donor choosing this option, versus lower percentages for the other types of donors. However, private

donors also seemed to indicate that their local partners were not proactive in initiating proposals, whilst 40% of the respondents from bilateral donors believed that local CSOs shaped their projects and activities.


**Table 12B: How would you describe your relationship with the organizations you support (by donor type)? (n=47)**



There was also an observed difference in perceptions about the local CSOs supported by the donors between regional and in-country donor respondents. Only one official amongst regional donor offices

respondents believed that local CSOs are learning to work in partnership, whilst nearly one-fourth of the officials from country offices/desks selected this option.

**Table 12C: How would you describe your relationship with the organizations you support? (n=47)**




**Eurocratization at work**

The donors seem to largely have a positive opinion overall about the capacities of the CSOs with which they work in the Western Balkans. Less than 30% of the respondents worked with small organizations with low levels of capacity, whilst over three-fourths of the donors that participated in the research worked with small- and medium-sized organizations (one of the “other” responses wrote that there are also small organizations with developing expertise and capacities), and over 60% of

the respondents wrote that the local CSOs with which they worked are professional.

These findings can suggest one of two things. The first is that the assessment of local CSOs in the Western Balkans thus far has been overly pessimistic, and the level of capacities is not as bad as widely reported. Alternatively, only CSOs with some developed capacities interact with international donors, so the smaller local organizations with low or moderate capacities become increasingly marginalized.

**Table 13A: How would you describe the organization(s) with whom you work?(n=46)<sup>22</sup>**




<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

The above answer also supports the thesis of the “Eurocratisation” phenomena mentioned widely in the Europeanization literature<sup>23</sup>. In other words, major donors tend to build and bolster organizations with existing capacities, instead of supporting smaller CSOs. Only 15% of the multilateral respondents worked with smaller CSOs, whilst over one-third of the private foundation donors in the sample did so. Also, multilateral donors seem to work less with organizations leading networks. This corroborates the earlier finding that multilateral donors provide funding as service providers more than other donors.

All of the private foundation donors in the questionnaire sample worked with medium-sized organizations, and nearly 60% worked with CSOs that led networks. This suggests that the private foundations place a greater focus on working with local CSOs and CSO networks compared to their multilateral and bilateral counterparts. This may mean that governmental and multilateral agencies neglect smaller CSOs and networks, or more positively, the approaches by private and other types of donors in the Western Balkans complement each other.

**Table 13B: How would you describe the organisation(s) with whom you work? (by donor type)<sup>24</sup>**



### Cautious about the impact, several leading CSOs exist, but not the whole sector

Unsurprisingly, as with the other questions in the survey, respondents did not select the most negative or pessimistic options. For donor impact, there were no responses for the option that their involvement has been “a waste of time and money”, and only one donor replied that donors had not helped CSDev. On

the other hand, 39% of the participants believed that civil society would not exist without donors, though 35% of the respondents believed that support could have been used more effectively. Nearly one-third of the respondents had a positive view of donor impact, i.e. that funding created professional CSOs and


<sup>23</sup> See Börzel, T. and Panke D. (2010), “Europeanization” in M. Cini and N. Perez-Solorzano Borrigan (eds), *European Union Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2005) *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Cornell Univ. Press. and other literature.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

that donor support has created sustainable civil society. The most popular answers were more cautiously positive, with 67% of respondents replying that donors had strengthened civil society on the whole and that donors have created leading

CSOs (though not throughout the sector). Similarly, participants in the survey replied that donors had created professional individuals in civil society, but had not developed the whole sector.

**Table 14: How would you describe the impact of donor funding in the country / region? (n=46).<sup>25</sup>**



### Broad consensus on main problems in CSDev

There seemed to be a broad consensus amongst the donor organizations across the region about the problems facing CSOs and CSDev in the Western Balkans. One of the private foundations referred to “civil society” as “project society”, since the survival of CSOs depends on continuing short-term grants to retain staff and to complete projects.

Thus, there were four main problems for CSDev identified by respondents that are evident in all parts of the Western Balkans:

(i) most CSOs have relatively *low capacity*, and even the more successful organizations have developed project management capacities only through pursuing donor priorities, not locally driven initiatives;

(ii) as a result of the over-dependence on donor funding, CSOs have *not developed alternative fundraising strategies*, and the state and private sector do not have the interest or accountability to fill the gap as donors gradually focus on other parts of the world. This leaves CSOs vulnerable to *political pressures* without having a partnership with governmental actors;

(iii) because of the attention to donor priorities, CSOs have become disconnected from their local constituencies, and as a result, there is low trust amongst citizens in these countries towards CSOs;

(iv) due to these weaknesses, there is *high turnover of CSO staff*, so it is difficult to build a pool of expertise in the civil society sector.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

## 4.2. Donor maps

Donor maps (presented below in the text) present a dissection of civil society support per donors and sectors in the period 2010-2011 as reported by donor representatives interviewed or discerned from official information on their websites.

### Albania

A total number of 18 donors were covered. The total amount of funds allocated for Albania in the period 2010-2011 was approx. 247 million Euros<sup>26</sup>. From this amount, almost 4%, or 9.82 million Euros were allocated for civil society. Overall, the World Bank is the largest donor in Albania, while the largest donor to civil society is the EU with 4.5 million Euros, or 45% of the total amount provided from all donors funding civil society. The EU support to civil society is 4.8% of their overall amount of funding provided for the country. SIDA is the second largest donors for civil society with 1.3 million Euros of allocated funds, or 16% of SIDA's total amount of funds they allocated in Albania for 2010 -2011 period. SDC is the third biggest donor with approx. 1 million Euros allocated for civil society, or 9% of their overall funding. The funding of civil society has been increased in some of the donors surveyed: USAID and ADA. Three of the donors surveyed provide funding only for the civil society sector: NED, BTM and FES. The bellow table outlines specific priority areas for support for each donor.

<sup>26</sup> This amount excludes the funding provided from Norwegian Embassy, Finish Government, Netherlands Embassy, KAS and ERSTE Foundation.

**Table 15: Donor map Albania**

DONOR		Funding for Albania (2010-2011)	Funding for civil society (2010-11)	Environment	Assistance for local community /CSOs and CSO networks	Capacity / technical assistance for civil society	Economic and private sector development	Minority rights and inter-ethnic co-operation	Youth and education	Service provision	Infrastructure	Strengthening Civil Society – core funding, institution-building	Good governance	Regional co-operation and development assistance	Media development and support	Institution building (including support for political elites)	Capacity / technical assistance for government
Multilateral	EU <sup>1</sup>	€93.2m	€4.5m <sup>2</sup>	Y <sup>3</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N <sup>4</sup>	CC	Y	Y	Y	Y
	UNDP <sup>5</sup>	€6.348m	€184,920	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	World Bank <sup>6</sup>	€110.9m <sup>7</sup>	N/A	Y <sup>8</sup>	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	CC <sup>9</sup>	N	CC <sup>10</sup>	Y
Bilateral	Austrian Development Agency <sup>11</sup>	€1.5m <sup>12</sup>	€100,000 <sup>13</sup>	Y	Y	Y <sup>14</sup>	Y	Y	N	Y	Y <sup>15</sup>	N	CC <sup>16</sup>	Y	Y	N	Y
	Finnish Government <sup>17</sup>	N/A <sup>18</sup>	N/A	Y <sup>19</sup>	N	N	CC	N	CC	N	N	N	CC	CC	N	CC	N
	Netherlands Embassy <sup>20</sup>	N/A	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y <sup>21</sup>	CC <sup>22</sup>	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	CC	Y
	Slovak Aid	€2.5m <sup>23</sup>	€1.3m <sup>24</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)	€8m	€1.3m <sup>25</sup>	Y	Y	Y	CC	CC	Y	Y	N	CC	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) <sup>26</sup>	€11m <sup>27</sup>	€1m <sup>28</sup>	CC <sup>29</sup>	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	CC <sup>30</sup>	N	Y	Y
	USAID <sup>31</sup>	\$13.5m <sup>32</sup>	\$610,000 <sup>33</sup>	CC	Y	Y	Y <sup>34</sup>	N	N	Y	Y <sup>35</sup>	Y	Y	N	N <sup>36</sup>	Y <sup>37</sup>	Y <sup>38</sup>
	Balkan Trust for Democracy	\$200,000 <sup>39</sup>	\$200,000	CC	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N <sup>40</sup>	Y	Y	CC	N	CC
Private Donors/Implementing Agencies	Erste Foundation <sup>41</sup>	N/A <sup>42</sup>	N/A	N	N	N	Y <sup>43</sup>	N	Y	N	N	N	CC <sup>44</sup>	N	Y	CC <sup>45</sup>	CC <sup>46</sup>
	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	€400,000 <sup>47</sup>	€400,000 <sup>48</sup>	CC	Y	Y	CC	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung <sup>49</sup>	N/A	N/A	N <sup>50</sup>	Y <sup>51</sup>	N	Y	Y	Y	CC <sup>52</sup>	N	N	N	Y	Y <sup>53</sup>	Y <sup>54</sup>	N
	NDI	\$300,000	\$25,000	N	Y	Y	N	CC	Y	N	N	CC	Y	Y	N	Y	CC
	NED <sup>55</sup>	\$150,000 <sup>56</sup>	\$150,000	N	Y <sup>57</sup>	N <sup>58</sup>	N <sup>59</sup>	Y	Y	N	N	Y <sup>60</sup>	Y <sup>61</sup>	Y	Y <sup>62</sup>	CC <sup>63</sup>	N
	Open Society	€2.219m	€260.875 <sup>64</sup>	CC	CC	Y	CC	Y	Y	CC	N	Y	Y	CC	Y	N	Y
	Rausing Trust	£25,000 <sup>65</sup>	£25,000	N	N	N	N	N <sup>66</sup>	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N

N = No, not an objective or strategy

Y= Yes, an objective and strategy

CC = cross cutting (not a specific objective but an aspect or outcome of other initiatives)

