

Evaluating the **Beyond 2015 Campaign**

Report of the **Participatory Evaluation Meeting**, New York, 29th September 2015

Executive Summary

Key aspects of Beyond 2015's legacy: Space for trust-building and effective quality work among South/North organisations and across silos - Legitimacy of the campaign thanks to its inherent participatory structure and processes - Retrieved confidence on the ability of civil society to come together in a coordinated manner at the global level and produce through a transparent process substantive and timely input for a global intergovernmental process - Determination and ability to enable and empower understanding and partnership between the global North and the global South - Flexibility to adapt to national realities - Methods and procedures to engage organizations in order to build capacity in them, as well as to help them bring the voices of the most vulnerable to the international level - Professional, efficient and neutral secretariat

Threats that could compromise this legacy: **a.** Fragmentation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda at national implementation; and **b.** Loss of the structure for efficient collaboration and coordinated voices that Beyond 2015 has created, particularly in a context of decreasing enabling environments for civil society and NGOs engagement in national realities.

Most complex aspects of engaging in Beyond 2015 for member organisations and their staff: (i) mobilising and engaging; (ii) operating in a complex fast-paced and highly-political environment, on top of it dominated by English; (iii) setting up the right governance and structure; (iv) finding the right schemes for staying together in diversity, and (v) operating, initially, in a scenario of funding uncertainty.

Most rewarding aspects of engaging in Beyond 2015 for member organisations and their staff: (i) shaping global policies and preserving and enhancing space for meaningful participatory and inclusive engagement of civil society in an intergovernmental process; (ii) preserving collective, transparent and inclusive de internal decision-making process and embracing the diversity of views; (iii) capitalising on the power of critical mass for having impact, and (iv) having impact back at home.

I. Background

Context: In September 2015, Beyond 2015 initiated the overall evaluation of the campaign. The evaluation is drawing lessons from the successes and shortcomings of the campaign to make recommendations on how future global campaigns can more effectively influence global decision-making, and how civil society collaboration can most effectively impact on the implementation, monitoring and accountability of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

Aim of the meeting: Understanding how civil society organisations experienced participation in the campaign, and what impact this had on their participation in the post-2015 process.

Format and guidelines: Discussions were structured around 4 sessions, namely: Session 1, The impact on participating organisations and staff; Session 2, The impact on the intergovernmental process; Session 3, The impact on the regions, and Session 4, Summarising the legacy.

Special attention was placed in enabling a participatory meeting, with a view to maximising exchange of ideas and interaction, while facilitating substantive analysis. A combination of

personal time for reflection and compilation of ideas on sticky notes, break out sessions and full group discussions was featured along the programme. The full programme of the meeting is available from here/in Annex 1 to this report.

In the spirit of making the most of everybody's time and experience of the campaign, and ensuring that no voice was left unheard, participants were kindly invited to bear in mind the following guiding principles:

- Freedom to speak up one's mind with candid, frank, constructive and results-oriented criticism.
- Listening ear, open mind and warm heart to contribute to dynamic respectful exchanges, where every voice is heard and speaking time is fairly shared.
- Scrupulous respect for confidentiality beyond the meeting.
- Interconnection between the different sessions to build upon the discussions as they evolve and achieve more than the mere sum of the different parts of the programme.
- English language as working language but never as a communication barrier; and if it becomes one at any moment of the meeting we will work it out.
- Use of mobile phones, email work and social media are not part of the programme for the day in the interest of concentration and full-mindedness.

Participants: Representatives of Beyond 2015 Executive Committee, Secretariat, Regional Coordinators, national leads/focal points, partners, UN Working Group, representatives of 'Supportive States' projects and a number of 'critical friends'. A detailed participants list in Annex 2 to this report.

Secretariat and Executive Committee support: The global Secretariat of the Campaign as well as two Executive Committee members worked directly in the preparation of the meeting. They were in charge of hiring Maruxa Cardama as an external consultant to conceptualise, facilitate and report on the meeting. A detailed profile of Maruxa Cardama is available on LinkedIn. Secretariat staff supported the smooth development of the meeting, included by arranging note taking.