- 1 EU budgetary information is from an earlier survey. Civil society funding was higher in 2009 compared to 2010. Strategies and objectives have been identified using the EU Multi-year Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) for 2009-2011. The National Programme document was unavailable online.
- 2 EIDHR funding for 2009 and 2010 was 600,000 €.
- 3 Environment is also identified as a cross-cutting area in the EU MIPD 2009-2011.
- 4 Civil society is one of the cross-cutting areas of the EU MIPD 2009-2011, but the EU does not provide core funding.
- 5 This is based on information collected on the website of UNDP Albania. UNDP budgetary information is from an earlier survey. The amount of civil society support in 2010 is higher than in 2009.
- 6 The World Bank did not respond to the request for information, so the strategies are derived from the online database of active projects.
- 7 World Bank (IBRD/IDA) total disbursed amount for active projects, not just 2010-2011. The amount is in US Dollars.
- 8 For example, the World Bank project 'Afforestation & Reforestation of Refused Lands in Albania BioCarbon Fund Project'.
- 9 For example, the 'Energy Community of South East Europe (EC-SEE) Project APL2 (Albania)' has a regional component.
- 10 For example, the World Bank project 'Business Environment Reform and Institutional Strengthening'.
- 11 ADA is closing its office in Albania in 2012. Support for NGOs and private sector will probably continue after this date. The country programme 2007-2009 still applies; it is available on the website.
- 12 This data is for 2011.
- 13 There is an additional fund of 100,000€ for the whole Balkans for projects co-financed with Austrian NGOs. Funding for civil society is higher than the previous year, and it will remain the same in 2012.
- 14 This is very small, only 1 project.
- 15 ADA is the leader in terms of assistance for water infrastructure.
- 16 This essentially consists in training NGOs to perform a watch-dog function.
- 17 The strategies are derived using the document published by the MFA.
- 18 According to an official at the Finnish MFA, the total commitment by Finland in the region is approximately 37 million Euros for the period 2009-2013, of which 15 will go to Kosovo, 11 million for a regional programme. The other numbers have not been calculated by the MFA.
- 19 Finnish regional programme.
- 20 According to an official at the Dutch MFA, the MATRA programme is being phased out, so it is difficult to obtain the appropriate information. The strategies have been derived using the country strategy document (2008-2011) available on the Dutch embassy (Albania) website.
- 21 The Dutch strategy includes policies towards marginalised groups, the Roma and LGBT, in a section on human rights.
- 22 The Dutch strategy includes environmental education within its environmental focus.
- 23 This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 24 This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 25 This amount goes to 3 Swedish NGOs which subcontract to local CSO organisations. In addition, the Swedish embassy allocates 300 000 EUR to a project of twinning between Albanian and Swedish association of municipalities.
- 26 SDC budgetary information is from an earlier survey. The overall level of financial support has increased in 2010 compared to 2009, but civil society support is at similar levels. The SDC Albania office did not respond to the request for information, so objectives are derived from their document outlining 2010-2013 strategies.
- 27 This figure is an approximation.
- 28 This figure is an approximation.
- 29 SDC Albania includes environment within its programme for infrastructure.
- 30 SDC Albania has regional cross-border projects in its economic strand of projects.
- 31 USAID's strategic document is available online.
- 32 This figure is for 2011. In 2010, USAID's budget for Albania was \$15.5m.
- 33 This information is from an earlier survey. The level of civil society support is decreasing in line with the total budget.
- 34 USAID Albania has a programme in 'economic growth'.
- 35 USAID invested through a BOT concession for the Mother Teresa Airport. USAID mainly invests in electronic infrastructure in Albania.
- 36 USAID carried out activities in this field in the past.
- 37 Only with municipalities.
- 38 USAID sponsored an e-health programme with the Albanian Ministry of Health.
- 39 The funding by BTD was lower in 2009 compared to 2010.
- 40 No core funding, but can structure project funding to help build infrastructure.
- 41 ERSTE Foundation refused to answer questions about their strategies and objectives, but they provided budgetary information in a previous survey.
- 42 The overall budget in 2009 was approximately 20,000 Euros.



- 43** Social entrepreneurship is one of the priority areas for the ERSTE Foundation through EFB Think and Link Programme.
- 44** ERSTE Foundation activities cross-cut this area through the European Fund for the Balkans programme.
- 45** ERSTE Foundation activities cross-cut this area through the European Fund for the Balkans (Practicing Europe) programme.
- 46** ERSTE Foundation activities cross-cut this area through the European Fund for the Balkans (Practicing Europe) programme.
- 47** This figure is an approximation.
- 48** This figure is an approximation.
- 49** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Albania refused the request to provide information about strategies and objectives, but the programme can be found at a regional level, as provided by an official at the Serbia office for the foundation.
- 50** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is working more in this area, so it will be a priority in the future.
- 51** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung provides training and education for CSOs, not funding.
- 52** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung consults with political parties, and CSOs are sometimes involved in this process.
- 53** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung provides training for journalists to become independent through workshops and roundtables.
- 54** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung supports some, but not all, aspects of EU integration processes.
- 55** Albania has the lowest focus by NED, since there have not been enough good proposals.
- 56** This is the figure for 2011. The figure for 2010 was \$140,000. NED receives its core funding from Congress, with additional funding for specific needs (e.g. upcoming election). Of the funding, 55% is given to four organisations: NDI, IRI, CIPE and the Solidarity Center. The remaining funds are 'discretionary funds'. The strategic objectives are being formulated for 2012-2017 at present, and there is no estimate of the budgets yet. In addition to the country funding, there was \$400,000 for regional programmes in 2011, which was an increase from \$200,000 in 2010, mainly due to the RECOM programme.
- 57** In the discretionary track of NED funding, they only work with indigenous NGOs.
- 58** NED rarely funds others to do it.
- 59** It is done indirectly through one of the organisations funded by NED, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).
- 60** Funding is project-based, but there is flexibility within the award for it to work as an operational grant.
- 61** However, this is not directly with local government.
- 62** Media is a core area for NED.
- 63** NED works indirectly with parliaments and political parties.
- 64** Although researchers and practitioners give different definitions for civil society, OSFA strongly believes that civil society is a space for social interaction of the non-state and non-business actors. NGOs are civil society organizations that represent the interests of certain groups. They are registered according to the Albanian laws and bylaws. NGOs are legal entities and they have a well-defined status, governing structure, target group and field of activity and coverage. Whereas, CSOs are not legal entities, as they are not registered. CSOs are mainly community based organizations. They might either have the same features of the NGOs (status, governing structure, field of activity, target group), or might have some blurry features and exist as a reaction towards a societal local or national problem. OSFA is mostly financially supporting NGOs to avoid fiscal evasion and to respect the national laws and bylaws. Nevertheless, OSFA has continuously offered its support to various CSOs with capacity building activities and logistics.
- 65** The Rausing Trust has one current grantee in Albania, VATRA, which is an organisation that deals with trafficking. VATRA has a three-year grant of £75,000 from 1 November 2010, which corresponds to an average of £25,000 annually. The Trust has been funding VATRA since 2003.
- 66** The Rausing Trust has supported minority rights issues previously.

## Bosnia and Herzegovina

In total, 22 donors<sup>27</sup> were included in the survey. According to the data gathered, a total sum of 342.8 million Euros has been allocated by donors in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the 2010 - 2011 period. From this, 8.5 million Euros was for civil society<sup>28</sup>, which makes 2.5% of the total funds allocated in the country. As in Albania, the biggest donor overall is the World Bank, while EU provides the biggest amount of funding for civil society. The EU has allocated 4.2 million Euros for civil society, or 3.9% of the overall amount of funding provided for country. USAID is the second biggest donor to the civil society sector with 1.67 million Euros<sup>29</sup>. Four of the donors included in the survey have funding only for civil society: NED (approx. 605, 200 Euros), BTD (approx. 160,000 Euros), ERSTE Foundation (77,320 Euros) and CS Mott Foundation (440, 000 Euros). The bellow table outlines specific priority areas for support for each donor.

<sup>27</sup> Six of the organizations did not respond to the request for information, so their online available data were used. The amount of funding was not included for Finish Government, Heinrich Boll Foundation, FES, KAS, OSI while one (NDI) refused to give data on the amount of funding they provide.

<sup>28</sup> No information was available on the funding for civil society provided by UNDP, ADA, German Embassy, the Netherlands Embassy, the Norwegian Embassy, SIDA and SDC, so this amount is not included in the calculation.

<sup>29</sup> It is important to be mentioned that USAID uses broad definition for civil society and includes formal institutions such as NGOs, media outlets, academia, universities political parties etc.; and informal ones, such as citizens' groups and individual sectoral experts.

**Table 16: Donor map Bosnia and Herzegovina**

DONOR		Funding for Bosnia (2010–11)	Funding for civil society (2010–11)	Environment	Assistance for local community /CSOs and CSO networks	Capacity / technical assistance for civil society	Economic and private sector development	Minority rights and inter-ethnic co-operation	Youth and education	Service provision	Infrastructure	Strengthening Civil Society – core funding, institution-building	Good governance	Regional co-operation and development assistance	Media development and support	Institution building (including support for political elites)	Capacity / technical assistance for government
Multilateral	EU	€107.428m	€4.2m <sup>1</sup>	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y <sup>2</sup>	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N <sup>3</sup>	Y <sup>4</sup>	Y
	OSCE	€14,9m <sup>5</sup>	€100,000 <sup>4</sup>	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	CC	Y	Y
	UNDP <sup>7</sup>	\$24m <sup>8</sup>	N/A	Y	Y	CC	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	CC	Y	Y
	World Bank <sup>9</sup>	€121.75m <sup>10</sup>	N/A	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	CC	CC <sup>11</sup>	N	Y	Y
Bilateral	Austrian Development Agency <sup>12</sup>	€4.02m <sup>13</sup>	N/A	Y <sup>14</sup>	CC	CC	Y	CC	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y <sup>15</sup>	CC	Y	Y
	Finnish Government	N/A <sup>16</sup>	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y <sup>17</sup>	CC <sup>18</sup>	N	N	N	CC	CC	N	CC	N
	Germany	€7.40m <sup>19</sup>	N/A <sup>20</sup>	CC <sup>21</sup>	CC	Y	Y	CC	Y	CC <sup>22</sup>	Y	N	Y	Y <sup>23</sup>	Y	Y	Y
	Netherlands Embassy <sup>24</sup>	€9.49m <sup>25</sup>	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
	Norwegian Embassy <sup>26</sup>	€10.22m <sup>27</sup>	N/A	CC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	CC	N	Y	N	N
	Slovak Aid	€ 2.5m <sup>28</sup>	€ 1.3m <sup>29</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) <sup>30</sup>	€18.5m <sup>31</sup>	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) <sup>32</sup>	€7m <sup>33</sup>	N/A	N	N	N	Y	CC <sup>34</sup>	CC <sup>35</sup>	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	USAID	\$18.965m	\$2.2m <sup>36</sup>	CC <sup>37</sup>	Y	Y	Y	CC	Y <sup>38</sup>	N	Y	CC	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
	Balkan Trust for Democracy	\$210,000	\$210,000 <sup>39</sup>	CC	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N <sup>40</sup>	Y	Y	CC	N	CC
Private Donors/Implementing Agencies	CS Mott Foundation	€440,000	€440,000	CC	Y	Y	CC	CC	CC	N	N	CC	CC	CC	CC	CC	N
	Erste Foundation <sup>41</sup>	€77,320	€77,320	CC	CC	CC	Y <sup>42</sup>	Y	Y	N	N	N	CC	N	Y	CC	CC
	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung <sup>43</sup>	N/A	N/A	N	N	Y	Y	Y <sup>44</sup>	CC <sup>45</sup>	N	N	N	CC	Y	Y	N	CC
	Heinrich Boll Foundation	N/A	N/A	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung <sup>46</sup>	N/A	N/A	N <sup>47</sup>	Y <sup>48</sup>	N	Y	Y	Y	CC <sup>49</sup>	N	N	N	Y	Y <sup>50</sup>	Y <sup>51</sup>	N
	NDI	N/A <sup>52</sup>	N/A	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>53</sup>	Y	N	Y	N
	NED <sup>54</sup>	\$800,000 <sup>55</sup>	\$800,000	N	Y <sup>56</sup>	N <sup>57</sup>	N <sup>58</sup>	Y	Y	N	N	Y <sup>59</sup>	Y <sup>60</sup>	Y	Y <sup>61</sup>	CC <sup>62</sup>	N
	Open Society <sup>63</sup>	N/A	N/A	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	CC <sup>64</sup>	Y	N

N = No, not an objective or strategy

Y = Yes, an objective and strategy

CC = cross cutting (not a specific objective but an aspect or outcome of other initiatives)

- 1 This includes €3m within the IPA programme and €1.2m within the EIDHR programme. This funding has increased compared to 2010 (€1.2m) and it will further increase in 2012 (€4.7m).
- 2 Civil society is not involved in this programme.
- 3 This used to be done in the past. This programme phased out in July 2010.
- 4 These projects are currently blocked due to the political situation in Bosnia.
- 5 This figure is for 2011. In 2010, the total funding amounted to €15,278,300.
- 6 This figure is for 2011. The Community Engagement activities budgets have been approximately €130,000 in 2009, €115,000 in 2010, and will be €87,500 in 2012. Please note that *not* all funds within Community Engagement activities are used for supporting NGOs, but all funds are used for strengthening civil society. For more information on Community Engagement activities please see [www.oscebih.org](http://www.oscebih.org). Note that other Mission activities also involve CSOs.
- 7 The strategy and activities of UNDP in Bosnia are described in the UNDAF document available on the website [www.undp.ba](http://www.undp.ba)
- 8 This figure is an approximation.
- 9 The World Bank did not respond to the request for information, so the strategies have been derived using the country partnership document for 2008-2011 and using the list of active projects on the World Bank website.
- 10 World Bank disbursements thus far for active projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 11 The World Bank 'Energy Community of South East Europe (ECSEE) APL3-Bosnia and Herzegovina Project' has a cross-border element.
- 12 The Austrian Development Agency did not respond to the request for information, so the current strategies have been derived from the Country Strategy (2011-2013) available on the agency website.
- 13 This figure is for 2010. It was retrieved from the Donor Mapping Report 2009-2010 (<http://www.donormapping.ba/pdf/DMR-Report-Eng-2010.pdf>).
- 14 ADA prioritises sustainable development and environment as a regional strategy.
- 15 In addition to the country strategy, ADA also has a regional programme.
- 16 According to an official at the MFA, there is €37m funding for the region for the period 2009-2013, of which 11 million are for a regional environmental programme and 15 million for Kosovo. The other figures have not been calculated by the MFA.
- 17 Development of Disability Policy Programme in BiH funded by Finland.
- 18 Finnish programme on Education on Sustainable Development.
- 19 This figure is for 2010.
- 20 The youth and health programmes mainly engage with civil society. In 2010, the funding for these projects amounted to €66,333.
- 21 Environment comes under energy and waste management projects.
- 22 There is a project on sexual health and HIV prevention.
- 23 Note that this is not implemented as part of the bilateral cooperation.
- 24 The Netherlands development aid programme will end after 2011 except for a post conflict programme in the Srebrenica area (€5 million/year). Some smaller programmes, managed from headquarters will continue, such as the Human Rights Facility (approximately €700,000/year), the programme for social transformation (MATRA, approximately €0.2 million/year) and a programme to support PFM of countries within the Dutch constituency of WB/IMF. The activities and priorities of the Netherlands development aid programme have been derived from the data available on the Donor Coordination Forum of Bosnia and Herzegovina (<http://www.donormapping.ba/>).
- 25 This figure is for 2010.
- 26 Involvement of the Norwegian Embassy is derived from the list of funded projects in 2010: [http://www.norveska.ba/Embassy/Embassy\\_Fund/Projects-supported-through-the-Embassy-Fund-in-2010/](http://www.norveska.ba/Embassy/Embassy_Fund/Projects-supported-through-the-Embassy-Fund-in-2010/)
- 27 This figure is for 2010. It was retrieved from the Donor Mapping Report 2009-2010 (<http://www.donormapping.ba/pdf/DMR-Report-Eng-2010.pdf>).
- 28 This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 29 This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 30 SIDA published its strategy for BiH for 2011-2014, which will be used for the table above.
- 31 SIDA estimated funding per year 2011-2014.
- 32 SDC BiH did not respond to the request for information, but instead referred the researchers to the Co-operation Strategy 2009-2012 document found on its website. The document was used to derive the entries in the table above.
- 33 This figure is an approximation.
- 34 Ensuring gender equality is an over-arching theme for all of the SDC programmes.
- 35 SDC in BiH has a programme on youth employability as part of its economic development programmes.
- 36 The funding for civil society in 2011 is the same as in 2010, but it will increase up to \$2.3m in 2012. USAID uses a broad definition of civil society that allows for diverse interests and activities and encompasses all the organizations and associations that exist outside of the state and the market that is accepted by political scientists and the international development community. Civil society can be either formal

(including non-governmental organizations, media outlets, academia, universities, political parties), or informal (such as citizens' groups, and individual sectoral experts).

- 37** Strengthening environmental NGOs is a potential focus for USAID activities to strengthen accountability (Goal 3).
- 38** USAID does not have education-related projects.
- 39** The funding for civil society was higher in the previous year.
- 40** No core funding, but can structure project funding to build infrastructure.
- 41** The budgetary information for the ERSTE Stiftung is from an earlier survey. The amount of support in 2010 was less than in 2009. The information about the strategies is derived from the information on the foundation's website.
- 42** Social entrepreneurship is a priority area for the ERSTE Stiftung in the region.
- 43** Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in BiH sent a programme document via e-mail, but did not provide financial details. The strategies in the table above were derived from the document.
- 44** Friedrich Ebert Stiftung has a specific focus on gender equality.
- 45** Friedrich Ebert Stiftung implemented a Youth Forum on Social Democracy.
- 46** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in BiH did not respond to the request to provide information about strategies and objectives, but the programme can be found at a regional level, as provided by an official at the Serbia office for the foundation.
- 47** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is working more in this area, so it will be a priority in the future.
- 48** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung provides training and education for CSOs, not funding.
- 49** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung consults with political parties, and CSOs are sometimes involved in this process.
- 50** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung provides training for journalists to become independent through workshops and roundtables.
- 51** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung supports some, but not all, aspects of EU integration processes.
- 52** NDI refused to disclose budgetary data. The amount of funding increased this year, because of a regional programme and should remain the same next year.
- 53** NDI works with young party professionals, but good governance will be more pronounced in the future.
- 54** Bosnia-Herzegovina is the highest priority country for NED.
- 55** This is the figure for 2011. The figure for 2010 was \$900,000. NED receives its core funding from Congress, with additional funding for specific needs (e.g. upcoming election). Of the funding, 55% is given to four organisations: NDI, IRI, CIPE and the Solidarity Center. The remaining funds are 'discretionary funds'. The strategic objectives are being formulated for 2012-2017 at present, and there is no estimate of the budgets yet. In addition to the country funding, there was \$400,000 for regional programmes in 2011, which was an increase from \$200,000 in 2010, mainly due to the RECOM programme.
- 56** In the discretionary track of NED funding, they only work with indigenous NGOs.
- 57** NED rarely funds others to do it.
- 58** It is done indirectly through one of the organisations funded by NED, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).
- 59** Funding is project-based, but there is flexibility within the award for it to work as an operational grant.
- 60** However, this is not directly with local government.
- 61** Media is a core area for NED.
- 62** NED works indirectly with parliaments and political parties.
- 63** The Open Society did not respond to the request for information, so the project areas on the website were used for this survey.
- 64** Open Society Media Center.

## Kosovo

In total 18 donors were interviewed. A total amount 240.8 million has been allocated to Kosovo for the period 2010-2011. The biggest donor overall is the EU, with 67 million Euros allocated<sup>30</sup>, followed by the World Bank's funding of 50 million Euros<sup>31</sup>. The total amount of funding to civil society is 19.7<sup>32</sup> million, making approximately 8% of the total amount of funds available for Kosovo. The biggest donor in the civil society sector is SIDA with 4.2 million Euros or approx. 44% of the overall SIDA funds allocated for Kosovo. Substantial amount of 2.7 million for civil society funding is provided by USAID<sup>33</sup> (7% of their total funding in Kosovo), making it the second largest donor "followed by the EU with 2.6 million (approx. 3.8% of EU's total funding to Kosovo). Three of the donors surveyed in Kosovo provide funding only for civil society: Olof Palme Foundation, BTD and FES. The below table outlines

<sup>30</sup> Includes all political and financial commitment to Kosovo by the EU.

<sup>31</sup> Undisbursed commitments in current portfolio.

<sup>32</sup> There was no information available for civil society funding by OSCE, UNDP and the World Bank, thus their funding is not included in the calculation.

<sup>33</sup> The funding will finish in 2011.