II. Report of the Participatory Evaluation Meeting

This report contains a brief summary of key take away messages commented by external consultant Maruxa Cardama. As such, on occasions it may fall short on detail and nuance. In no instance is conciseness intended to reduce the richness of the views shared, either to align all experiences within the campaign.

II.1. Session 1: The impact of Beyond 2015 on participating organisations and staff

Framing question addressed: How civil society member organisations and their representatives have experienced participation in the campaign? Identifying most rewarding and most complex aspects for individuals and for organisations; as well as the impact of the campaign in their work nationally and thematically.

Details on the questions addressed at this session on the programme in annex 1.

a. The most complex aspects

Mobilising and engaging

- Overcoming the prevalent scepticism around global UN intergovernmental processes.
- Breaking down thematic silos for policy-making and partnering.
- Helping organisations identify how the global process could impact on local and grassroots levels and how engaging in it could facilitate their mission.

- Bringing the campaign to scale and gathering a group wide, inclusive and representative enough at the global, regional and national levels.

Operating in a complex, fast-paced and highly-political environment

- Understanding a highly complex and political process, plentiful of moving targets, which requires deep understanding of multilateralism dynamics and its jargon.
- Operating in a fast-paced process, requiring supersonic reaction times; which could be further accelerated in specific countries or regions in order not to lose timeliness. This reality left hardly any time for reflection in order to learn from successes and failures.
- Surviving the dominance of English at the intergovernmental process added a significant burden to the above. The Latin America region particularly highlighted the impact of the language barrier when engaging with the global works and positions.
- Sustaining an enormous time commitment on top of the 'day-time jobs' of the individual staff representing their organisations, as well as the national focal points/leads and Executive Committee members.

Governance and structure

- Identifying an ambitious while feasible advocacy strategy within the realm of an intergovernmental UN Member State-driven process.
- Explaining engagement opportunities in decision-making and decisions.
- Finding the balance between collecting information at the national and regional levels and keeping a reasonable burden for those in charge. Striking the right amount and regularity for information flow by the Secretariat.
- Striking stability and consistency in the relationship between Beyond 2015 and Action2015.

Let's stay together!

- Explaining that, even if the campaign already moved at high speed globally, certain countries or regions had to work even quicker in order to remain timely and impactful in that given geographical area. This required mutual understanding to make sure that members could appreciate that those different paces did not imply hidden agendas from that national/regional initiative to spin off from the global campaign. The case study evoked is the European Task Force, which had to follow a particularly fast track due to the external pressure coming from the timelines of the European Union institutions. European civil society followed that pace. However the global campaign required more time to come up with global positions and time was invested in going back to basics to develop the 4 conceptual foundations for the post-2015 framework: Vision, Purpose, Values and Criteria.
- Overcoming the natural tension between widening the circle of organisations engaged and not losing substance. Or contemplated from another perspective, demonstrating that common positions can be elaborated even when not all organisations agree on all details; provided that difference is embraced as richness and recognised. This can be illustrated with the case of a given position paper that received 80 pages of comments.
- Learning to identify and prevent the risk of becoming a mouthpiece for governments.
- Working with and empowering the existing structures and organisations is identified as often challenging and always rewarding when achieved. The different regional views expressed indicate different perceptions on whether the campaign maximised its potential to work with and empower existing structures. The most complex phase to this regard was the initial one.

Money, money, money

- Operating within the funding uncertainty so inherent to civil society organisations. The funding scarcity at the initial stages overstretched the work of coordinators.
- Establishing balanced fund-raising relationships between different existing organisations, themes and fund-raising strategies was complex and at times success was mitigated.
- Getting the 3 country donors (Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland) to accept putting the money into a common basket - pool funding – was a significant achievement. It created flexibility and reduced the reporting burden; while it allowed to configure a ‘donor coordination group’ for open regular dialogue.

b. The most rewarding aspects

Shaping global policies and enhancing the space for meaningful civil society engagement

- Setting the vision and political strategy for the campaign (VPVC) and later identifying its Policy to Action messages.
- Offering different organisations from both the North and the South a space where to work together and learn from each other.
- Preserving and enhancing space for meaningful participatory and inclusive engagement of stakeholders and civil society in UN intergovernmental process.
- Widening the sample for diverse and representative engagement of stakeholders and civil society in UN intergovernmental process.
- Getting language in the outcome document of the intergovernmental process reflective of fundamental positions of the campaign.
- Igniting a process of mission renewal and refocus in individual organisations, parallel to their contribution to a global agenda.