Table 17: Donor map Kosovo

DONOR		Funding for Kosovo (2010-11)	Funding for civil society (2010-11)	Environment	Assistance for local community /CSOs and CSO networks	Capacity / technical assistance for civil society	Economic and private sector development	Minority rights and inter-ethnic co-operation	Youth and education	Service provision	Infrastructure	Strengthening Civil Society – core funding, institution-building	Good Governance	Regional co-operation and development assistance	Media development and support	Institution building (including support for political elites)	Capacity / technical assistance for government
Multilateral	EU	€67m <sup>1</sup>	€2.6m <sup>2</sup>	Y <sup>3</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y <sup>4</sup>	Y	CC	Y	Y
	OSCE <sup>5</sup>	€22,6m <sup>6</sup>	N/A	N <sup>7</sup>	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N <sup>8</sup>	N	Y <sup>9</sup>	Y	Y	Y <sup>10</sup>	Y <sup>11</sup>
	UNDP	\$10m	N/A <sup>12</sup>	Y	CC	CC	Y	Y	CC	CC	CC	CC	Y <sup>13</sup>	Y	CC	Y	Y
	World Bank	€50m <sup>14</sup>	N/A	Y	N	N	Y	CC	Y	Y	Y	CC	Y <sup>15</sup>	Y	N	CC	N
Bilateral	Austrian Development Agency	€1.9m <sup>16</sup>	€0.1m	CC	CC	N	Y	CC	Y <sup>17</sup>	N	N <sup>18</sup>	CC	CC <sup>19</sup>	N	N	Y	Y
	Finish <sup>20</sup>	€3m	€300,000 <sup>21</sup>	CC	Y	Y	CC	CC	CC	N	N	Y <sup>22</sup>	CC	Y	Y <sup>23</sup>	N	Y
	Netherlands Embassy	€4.214m <sup>24</sup>	€2.152m <sup>25</sup>	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	CC	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
	Norwegian Embassy	€16m <sup>26</sup>	€2m <sup>27</sup>	Y <sup>28</sup>	N	Y	Y <sup>29</sup>	Y	Y	N	Y <sup>30</sup>	Y	Y <sup>31</sup>	Y <sup>32</sup>	Y	Y	CC
	Slovak Aid	€ 2.5m <sup>33</sup>	€ 1.3m <sup>34</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)	€9.63m <sup>35</sup>	€4.2m	Y	Y	Y	CC	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y <sup>36</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)	€12.7m <sup>37</sup>	€0.65m <sup>38</sup>	N	Y	CC	Y	CC	Y	N	Y	Y	CC <sup>39</sup>	CC	CC	N	Y
	USAID	€38m <sup>40</sup>	€2.7m <sup>41</sup>	N	Y	Y <sup>42</sup>	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	CC	Y <sup>43</sup>	N	Y	Y	Y
Private Donors/Implementing Agencies	Balkan Trust for Democracy	€0.5m <sup>44</sup>	All <sup>45</sup>	CC	Y <sup>46</sup>	N	N	Y	N <sup>47</sup>	N	N	N <sup>48</sup>	Y <sup>49</sup>	Y	Y	N	CC
	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	€0.2m <sup>50</sup>	All	N	Y	N <sup>51</sup>	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y <sup>52</sup>	Y	N <sup>53</sup>	CC	Y
	NDI	\$2m	\$250,000	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	CC	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	NED	\$0.5m <sup>54</sup>	\$0.5m	N	Y <sup>55</sup>	N <sup>56</sup>	N <sup>57</sup>	Y	Y	N	N	Y <sup>58</sup>	Y <sup>59</sup>	Y	Y <sup>60</sup>	CC <sup>61</sup>	N
	Olof Palme	€0.25m <sup>62</sup>	All	CC	Y	CC	CC	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y <sup>63</sup>	Y	CC	Y <sup>64</sup>	N
	Open Society	€3-4m	€1m	N <sup>65</sup>	CC	CC	N	Y	Y	CC	N	Y	Y <sup>66</sup>	CC	N <sup>67</sup>	Y	CC

N = No, not an objective or strategy

Y= Yes, an objective and strategy

CC = cross cutting (not a specific objective but an aspect or outcome of other initiatives)

- 1 Includes all political and financial commitment to Kosovo by the EU. The main sources of development assistance comes from IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance), which includes funds as part of the national programme and the multi-beneficiary regional programme (e.g. TACSO - Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations, the Civil Society Facility. This also includes funds received through EIDHR (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights).
- 2 There is a specific budget as part of IPA for civil society development (referred to as "Civil Society Facility"). The money is used for projects, twinning schemes (P2P) and technical assistance (TACSO). Assistance for civil society organisations also comes from the EIDHR (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights), which allocated €0.86m to Kosovo CSOs in 2010. The figure of €2m includes IPA-CSF and EIDHR funds for civil society.
- 3 The EU does include specific calls for environment related projects in the context of regional partnership initiatives, for which organisations in Kosovo can apply. See: <http://sites.google.com/site/ipa128287/226317>
- 4 This involves both training ministries to engage with CSOs and training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 5 Information on specific OSCE activities/programmes in Kosovo is available on the web, but the strategic documents are internal.
- 6 This figure is for 2011. In 2010, OSCE funding for Kosovo amounted to € 23,5m.
- 7 Note that some of the activities aimed at tackling organised crime were related to the environment.
- 8 This is done marginally through support to local public safety councils.
- 9 This involves both training ministries to engage with CSOs and training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 10 This includes support for political party development.
- 11 Capacity/technical assistance primarily focuses on local government at the level of municipalities.
- 12 Civil Society organizations are very often important partners in UNDP Kosovo project delivery. However, the organization does not have specific projects targeting this sector. Rather, projects are designed to target large systemic causes targeting a myriad of actors including government institutions, private sector and civil society. Civil society organizations happen to be implementing partners, subject to capacity development efforts as well as targeted multipliers to advance human development in Kosovo.
- 13 This involves both training ministries to engage with CSOs and training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 14 Undispersed commitments in current portfolio. Likely to remain stable with potential of increase.
- 15 This involves training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 16 €2.5m (approx.) if regional programmes included.
- 17 Most important strategic initiative – focus specifically on higher education.
- 18 Funded water projects until 2010. Ceased because they were deemed unsuccessful.
- 19 Recently introduced (2010) – elite focused.
- 20 Finland has a Development Policy Framework Programme for the Western Balkans for the years 2009-2013
- 21 This amount was the same in 2010 and 2011, and it is likely to remain the same in 2012.
- 22 However, providing core funding should be avoided, focusing more on project-based funding
- 23 E.g. supporting minority media
- 24 This figure is for 2010.
- 25 In 2011, this level decreased to €869.357. It will further decrease in the future.
- 26 Remained constant and will do so for the next 3 years at least.
- 27 Two grant schemes.
- 28 A project on forestry.
- 29 Key initiative in the period 2010-2014.
- 30 Schools, hospital in Mitrovica, new pavements in Pristina, toilets in primary schools, libraries.
- 31 This involves training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 32 IT infrastructure development – also "Young man initiative" – designed to make young boys better citizens.
- 33 This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 34 This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 35 Annual budget is €8.75m but in 2011 an additional amount has been allocated. The normal annual allowance is likely to remain constant.
- 36 This involves training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 37 €14.7m in 2010 .
- 38 €0.162m in 2010.
- 39 This involves training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 40 \$54m
- 41 Ending in 2011.
- 42 Finishing in September 2011 as a result of rationalization of provision.
- 43 This involves both training ministries to engage with CSOs and training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 44 The overall amount is decreasing due to Dutch embassy grant coming to an end.
- 45 All funds for civil society, but municipalities could have applied but didn't.
- 46 But not in the future.
- 47 Up until 3 months ago.



- 48 No core funding, but can target project funding to help build infrastructure.
- 49 This involves training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 50 Due to remain constant.
- 51 Up until 2006, but not since then.
- 52 This involves both training ministries to engage with CSOs and training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 53 Initially, but not any longer.
- 54 This figure is for 2011. The figure for 2010 was \$510000. NED receives its core funding from Congress, with additional funding for specific needs (e.g. upcoming election). Of the funding, 55% is given to four organisations: NDI, IRI, CIPE and the Solidarity Center. The remaining funds are 'discretionary funds'. The strategic objectives are being formulated for 2012-2017 at present, and there is no estimate of the budgets yet. In addition to the country funding, there was \$400000 for regional programmes in 2011, which was an increase from \$200000 in 2010, mainly due to the RECOM programme.
- 55 In the discretionary track of NED funding, they only work with indigenous NGOs.
- 56 NED rarely funds others to do it.
- 57 It is done indirectly through one of the organisations funded by NED, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).
- 58 Funding is project-based, but there is flexibility within the award for it to work as an operational grant.
- 59 This is not done directly with local government.
- 60 Media is a core area for NED.
- 61 NED works indirectly with parliaments and political parties.
- 62 Predicted increase to €0.4 – 0.6m p.a. over next 4 years.
- 63 This involves training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 64 Support for political parties and their linkage with constituencies
- 65 From 2007-2010, but now ceased.
- 66 This involves both training ministries to engage with CSOs and training CSOs to engage with state agencies.
- 67 Until 2005.

## Macedonia

Eighteen donor data<sup>34</sup> were included in the survey. A total amount of approx. 206.4 million Euros was allocated in the period 2010 -2011. The funding provided for civil society for the same period is 4.5 million, making up 2.3% of the total funding. It should be noted that many of the donors were not able to provide concrete amounts of the funds they allocated for civil society<sup>35</sup>. From the data available, the EU is by far the largest donor overall, and the largest source of funding for civil society with 2.1 million Euros, or 2% of the total funds they allocate for Macedonia. SDC is the second largest donor to civil society with 1.2 million Euros, or 15% of their total support provided, while USAID follow as the third with approx. 1.126 million Euros (or 1.473 million Dollars). From all the donors, NED and the BTDF fund only the civil society (327,760 Euros and 180,000 Euros, respectively). The bellow table outlines specific priority areas for support for each donor.

34 From this, four did not have or did not want to disclose the data budgetary data: the Finish Government, NDI, KAS, ERSTE Foundation. The amount of funding provided by these donors was not available and is not included in the total amount of funds reported

35 From the total sum UNDP, OSCE, the World Bank, ADA, the Finish Government, SIDA, USAID, NDI, KAS and ERSTE Foundation data are excluded. FES has noted they allocate between 100,000 - 200,000 Euros for civil society. For the purpose of calculation 100,000 was taken.