Standing on equal foot

- Preserving collective decision-making at all stages even when complex is key for ownership and engagement by all members.
- Finding inclusive language that embraces diversity, reflects a wide range of realities and profiles difference as richness.
- Guaranteeing awareness-raising and information sharing.

The power of critical mass

- Allowing organisations to feel empowered through a global collaboration, while increasing their legitimacy and credibility at the national level, thanks to being part of the campaign.
- Broadening the scope of countries to carry out national consultations and therefore provide inputs.

Impact at home

- Tending bridges and offering space and flexibility for adapting the work at the national level. On a complementary note, the case of the creation of thriving national hubs, particularly in Latin America was evoked.
- Building on existing networks and relationships to avoid the risk of being the type of global campaign that parachutes down only when it is convenient.
- Facilitating new connections between organisations and the local and national governments at country level.

II.2. Session 2: The impact of Beyond 2015 on the intergovernmental process

Framing question: What are the overall lessons learnt, both positive and negative, in terms of advocacy impact and effectiveness in securing improvements in the Post 2015 process and outcome?

Details on the questions addressed at this session on the programme in annex 1.

a. Shortcomings

1. Not enabling people living in poverty to participate in intergovernmental negotiation sessions.
2. Not closing the loop between influencing the intergovernmental process and acting back at the national and the regional levels. On a complementary note, it was indicated that it was difficult to get members to engage directly in lobby activities during the intergovernmental negotiation sessions in the UN headquarters in New York. The need for solid and multi-sectoral lobby capacities, as well as for knowledge of UN process are identified as the main reasons.
3. Not influencing enough the monitoring and review discussions between UN member states. It is evoked that the campaign may have suffered from slow reaction time on a topic where the window of political influence was particularly narrow and short.
4. Obtaining meagre results regarding the relationship between Means of Implementation for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Financing for Development track. It is perceived that the overlaps between the organisations working on both intergovernmental tracks could have been coordinated and exploited better.
5. Not managing to counterbalance what is perceived as an exacerbated focus on sustained economic growth in the final 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
6. In the European Union: Not further pushing countries to be more progressive. The need for finding common EU positions is evoked as the *realpolitik* reason behind this.
7. In Latin America and the Caribbean: Not achieving as good dialogue with national governments as what it had been hoped for. Multilateralism not being sufficiently developed for a notion is evoked as the reason.
8. In Africa: Not improving the involvement and mobilisation of francophone African countries.

b. Accomplishments

1. Helping campaign members understand and approach their contribution as an opportunity to change the world and not just 'their world'.
2. Obtaining an UN led-process and not one left solely to the national level.
3. Shaping the initial conversations and finally obtaining a single post-2015 framework reconciling the multilateral tracks on development (post-Millennium Development Goals MDGs) and sustainable development (post Rio+20 and the Sustainable Development Goals SDGs).
4. Operationalising the adagio of 'leaving no one behind' in a two-way approach that reconciles both the top-down and the bottom-up directions. Working to explain at the national and local levels the relevance and impact of the intergovernmental process and its resulting agenda; while channelling local and national needs into the intergovernmental process and carrying out reality-checks of the political developments in the process.
5. Facilitating the ownership of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by civil society organisations. Increasing the general awareness and also the technical knowledge of the post-2015 intergovernmental process and the SDGs within the campaign's membership, as well as across the broader public.
6. Increasing and solidifying space for stakeholders and civil society engagement in the UN, including speaking roles; as well as for interaction between civil society and governments. Helping the intergovernmental process and the UN system further appreciate the value of civil

society's input and push. Creating a *crescendo* from consultation exercises and side-events to direct influencing and shaping.

7. Making the UN system engage stakeholders and civil society beyond UN Major Groups, in order to widen the scope of participation and representation (including geographical balance) and to bring new actors to the table.
8. Elaborating and channelling into the intergovernmental process structured, substantive and timely inputs from civil society organisations.
9. Contributing to triggering regular dialogue between civil society organisations and national governments. Also contributing to the accreditation of civil society representatives within national delegations participating in the intergovernmental negotiations – for instance the Mexican delegation, which is perceived as an example of creating a virtuous circle of collaborative approach.
10. Using inclusive media and communications tools for outreach, which ended up becoming powerful advocacy tools. As regards the impact of the use of Twitter, it would seem that the views are different across campaign members. Those who had direct exposure to and participation in the intergovernmental negotiations sessions at the UN headquarters in New York could perceive the impact of tweets by Beyond 2015 on the negotiation room. As an example, the author of this report is taking the liberty of evoking that the Kenyan and Irish co-facilitators' teams; the UN system and the wider civil society network would very frequently echo Beyond 2015 tweets.
11. In the European Union: Pushing the European Commission to make the sustainable development and the development sectors come together in their internal work, in turn pushed the UN to do so. This also implied helping EU countries come to terms with the current global state of affairs and accept that we are all developing countries.
12. In Africa: Influencing regional positions/processes (regional indicators, African Union position, data revolution) and parliamentarians; as well as pushing for early focus on implementation. As an example, it was mentioned that engaging with the UN Development Programme in Botswana enabled civil society organisations to reach the government.
13. In Asia and Pacific: Improving the engagement of civil society organisations with the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, resulted in close collaboration and regular information sharing with the resident coordinator and other relevant staff - particularly for the Pacific.

c. Unique influence in the intergovernmental negotiations process

1. Close links between Beyond 2015 vision and the overarching vision of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.
2. Having equality as a stand alone SDG of the framework finally adopted.
3. The Pacific region underscores its very strong influence in the inclusion of the stand-alone SDG on oceans.
4. Language by the campaign on the final outcome document of the intergovernmental process regarding the notions of: leaving no one behind; no target can be considered met until it's met for all; universality and integrated approach of the agenda; planetary boundaries; climate action; accountability, particularly for the private sector; alternative measures of progress and participation.
5. Strong human rights language in the report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons is attributed to the inclusion in the panel of a civil society representative selected by the campaign and more notably to the fact that Beyond 2015 was asked to proof read early drafts with a human rights lens

As general comments, it is observed that:

- It is fundamental to measure impact and assess success beyond the wording of an outcome document of an intergovernmental process. It is underscored that the campaign's legacy goes well beyond that aspect.
- Though the campaign was results oriented, yet assessing its advocacy results is very difficult. Particularly complex is the assessment of where does coincidence end and real influence begin: What did the campaign influence during the intergovernmental negotiation process and its outcome document that would not have been there without the campaign's action?

C. Session 3: The impact of Beyond 2015 on the regions

Framing question: What is “the” difference the campaign has made in each region that would have not been achieved otherwise, both in terms of the engagement of individual organisations in the post 2015 process and of overall regional mobilisation?

Details on the questions addressed at this session on the programme in annex 1

a. Areas for improvement identified irrespective of regions

- Identification of regional leadership in order to avoid action gaps or discontinuity and improvement of regional coordination.
- Clearer relationship between the Executive Committee and regional and national structures.

b. Latin America and the Caribbean

Highlights achieved

- Impact of awareness raising and extensive understanding of lessons learnt with MDGs.
- Regional coalitions and national platforms for coordination and advocacy, including between organisations that had not worked together previously.

Implementation & partnerships: Drivers to be maintained

- Very good relations with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Multi-disciplinary engagement at national and regional levels.
- Working on the basis of existing organisations, platforms and structures.
- The Idea of establishing a regional secretariat should be integrated in the fund-raising strategy of a successor campaign.