**Table 18: Donor map Macedonia**

DONOR		Funding for Macedonia (2010-2011)	Funding for civil society (2010-11)+	Environment	Assistance for local community /CSOs and CSO networks	Capacity / technical assistance for civil society	Economic and private sector development	Minority rights and inter-ethnic co-operation	Youth and education	Service provision	Infrastructure	Strengthening Civil Society – core funding, institution-building	Good governance	Regional co-operation and development assistance	Media development and support	Institution building (including support for political elites)	Capacity / technical assistance for government
Multilateral	EU	€98.028m	€2.1m <sup>1</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	OSCE	€8m	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N	Y	Y <sup>3</sup>	N	Y	Y	N	N <sup>4</sup>	N <sup>5</sup>	Y <sup>6</sup>	Y	N <sup>7</sup>	Y	Y
	UNDP	\$9.35m	N/A	Y	CC	CC	Y	Y	CC	CC	Y	CC	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	World Bank <sup>8</sup>	\$50-60m	N/A	Y	Y	CC	Y	CC	CC	CC	Y	N	Y	CC	N	Y	Y
Bilateral	Austrian Development Agency (ADA) <sup>9</sup>	€0.85m <sup>10</sup>	N/A	Y	N	CC	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	CC	N	N	CC	CC
	Finish Government <sup>11</sup>	N/A	N/A	Y	Y	CC	Y	Y	Y	N	Y <sup>12</sup>	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Netherlands Embassy	€1.45m	€0.6 <sup>13</sup>	CC	CC	CC	Y	CC	N	N	N	CC	Y	N	Y	CC	CC
	Slovak Aid	€ 2.5m <sup>14</sup>	€ 1.3m <sup>15</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) <sup>16</sup>	€7m <sup>17</sup>	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	CC	N	CC	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)	€8m <sup>18</sup>	€1.2m <sup>19</sup>	Y	Y	CC	N	Y	CC	CC	Y	Y	CC	Y	CC	Y	N
	USAID	\$19.52m	\$1.473m	CC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	CC	CC <sup>20</sup>	Y	Y	CC <sup>21</sup>	Y	Y	Y
Private Donors/Implementing Agencies	Balkan Trust for Democracy	€180,000	€180,000 <sup>22</sup>	CC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N <sup>23</sup>	Y	Y	CC	N	CC
	ERSTE Foundation	N/A	N/A	N	CC	CC	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	CC	N	Y	CC	CC
	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	€345,000 <sup>24</sup>	€100,000-200,000 <sup>25</sup>	Y	Y	N	N <sup>26</sup>	Y	Y	N	N	Y <sup>27</sup>	Y	Y	CC	Y	CC
	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	N/A	N/A	CC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
	NDI	N/A <sup>28</sup>	N/A	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	CC	N	Y	Y
	NED <sup>29</sup>	\$430,000 <sup>30</sup>	\$430,000	N	Y <sup>31</sup>	N <sup>32</sup>	N <sup>33</sup>	Y	Y	N	N	Y <sup>34</sup>	Y <sup>35</sup>	Y	Y <sup>36</sup>	CC <sup>37</sup>	N
	Open Society	€4.388m <sup>38</sup>	€797,569 <sup>39</sup>	CC	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	CC

N = No, not an objective or strategy

Y= Yes, an objective and strategy

CC = cross cutting (not a specific objective but an aspect or outcome of other initiatives)

- 1 This figure includes assistance to civil society through both the IPA (€1,5m) and the EIDHR (€600,000) programmes. This level of funding is similar to what was disbursed in 2010 and to what will be disbursed in 2012.
- 2 OSCE had a specific budget for civil society until 2008/2009.
- 3 This activity is being phased out.
- 4 This used to be one of OSCE's fields of activity between 2001 and 2003.
- 5 This used to be a major field of activity until 2009/2010.
- 6 This is not specifically related to civil society-government cooperation.
- 7 This programme closed in 2008/2009.
- 8 The World Bank did not respond to the request for information, so the strategies are derived from the online database of active projects.
- 9 This is entirely based on ADA's Macedonia Country Strategy 2010-2012 available at [www.entwicklung.at/uploads/media/Country\\_Strategy\\_Macedonia\\_2010-2012\\_01.pdf](http://www.entwicklung.at/uploads/media/Country_Strategy_Macedonia_2010-2012_01.pdf)
- 10 This figure is for 2010. ADA closed its office in Skopje in June 2010. Bilateral assistance is being phased out until 2012.
- 11 This is entirely based on the data available online, on the websites of the Finnish embassy in Belgrade and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at <http://formin.finland.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=184774>
- 12 Finland funded the EBRD's Western Balkans Fund which was used for the development of municipal infrastructure and transport projects, among other things.
- 13 This is an approximate figure. In 2010, funding for civil society was 700,000 €.
- 14 This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 15 This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 16 SIDA is closing its office in Skopje in 2012. As a result, all the activities are being phased out or have already ended. Data shown in this table represents activities pursued until 2010. Officials of the SIDA office in Macedonia suggested that the decision to close the office was based on the expectation that Macedonia would start the accession negotiations until 2012.
- 17 This is the figure for 2010. For 2011, funding was cut down to 250,000 EUR and it will be brought down to 150,000 EUR in 2012.
- 18 CHF 10m
- 19 CHF 1.5m
- 20 USAID sponsors several energy efficiency programmes in Macedonia.
- 21 These projects are managed from Washington.
- 22 All funds are for civil society. This budget is comparable to 2010, but it will be lower in 2012.
- 23 No core funding, but can structure project funding to help build infrastructure.
- 24 This figure does not include salaries.
- 25 This figure includes support for trade unions. FES Macedonia defines civil society as everything that is not government: "BINGO, GONGO, QUANGO. WE SAY: NGOs (project and program based), ASSOCIATION OF journalists, trade unions (membership-driven, not projects). What they do is different. We cannot interact directly with political parties. So we organise the seminars with an NGO or think-tank organization, support for this CSO. The target group is politicians. 80% in co-operation with others, partner organizations. Co-financing is preferable. Do a lot of regional youth exchange programmes. Do a lot with them at a regional level. If there is a change, such as in free media, then we can change the programme within the country."
- 26 FES Macedonia is involved in projects on social dialogue with trade unions.
- 27 This is done in relation to trade unions.
- 28 The interviewee refused to disclose budgetary information.
- 29 Macedonia is the fourth highest priority country for NED, though it may swap with Serbia in the future (third).
- 30 This is the figure for 2011. The figure for 2010 was \$150,000. The increased funding in 2011 was due to the elections in Macedonia. NED receives its core funding from Congress, with additional funding for specific needs (e.g. upcoming election). Of the funding, 55% is given to four organisations: NDI, IRI, CIPE and the Solidarity Center. The remaining funds are 'discretionary funds'. The strategic objectives are being formulated for 2012-2017 at present, and there is no estimate of the budgets yet. In addition to the country funding, there was \$400,000 for regional programmes in 2011, which was an increase from \$200,000 in 2010, mainly due to the RECOM programme.
- 31 In the discretionary track of NED funding, they only work with indigenous NGOs.
- 32 NED rarely funds others to do it.
- 33 It is done indirectly through one of the organisations funded by NED, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).
- 34 Funding is project-based, but there is flexibility within the award for it to work as an operational grant.
- 35 However, this is not directly with local government.
- 36 Media is a core area for NED.
- 37 NED works indirectly with parliaments and political parties.
- 38 This figure is for 2010.
- 39 Ibid.

## Montenegro

A total number of 19 donors' data<sup>36</sup> were included in the research. From the data available, donors allocated approx. 123.64 million Euros for the period 2010-2011. From this, an amount of approximately 3.7 million Euros<sup>37</sup> has been allocated for civil society, which is 3% of the total funding. Overall, the World Bank is the biggest donor with approx. 63.7 million Euros allocated<sup>38</sup>, followed by the EU with 34 million Euros. However, their funding to civil society is very limited, i.e. EU allocates less than 1% of their funds to civil society<sup>39</sup>, while the World Bank does not provide such funding. The biggest donor to civil society is by far the Norwegian Embassy, with 1.2 million Euros funds allocated, or 0,6% of their total funding provided for Montenegro (expected to further increase in 2012). EU is the second largest donor with 300,000 Euros in 2009, and 400,000 in 2010. Many of the donors had not allocated any funds for civil society in the surveyed period: World Bank, Oak Foundation, King Baudouin Foundation. On the other hand, BTD, ERSTE Foundation and CS Mott Foundation provide funding only for civil society with a total allocated the amount of 353, 650 Euros. The bellow table outlines specific priority areas for support for each donor.

36 Budgetary information were not available for five donors: Finnish Government, SIDA, Netherlands Embassy, KAS and OSI, thus they are not included in the total amount of funds reported.

37 There was no information available for civil society funding from UNDP, the World Bank, from ADA.

38 However, approx. 70% of the funding, according to the Partnership Strategy Document and list of active project on the web site have not been disbursed.

39 The budgetary information available were for 2009.

Table 19: Donor map Montenegro

DONOR		Funding for Montenegro (2010-11)	Funding for civil society (2010-11)	Environment	Assistance for local community /CSOs and CSO networks	Capacity / technical assistance for civil society	Economic and private sector development	Minority rights and inter-ethnic co-operation	Youth and education	Service provision	Infrastructure	Strengthening civil society – core funding, institution-building	Good governance	Regional co-operation and development assistance	Media development and support	Institution building (including support for political elites)	Capacity / technical assistance for government
Multilateral	EU <sup>1</sup>	€34m	€0.3m <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	CC	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	CC	Y	Y
	OSCE	€2.3m	€33,000 <sup>3</sup>	Y	Y <sup>4</sup>	Y <sup>5</sup>	CC <sup>6</sup>	Y	Y	N <sup>7</sup>	N	Y	Y	CC <sup>8</sup>	Y	Y	Y
	UNDP <sup>9</sup>	\$8m <sup>10</sup>	N/A <sup>11</sup>	Y	CC	CC	Y	Y	N	N	CC <sup>12</sup>	N	Y	CC <sup>13</sup>	N	Y	Y
	UNICEF <sup>14</sup>	€2.44m <sup>15</sup>	€100,760 <sup>16</sup>	CC	CC	CC	N	Y	Y	N	N	CC	Y	CC	CC	N	Y
	World Bank <sup>17</sup>	\$84.2m	N/A	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	CC	N	Y	Y
Bilateral	Austrian Development Agency <sup>18</sup>	€1.5m	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	CC <sup>19</sup>	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y <sup>20</sup>	Y <sup>21</sup>	Y	Y
	Finnish Government <sup>22</sup>	N/A <sup>23</sup>	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N
	Netherlands Embassy <sup>24</sup>	N/A	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	CC	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	CC	Y	Y
	Norwegian Embassy	€2m <sup>25</sup>	€1.2m <sup>26</sup>	Y <sup>27</sup>	Y	Y <sup>28</sup>	CC <sup>29</sup>	Y	Y <sup>30</sup>	CC <sup>31</sup>	N <sup>32</sup>	Y	CC	CC	CC	CC	N
	SlovakAid	€ 2.5m <sup>33</sup>	€ 1.3m <sup>34</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) <sup>35</sup>	N/A	N/A	Y	Y	Y	CC <sup>36</sup>	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	USAID <sup>37</sup>	€4m <sup>38</sup>	€ 0.4m <sup>39</sup>	CC	Y <sup>40</sup>	Y <sup>41</sup>	Y <sup>42</sup>	CC	N	Y <sup>43</sup>	CC	Y <sup>44</sup>	CC	CC	Y <sup>45</sup>	N	Y <sup>46</sup>
Private Donors/ Implementing Agencies	Balkan Trust for Democracy	€175,000	€175,000 <sup>47</sup>	CC	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N <sup>48</sup>	Y	Y	CC	N	CC
	CS Mott Foundation	€142,000	€142,000	CC	Y	Y	CC	CC	CC	N	N	CC	CC	CC	CC	CC	N
	Erste Foundation <sup>49</sup>	€36,650	€36,650	CC	CC	CC	Y	Y	Y	CC	N	N	CC	CC	Y	CC	CC
	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	€1m <sup>50</sup>	N/A <sup>51</sup>	Y	Y	Y	CC	CC	Y	N	N	N	Y <sup>52</sup>	Y	Y	Y	N
	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung <sup>53</sup>	N/A	N/A	N <sup>54</sup>	Y <sup>55</sup>	N	Y	Y	Y	CC <sup>56</sup>	N	N	N	Y	Y <sup>57</sup>	Y <sup>58</sup>	N
	Open Society <sup>59</sup>	N/A	N/A	CC <sup>60</sup>	CC	CC	N	Y <sup>61</sup>	Y <sup>62</sup>	N	N	N	Y	Y <sup>63</sup>	CC	Y	Y <sup>64</sup>
	NDI <sup>65</sup>	\$350,000	\$7,000	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	CC	Y	Y	N	Y	Y

N = No, not an objective or strategy

Y= Yes, an objective and strategy

CC = cross cutting (not a specific objective but an aspect or outcome of other initiatives)

- 1** The EU budgetary information is from an earlier survey. The level of civil society funding was higher in 2009 than in 2010. The information about strategies is derived from the 2009 Country Programme documents available on the DG Enlargement website.
- 2** EIDHR funding for civil society was 350,000 € in 2009 and 400,000 € 2010.
- 3** This figure is for activities within a narrow department. Some of the other activities of the OSCE do have a civil society dimension. The levels of civil society funding in 2010 are the same as 2009 and projected funding for 2011.
- 4** OSCE does not give grants, but interacts with CSOs through working groups.
- 5** OSCE works through national structures for CSO needs on a national/global level.
- 6** OSCE works on economy and environment, mainly on good governance and anti-corruption. This is done to facilitate investment for municipalities.
- 7** OSCE has done this in the past.
- 8** It is not a key part of the OSCE mandate, but there is cross-border work on policing.
- 9** The data were derived from the UNDP Country Programme Republic of Montenegro (2007-2011) available on the UNDP website and verified with a UNDP in Podgorica.
- 10** This figure only includes the programmatic budget, without the operational costs of the UNDP office in Montenegro.
- 11** UNDP had a specific budget for civil society in the past (i.e. 2005).
- 12** UNDP funded infrastructural projects in the context of tourism development.
- 13** Co-operation through the UNDP regional environmental programme.
- 14** UNICEF has a Country Programme Document (<http://www.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/2011-PL3-ODS-Montenegro-English.pdf>).
- 15** \$3,153,707.58.
- 16** Funding for civil society was higher in 2010/2011 compared to 2009/2010. UNICEF understands civil society as the sphere of autonomous associations that are independent of the public and for-profit sectors and designed to advance collective interests and ideas.
- 17** The World Bank did not respond to the request for information, but replied that there are no civil society programmes. The data are derived from the Partnership Strategy document and list of active projects on the website. The budgetary figure is for 2010, with most of the funding (approximately 70%) not disbursed.
- 18** Austrian Development Cooperation did not respond to the request to provide information about its strategies in Montenegro, so the information has been derived using the Montenegro Country Strategy (2010-2012) document found on the Austrian Development Cooperation website.
- 19** Ensuring gender equality is a cross-cutting theme across Austrian Development Cooperation programmes.
- 20** In addition to the country programmes, Austrian Development Cooperation also has regional programmes.
- 21** Austrian Development Cooperation programmes regionally include the area of media.
- 22** The strategies are derived from the Finnish MFA Western Balkans strategy (2009-2013) document.
- 23** The total budget will be 37 million Euros, of which 15 million will be for Kosovo and 11 million for a regional environmental project. The rest of the figures have not been finalised.
- 24** This is based on the information available on the website of the Dutch embassy in Belgrade.
- 25** This is an approximate figure. The budget figures are for both Serbia and Montenegro.
- 26** This is an approximate figure. Funding for civil society is the same as in 2010, and it is expected to increase in 2012.
- 27** The Norwegian Embassy is co-funding a project with GTZ/GIZ: 'Advisory Services to Energy Efficiency (ASE)'.
- 28** The Norwegian Embassy is funding a project to strengthen the Center for Mediation.
- 29** The Norwegian Embassy partially funded a project on 'Development of tourism in central and mountainous regions of Montenegro'.
- 30** The Norwegian Embassy funded the project 'Social science book for secondary school - "Undervegs"':
- 31** The Norwegian Embassy project on the Center for Mediation will ease the burden on courts, so this can be seen as service provision.
- 32** The Norwegian Embassy co-funded a project with the OSCE: 'Safe Ammunition Storage in Montenegro'.
- 33** This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 34** This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 35** SIDA objectives have been derived using the phasing out strategy document available on the SIDA website.
- 36** SIDA has a priority for increasing capacity for planning.
- 37** USAID Montenegro through its programs Good Governance Activity (implemented by East West Management Institute (EWMI)); Economic Growth Program (implemented by Community Housing Foundation (CHF)) and People with Disabilities Initiative (implemented by ORT America).
- 38** The overall budget for USAID in Montenegro will be lower as USAID Montenegro will be phasing out its country programs by July 2013 while USAID is scheduled to close-out in September 2013. Therefore, their last year of funding is actually FY11 (see the number above) and their programs will be operational until June 2013 on FY11 funds.

- 39** Funding for civil society will be lower in 2012 compared to 2011.
- 40** Through PWD program, USAID assists DPOs in five local communities/municipalities.
- 41** Given the expected closure of USAID operation in Montenegro in September 2013, the Mission intends to reinforce its assistance to the national NGO sector by selecting key partner organizations and providing them with target technical assistance that would enable them to further advance their work after closure. This will be implemented through Good Governance Activity.
- 42** USAID's Economic Growth Program strengthens economic competitiveness and capacity of local businesses and government service efficiency in northern Montenegro. This strengthening of economic competitiveness and capacity is focused on key sectors, specifically tourism and agriculture, and improvements in municipal services to better support economic activities in these sectors by providing a more conducive business enabling environment.
- 43** Through PWD program, USAID provides direct support to service provision DPOs.
- 44** As stated under capacity/technical assistance for civil society, USAID will be doing a targeted legacy program with selected key partners heavily focused on institutional building. In addition, USAID continues to provide grants to civil society organizations for program activities which sometimes include core funding.
- 45** USAID's Good Governance Activity has an Investigative Reporting Fund component, aiming to enhance the quality of investigative reporting in Montenegro, through mentoring program and granting scheme for national journalists. This activity assists reporters and editors in gaining fluency in basic investigative reporting skills through story-based, on-the-job mentoring and support.
- 46** Good Governance Activity provides technical assistance to the Government on implementing a program of national level reform activities, including developing and implementing support programs covering business registration reform, regulatory simplification of business licensing and permitting, and development of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) capacity within the Government of Montenegro (GoM). Also, GG Activity provides capacity building assistance to Podgorica Basic Court (BC POD) to improve its court administration, case handling, client services, and transparency. Further, GG Activity is helping Judicial Council to further develop the current Judicial Information System (PRIS) into a modern electronic court and case management system capable of complying with EU requirements. Finally, GG Activity began work to develop a new web presence for the Council and the Courts.
- 47** The BTD funding in Montenegro was lower in 2009 compared to 2010.
- 48** No core funding, but can structure project funding to help build infrastructure.
- 49** Erste Stiftung did not respond to the request for information about its strategies, but did provide budgetary information for an earlier survey. Information about its strategies are derived using information on the foundation's website.
- 50** This figures covers both Serbia and Montenegro. The operative funds represent 60 per cent of the budget.
- 51** Note that one third of the operative funds are allocated to trade unions.
- 52** Mostly training CSOs to engage with government.
- 53** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Montenegro did not respond to the request to provide information about strategies and objectives, but the programme can be found at a regional level, as provided by an official at the Serbia office for the foundation.
- 54** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is working more in this area, so it will be a priority in the future.
- 55** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung provides training and education for CSOs, not funding.
- 56** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung consults with political parties, and CSOs are sometimes involved in this process.
- 57** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung provides training for journalists to become independent through workshops and roundtables.
- 58** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung supports some, but not all, aspects of EU integration processes.
- 59** OSI Montenegro did not respond to the request for information. Programmes are listed on the OSI Montenegro website.
- 60** OSI Montenegro funded a conservation project within its Public Administration Programme.
- 61** OSI Montenegro has a Roma Programme.
- 62** OSI Montenegro has an Education Programme.
- 63** The East East Programme run by OSI is a regional programme.
- 64** OSI Montenegro Capacity Development Programme (CDP).
- 65** NDI closed its office in Montenegro in 2011. The information provided in this table applies for activities carried out in 2010.