Threats

- Governments pushing to shut down space for civil society, linked to survival of the NGOs.
- Absence of ‘one-stop-shop’ interlocutor for the region unlike in Europe (the EU).
- Organisations sometimes are excessively inward looking to the detriment of not reaching out enough to others, especially to grassroots organisations.

c. North America

Highlights achieved

- Re-engagement of civil society in global processes.
- Reinvigorated appetite for understanding and partnerships between the global North and global South.
- Re-establishment, to a certain level, of dialogue and collaboration between civil society organisations/NGOs and governments.

Implementation & partnerships: Drivers to be maintained

- Flexibility for adapting a global campaign to regional and national contexts and needs.
- Empowerment of existing organisations and structures.

Threats

- Little coordination between Canada and US. The US not wanting to be seen pushing the process and Canada remaining sceptical about the UN. Besides, the rapport between governments and civil society organisations/NGOs remains complex.
- Capacity issues for smaller organisations, combined with the fact that bigger ones tend to focus on working overseas.
- Complexity of synergies with other existing global campaigns, both in terms of fund-raising and work programme.

d. Europe

Highlights achieved

- Success in being able to trigger and sustain a fast pace for coordination and agreement in order to remain timely vis-à-vis EU institutions timelines, without compromising relevance.
- Reconciliation of the development and the sustainable development communities and their groupings.

Implementation & partnerships: Drivers to be maintained

- Peer to peer learning: Huge added value from national platforms' exchange on what happens at country level.
- Good relationships with key EU institutions officials and with the Brussels offices of NGOs.
- Awareness of the complexities but also of the need of the achieving representative and balanced North-South leadership and engagement.

Threats

- Essential to focus on evolving politics and perhaps less on policy (the Brexit scenario and the Greece economy contexts are evoked), with implications for budgetary cuts fund-raising potential. A scenario with the UK out of the EU could further complicate getting UK NGOs engaged. It can also bring other possibilities that should be mapped out early on.
- Perception that the European Task Force is over Nordic; and, at times, too determined by the works of EU institutions. Going beyond 'white Brits' for representing the campaign was evoked as an initial challenge faced by the campaign.
- The language on accountability and biodiversity of the global 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is less ambitious than the current one operating via EU legislation and policy.
- Fragile environments for a multi-disciplinary approach to implementation. EU Commission directorates for development and for the environment may not have enough political capital to push this agenda forward long-term within the EU. Civil society organisations do not regularly enjoy good relationships in ministries of trade, commerce and finance.

e. Africa

Highlights achieved

- Introduction of national lead agencies and focal points.
- Empowerment of new civil society actors in Africa.
- Solid communications and advocacy materials of the campaign helped civil society organisations build their reputation vis-à-vis governments and opened doors for sustained engagement. Zimbabwe or the African Union are referred to as very positive examples.

Implementation & partnerships: Drivers to be maintained

- The highest percentage of members to the campaign comes from this region.
- Understanding of the politics that play out among different civil society organisations and their different roles. The case study of Kenya was identified as a good practice: Key Kenyan players on the post-2015 agenda were invited to a meeting at which they distributed roles among themselves and agreed a strategy forward. A wider follow up meeting allowed for getting others on board.
- Engagement of civil society actors, including small organisations

Threats

- Need to create strong fully fleshed national hubs that to go beyond individuals. Besides, go beyond the engagement of organisations based solely or primarily on the financial resources made available to them.
- Call for more thorough impact assessment, at least for certain countries. The lack of sufficient accountability mechanisms to monitor and assess what partners did with the money in some countries entails substantial risks of reduced credibility and impact. Nigeria is evoked.
- Challenge with expertise and capacity to engage at global level. Widening the scope of involved actors too quickly in a successor campaign may be detrimental in terms of the key skills and competences required.
- The creation of a strong regional civil society coordination mechanism is an outstanding task. Mobilisation in big numbers in Africa is not always a form of legitimacy and does not automatically entail advocacy capacity or influence.
- National and local relevance. In general terms, the Beyond 2015 brand did not find all the traction with African governments that had been hoped for.

f. Asia

Highlights achieved

- Strengthened trust and alliances among civil society organisations, as well as leadership.
- Regional dialogue gave purpose to country work and issues.
- Multi-stakeholder engagement in policy-making thanks to Beyond 2015 capacity building (materials and workshops).
- South Korea indicated that the reporting system of Beyond 2015 was very useful for mobilisation and particularly highlighted the positions on SDGs localisation; the survey on implementation, and the comparison between civil society positions and the official government position.