## Serbia

The survey in Serbia included 19 donors' data<sup>40</sup>. From the budgetary information gathered, a total amount of approximately 556.294 million Euros has been allocated for the period 2010-2011. From this, 2.2%<sup>41</sup> has been allocated for civil society or approx. 12.337 million Euros. Overall, the World Bank is the biggest donor with 258.35 million Euros followed by the EU with 202 million Euros. The EU and OSI are the biggest donors in the civil society sector with 2 million Euros. Although, there is big discrepancy between them on basis of the amount of funding they provide to civil society in comparison to the other sectors: OSI allocates 40% of their total funds, while the EU only 1%. Similar amount of funds, or precisely 1.968 million Euros is provided by SIDA (16.4% of their total funding allocated for Serbia) Substantial funding is also provided by the Norwegian Embassy with approx. 1.2 million Euros, or 14% of their total funds and is expected to increase in 2012. The following organizations provide funding only for civil society: NED, BTDCS Mott Foundation and Rausing Trust. The bellow table outlines specific priority areas for support for each donor.

<sup>40</sup> Three of the donors did not provide information on the funding available and are excluded from the total amount of funding: NDI, ERSTE Foundation and the KAS. Information on the strategies and objectives were derived from their web pages.

<sup>41</sup> Information for civil society funding was not available for the following donors, thus is excluded from the computation: USAID, UNDP, OSCE, the Wolrd Bank, The Netherlands Embassy, KAS, FES, and ERSTE Foundation.

**Table 20: Donor map Serbia**

DONOR		Funding for Serbia (2010-11)	Funding for civil society (2010-11)	Environment	Assistance for local community /CSOs and CSO networks	Capacity / technical assistance for civil society	Economic and private sector development	Minority rights and inter-ethnic co-operation	Youth and education	Service provision	Infrastructure	Strengthening Civil Society – core funding, institution-building	Good governance	Regional co-operation and development assistance	Media development and support	Institution building (including support for political elites)	Capacity / technical assistance for government
Multilateral	EU	€202m	€2m <sup>1</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	OSCE	€7.5m	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	UNDP <sup>2</sup>	€8m <sup>3</sup>	N/A <sup>4</sup>	Y	CC	Y	Y	CC	CC	Y	Y	N	Y	CC	Y	Y	Y
	World Bank <sup>5</sup>	€258.35m	N/A	Y	Y	CC	Y	CC	Y	CC	Y	N	Y	CC	N	Y	Y
Bilateral	Austrian Development Agency (ADA)	€7-8m <sup>6</sup>	€0.25m <sup>7</sup>	CC	CC	CC	Y	CC	Y	Y	CC	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y <sup>8</sup>
	Finish Government <sup>9</sup>	€205,000	€50,000 <sup>10</sup>	Y	Y	CC	Y	Y	Y	N	Y <sup>11</sup>	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Netherlands Embassy <sup>12</sup>	€1.22m <sup>13</sup>	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	CC	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Norwegian Embassy <sup>14</sup>	€12.8m <sup>15</sup>	€1.2m <sup>16</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	CC	Y	CC	N	Y	CC	CC	CC	CC	N
	Slovak Aid	€2.5m <sup>17</sup>	€1.3m <sup>18</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) <sup>19</sup>	€12m <sup>20</sup>	€1.968m <sup>21</sup>	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	CC	Y	Y <sup>22</sup>	CC	N	Y	Y
	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)	€12.5m <sup>23</sup>	€0.8m <sup>24</sup>	CC	CC	CC	Y	Y	Y	CC	Y	N	Y	Y	CC	Y	Y
	USAID <sup>25</sup>	€23m <sup>26</sup>	N/A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	CC	N	CC	N	Y	CC	Y	Y	Y
Private Donors/Implementing Agencies	Balkan Trust for Democracy	€0.53m	€0.53m <sup>27</sup>	CC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N <sup>28</sup>	Y	Y	CC	N	CC
	BCIF <sup>29</sup>	€1.1m <sup>30</sup>	€0.65m <sup>31</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	CC	Y	Y	N	N <sup>32</sup>	CC	N <sup>33</sup>	N	N	N
	CS Mott Foundation	€0.7m <sup>34</sup>	€0.7m <sup>35</sup>	CC	Y	Y	CC	CC	CC	N	N	CC	CC	CC	CC	CC	N
	ERSTE Foundation	N/A	N/A	CC	CC	CC	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	CC	CC	Y	CC	CC
	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	€1m <sup>36</sup>	N/A <sup>37</sup>	Y	Y	Y	CC	CC	Y	N	N	N	Y <sup>38</sup>	Y	Y	Y	N
	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	N/A <sup>39</sup>	N/A	CC <sup>40</sup>	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	CC	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	NDI	N/A	N/A	N	CC	CC	N	Y	Y <sup>41</sup>	N	N	CC	Y <sup>42</sup>	N	N	Y	N
	NED <sup>43</sup>	\$740,000 <sup>44</sup>	\$740,000	N	Y <sup>45</sup>	N <sup>46</sup>	N <sup>47</sup>	Y	Y	N	N	Y <sup>48</sup>	Y <sup>49</sup>	Y	Y <sup>50</sup>	CC <sup>51</sup>	N
	Open Society	€5m	€2m	CC	Y	N	CC	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	CC
	Rausing Trust	£125,000 <sup>52</sup>	£125,000	N	N	N	N	N <sup>53</sup>	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N

N = No, not an objective or strategy

Y = Yes, an objective and strategy

CC = cross cutting (not a specific objective but an aspect or outcome of other initiatives)

- 1 EIDHR funding for civil society was €1.2m in 2009 and 2010.
- 2 UNDP has a strategic document available online. This questionnaire was filled through a combination of data collected in those documents and phone interview with UNDP staff in Belgrade.
- 3 \$11m
- 4 UNDP defines CSO as 'non-state actors whose aims are neither to generate profit nor to seek governing power. CSOs unite people to advance shared goals and interests.'
- 5 The World Bank did not respond to the request for information, so the strategies are derived from the online database of active projects.
- 6 This figure includes bilateral aid (€3.5m), the regional programme (€3-4m), and the economic development programme (€400-500,000). The bilateral programme is being phased out and replaced by aid channelled through EU. ADA's office in Belgrade will close down in June 2012.
- 7 The NGO programme will remain in the future, as well as the regional and economic development programmes. Nevertheless, support for civil society in Serbia will decrease in the coming years. The NGO, regional and economic development programmes are administered from Vienna.
- 8 This programme weights €5m per year.
- 9 This is entirely based on the data available online, on the websites of the Finnish embassy in Belgrade and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at <http://formin.finland.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=184774>
- 10 Funding for civil society is expected to be the same in 2012/2013.
- 11 Finland funded the EBRD's Western Balkans Fund which was used for the development of municipal infrastructure and transport projects, among other things.
- 12 This is entirely based on the information available on the website of the Dutch embassy in Belgrade.
- 13 This figure is taken from the Report on International Assistance in the Republic of Serbia in 2010 published by the Serbian European Integration Office.
- 14 This is based both on data collected on the website of the Norwegian embassy in Belgrade and on information provided by Jens Erik Grøndahl, Assistant Director General of the Western Balkans Section at the Department for European Affairs and Trade of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway.
- 15 The budget figures are for 2011.
- 16 This figure is an approximation. Funding for civil society is the same as in 2010, and it is expected to increase in 2012.
- 17 This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 18 This figure is for all Western Balkans countries included in this study.
- 19 Activities of the Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in Serbia are guided by Strategy for Development cooperation with Serbia that has been adopted by the Swedish Government and is valid from January 2009 to December 2012.
- 20 Approximately 15 per cent of the funding goes to civil society. Support to central government is the focus of SIDA activities in Serbia.
- 21 Civil society is defined as the part of society that is not part of government authorities at any level, or the private sector. SIDA supports the strengthening of civil society through independent NGOs which are not linked to any government authority at either central or local level. Funding levels for civil society are lower than in 2010 (€2,4m). In 2012, the funding for civil society will be the same as in 2011.
- 22 Projects aimed at increasing collaboration between civil society and government mainly consist in training NGOs to engage with public institutions.
- 23 CHF 15,6m
- 24 CHF 1.1m. This figure stands for the 'small actions' grant, which is not specifically for civil society, but in which NGOs take a major part. The SDC representative in Belgrade clearly stated that the SDC aims at directing aid to state institutions, which it perceives as more sustainable than NGOs.
- 25 This is entirely based on information collected from the USAID website for Serbia (<http://serbia.usaid.gov/home.4.html>).
- 26 \$31.5m
- 27 All funds for civil society. This budget is comparable to 2010, but it will be lower in 2012.
- 28 No core funding, but can structure project funding to help build infrastructure.
- 29 There is a Strategic Plan which outlines BCIF's activities for the period 2009-2011. A summary of this document is available upon request. Currently, BCIF is in the process of strategic planning for the next five years (2012-2016). This will be available in spring 2012.
- 30 This figure is for 2011. In 2010, the total funding was €1,3m.
- 31 This figure is for 2011. In 2010, the funding for civil society was €724,354. In 2012, funding for civil society is expected to be the same as in 2011. Definition of civil society: 'We consider both registered civil society organizations and informal groups civil society. In Serbia the Law on associations has recently been adopted (in 2009) and it regulates the work of associations of citizens. In its programs BCIF works with these kinds of registered forms, but with informal groups as well (citizens gathered around common ideas and goals). We do not give grants to political parties, religious associations, for-profit associations.'
- 32 In principle, BCIF does not provide institutional grants and core funding to CSOs, except in rare cases when it is of utmost importance for persistence of CSOs dealing with particularly sensitive issues such as LGBT for example.
- 33 BCIF operates directly only in Serbia. After the two countries split (Serbia and Montenegro), BCIF helped its Montenegro

office indigenize and supported the establishment of FAKT foundation in Podgorica. BCIF is a member of the regional network of indigenous grant-makers (Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo). The goal of the network is to promote and support development of local philanthropy, local communities, cross-sector partnership and long-term sustainability of civil society in 6 countries in Southeast Europe on national, regional and EU levels. In its efforts to coordinate donors' strategies and exchange experiences, BCIF regularly attends annual meetings of donors active in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, named GEF.

**34** \$945,000

**35** All funds for civil society.

**36** This figure covers both Serbia and Montenegro. The operative funds represent 60 per cent of the budget.

**37** Note that one third of the operative funds are allocated to trade unions. FES mainly works with 3 CSOs in Serbia: the Belgrade Open School, the European Movement, and the Educational Institute of the Democratic Party.

**38** Mostly training CSOs to engage with government.

**39** Interviewee refused to disclose budgetary information.

**40** This is increasingly becoming an explicit objective.

**41** There is a big youth component in their programmes, but it does not involve education.

**42** Mostly work with state institutions to engage with civil society.

**43** Serbia is the third highest priority country for NED, but it may swap with Macedonia in the future (fourth).

**44** This figure is for 2011. The figure for 2010 was \$650,000. NED receives its core funding from Congress, with additional funding for specific needs (e.g. upcoming election). Of the funding, 55% is given to four organisations: NDI, IRI, CIPE and the Solidarity Center. The remaining funds are 'discretionary funds'. The strategic objectives are being formulated for 2012-2017 at present, and there is no estimate of the budgets yet. In addition to the country funding, there was \$400,000 for regional programmes in 2011, which was an increase from \$200,000 in 2010, mainly due to the RECOM programme.

**45** In the discretionary track of NED funding, they only work with indigenous NGOs.

**46** NED rarely funds others to do it.

**47** It is done indirectly through one of the organisations funded by NED, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).

**48** Funding is project-based, but there is flexibility within the award for it to work as an operational grant.

**49** This is not done directly with local government.

**50** Media is a core area for NED.

**51** NED works indirectly with parliaments and political parties.

**52** The Rausing Trust supports two organisations in Serbia at present: the Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC) has a three-year grant for £300,000 from 1 July 2011; and the anti-trafficking organisation ASTRA has a three-year £75,000 grant since 1 November 2010. Thus, the average level of funding is approximately £125,000 per year. The Trust has funded HLC since 2008 and ASTRA since 2009. HLC works in all of the countries of the former Yugoslavia and in Albania.

**53** The Rausing Trust has supported minority rights issues previously.

**Table 21: Total funding per country & civil society sector**

	Total Amount of Funds allocated in EUR	Funding to civil society in EUR	Funding to Civil Society in %	Biggest donors & amount in EUR
<b>Albania</b>	247 million	9,8 million	4	EU - 4.5 million
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	342,8 million	8,5 million	2,5	EU - 4.2 million
<b>Macedonia</b>	206.4 million	5.625 million	2.3	EU - 2.1 million
<b>Montenegro</b>	123.6 million	3.7 million	3	Norwegian Embassy - 1.2 million
<b>Serbia</b>	559.3 million	12.3 million	2.2	EU, SIDA , OSI – each 2 million
<b>Kosovo</b>	240 milion	19.7 million	8	SIDA - 4.2 million

## 5. Conclusions & recommendations

The results of this comprehensive research are certainly not surprising, but they should ring the alarm for the donor organizations and civil society on the worrying trends and the threat to fragility of sustainable democratization and CSDev in the Western Balkans. The following conclusions and recommendation should pave the way towards greater cooperation among all stakeholders in order to create sustainable civil society as essential part of a viable democracy in the Balkans.

### ***EU as a potential hegemonic power***

EU is the most influential donor in terms of the **amount** of assistance and in its **funding repertoire**. It gives extensive provision of support to a wide variety of issues, ranging from “political” to “developmental” and “governance-oriented”. The EU is the only donor that supports all three issues in each of the surveyed countries.

The Commission is the only donor operating in the region to support political, developmental and governance reform consistently and comprehensively. This potentially places the EU in a strong position to determine **the focus of democracy promotion agendas and assistance**. It also means that the **effectiveness of the Commission’s intervention is a critical driver** of how international assistance in the Western Balkans is **perceived and legitimized**.

### ***It’s not about priorities; it’s about long-term core funding***

All donors **prioritize** and support equally **activities** such as capacity-building and policy advocacy. **Multilateral** donors dominate by far in supporting service provision by CSOs and are much less supporting networking. **Bilaterals** are the least interested in educational activities, while **private donors** dominate in the support to networking.

However, a clear distinction between donors exists in terms of **methods of support**. **Multilateral** donors dominate in short-term project grants (up to 24 months) and service contracts, while not a single one of them employs long term “core” funding. While over 80% of the donor respondents to the survey disburse funding for **short-term projects** (up to 24 months or less), **long-term core funding**, is only provided by less than 25% of the donors. The only known donor still offering long-term core funding in the region is SIDA, but it too, has announced a withdrawal.

### ***Relying on small donors, but not working with them***

The Eurocratisation phenomena comes out pronounced in the research, confirming that major donors tend to build and bolster organizations with existing capacities, instead of supporting smaller CSOs. If combined with the fact that smaller donors are the only ones offering long-term or core funding support and lack of structured donor coordination amongst different donors clarifies the great danger for the near future for CSDev as CSOs might be left without any long-term or core funding necessary for the existence of professional-level organization having capacities to absorb EU funding.

### ***Specialization through donor coordination***

As they have done elsewhere in post-communist Europe, most small donors and private foundations priorities CSDev. Larger bilateral and multilateral donors combine support for CSDev with capacity assistance for elites and state institutions, plus some assistance targeted towards transforming the process of political decision making/politics. Small donors operating in more than one country in the

region seem to diversify their provision and focus according to “local” needs and contexts (e.g. BTD in BiH and Macedonia), as well as the amounts of money they commit (e.g. NED in Albania and BiH). They will also vary the percentage of funding channeled through civil society.

There is a **core of larger multilateral and bilateral donors** (e.g. the World Bank, OSCE, USAID, OSI) **promoting very similar issues to the EU across the region**, but not as comprehensively. **Overtly “political” issues** (institution building, technical and capacity assistance for government) are usually only undertaken by **large donors**. Larger donors tend to support the same issues in each country (e.g. USAID).

**Small and medium sized donors (incl. private foundations)** seem to **cluster their assistance** around particular **priorities**, and are increasingly **narrowing the focus** of their provision (e.g. youth and education, minority rights). Other issue areas receive little direct donor support, aside from what the EU provides (e.g. the environment remains a popular issue and aid theme, either through direct funding or as part of a cross cutting objective). Several of the **small donors** are committing **very small (almost negligible) amounts of funding**, yet still seemingly **dispersing it across a number and range of issue areas** (e.g. FES in Kosovo; ERSTE Foundation in Montenegro). It seems that there is **too many donors**, offering **small and declining amounts of funding**, congregating around a **narrow set of issues**. Structuring donor cooperation with specialization by donors might be the only optimal solutions to avoid the duplication and in-effectiveness.

## 6. Implications and challenges for the EU

Assessing the extent to which (i) the EU's role as aid provider in the region is *hegemonic* (normative power) and (ii) the implications for the Commission of the diversification and rationalisation of funding amongst small and medium-sized donors are both complicated judgments to make.

It must, of course, be acknowledged that the stringencies of the Stabilization and Accession process (SAP) for Kosovo and the EU's strategic commitment to enlargement in the Western Balkans require the Commission to provide extensive assistance irrespective of what is offered by other donors. The EU's status and engagement in the territory is immediately different vis-à-vis other donors. The fact that the EU does not act solely as an aid provider both **limits** and **potentially extends its influence**.

One of the most salient criticisms of democracy promotion in post-communist states of the Central and Eastern Europe has been the widespread duplication of initiatives as a consequence of poor donor co-ordination and communication. Therefore, what influence the Commission can *actually* exert as the largest provider of assistance depends on how the EU **responds to and manages the decline and rationalization of funding offered by other donors**, particularly the **small foundations** who tend to provide **CSOs with match-funding and small amounts of core funding that enable organizations to apply for and deliver EU funded projects**.

The data suggest that the EU is confronted in the Western Balkans with **too many donors**, offering **small and declining amounts of funding**, congregating around

a **narrow set of issues**. Although there is evidence of donors, as a consequence of needing to rationalize their overall provision, withdrawing from areas of assistance in which they have been less than successful, and some indication that smaller donors are cultivating reputations for specific specialism, there is little to suggest **overall co-ordination** and a concerted attempt to prevent duplication of initiatives. Rather, there is still **clustering of donor initiatives around certain issues** and no obvious rationalization or co-operation between donors in terms of who funds what. This is arguably not in the Commission's interest.

Whether pursuing developmental, political or governance-oriented strategies, sustainable partnerships between donors are critical and are difficult to establish. Potential recipients of EU assistance rely on smaller donors to provide match funding; as private foundation withdraw or reduce their commitments, the Commission is likely to be faced with an **absorption and dispersal problem**. Amongst the few large and medium-sized donors that are committed to remain in Kosovo, there is little support being offered for building the institutions of civil society (block grants and core funding). The few donors (mostly bilateral or private foundations) who currently offer this type of assistance are withdrawing or rationalising their commitments. The EU, whose global programming resolutely disallows longer-term core funding regardless of the specific context, and still channels its aid through project grants may well **discover that the CSOs it seeks to engage as governance partners can no longer access the basic core funding they require to function**.

As EU calls for projects become more specific and demanding, requiring greater knowledge, capacities and great amount of co-financing, their success will become ever **more dependent** on the capacity training and core funding provided by the host of small donors and foundations that have operated across the territory.

Thus, whilst there is ample evidence here of the EU being the most significant donor right across the region, combining political, developmental and governance-oriented strategies designed to meet the specific challenges of the region as a whole, the extent to which the Commission is able to **steer the democracy promotion agenda** and **encourage greater diversification and co-operation** will determine whether its **role is hegemonic**, and how **successful** its assistance package is likely to be.




# Annex 1: List of websurvey respondents

DFID (Kosovo)	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA (Serbia)
ERSTE Foundation	
EU Delegation to Albania	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Albania)
EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
EU Delegation to Montenegro	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Macedonia)
EU Delegation to Serbia	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation - SDC (Serbia)
European Commission, DG Enlargement	Swiss Cultural Programme in the Western Balkans
European Cultural Foundation	The German Marshall Fund of the US, the Balkan Trust for Democracy
European Fund for the Balkans	The Olof Palme International Center (Serbia)
Fondacija tuzlanske zajednice	Think Tank Fund - Open Society Foundations
Foundation Open Society (Albania)	UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre
Foundation Open Society (Macedonia)	UNDP (Albania)
Foundation Open Society (Serbia)	UNDP (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
German Organisation for International Development (Headquarters)	UNHCR (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
Heinrich Boell Foundation	USAID (Albania)
Hungarian Interchurch Aid	USAID (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
King Baudouin Foundation	USAID (Kosovo)
Mott Foundation	USAID (Macedonia)
National Endowment for Democracy	USAID (Serbia)
OSCE Mission to Montenegro	UniCredit Foundation
OSCE Mission to Macedonia	Westminster Foundation for Democracy
Oak Foundation	The World Bank (Albania)
Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH	The World Bank (Macedonia)
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA (Headquarters)	
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA (Albania)	
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA (Bosnia- Herzegovina)	







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