Implementation & partnerships: Drivers to be maintained

- Letters sent to UN missions created space for dialogue.
- The many events organised at local level reinforced the culture of citizen engagement and the possibilities for local impact.

Threats

- Need to evaluate what would be the best structure to maximise the engagement potential in the region. Not all the potential has been used because of the strong engagement inequalities, as well as of the rivalry among Asian countries. Big Asian countries like India and Bangladesh did not engage much and no engagement existed in Vietnam, Thailand, Bhutan or Afghanistan.
- For implementation, academics must be brought into the conversation. I will help with governments' trust.

g. Pacific

Highlights achieved

- Regional identity and solidarity created.
- Model for work method and structure: PIANGO wants to replicate the Beyond 2015 model.
- Different accountability mechanisms via, on the one hand the contract between Beyond 2015 and PIANGO; and also via subcontracting PIANGO to manage all the contracting with lead agencies in the Pacific.

Implementation & partnerships: Drivers to be maintained

- Building constituency-based networks.
- Resources for skilled staff, who were also able to work through time zones.

- Involvement of countries that did not have national hubs/member organisations in the process.
- New actors and even relatively small organisations have been empowered and seen their capacity for understanding global processes and engaging nationally substantially improved.

Threats

- Regional coordination needs to be improved in order to become more strategic and functional.
- Dilution of the Pacific into a merger of Asia-Pacific.
- Major concern about how to ensure a transition to a new structure/framework within March 2016 as Beyond 2016 ends.

D. Session 4 - Summarising the legacy of Beyond 2015

a. The “one” thing that could or should have been done differently

1. Enabling the direct participation of people living in poverty.
2. Achieving and operationalising strategic synergies with existing global campaigns from early on, in follow up of the efforts that were put into dialogue towards this - particularly with the Global Call to Action Against Poverty GCAP
3. More globally representative and balanced leadership from the beginning.
4. Enhanced coordination between the global, regional and national levels in all directions via the Executive Committee.
5. More initiatives to build capacity for advocacy in regional teams, including more face-to-face meetings.
6. Working more with the media, particularly at the national and local levels.
7. Engaging in conversation with the private sector.
8. Hiring professional staff earlier. Some organisations felt they could have dedicated staff and own resources at the regional and national levels from earlier on in order to better cope with the endeavour of following a complex global process.
9. Creating an enabling framework for best practice identification and peer learning across regions and inter-regionally from early on.

b. The key aspects of the campaign’s legacy

1. Space for trust-building and effective quality work with among South/North organisations and across silos.
2. Legitimacy of the campaign thanks to its inherent participatory structure and processes.
3. Retrieved confidence on the ability of civil society to come together in a coordinated manner at the global level and produce substantive and timely input for a global process through a transparent process.
4. Determination and ability to enable and empower understanding and partnership between the global North and the global South.
5. Flexibility of the campaign to adapt to national realities.
6. Methods and procedures to engage organizations in order to build capacity in them, as well as to help them bring the voices of the most vulnerable to the international level.
7. Professional, efficient and neutral secretariat.

c. Main threats that could compromise or destroy the legacy

Fragmentation of the 2030 Agenda at the national implementation

Possible triggers:

- a. Perverse mainstreaming of issues; watering-down; or cherry-picking beyond national prioritisation; as well as reverting back to silos when adapting the global agenda into national policies. It is perceived that the power dynamics in the UN membership have not evolved as much as it would have been hoped for and that this could have negative impacts for the implementation and the accountability dimensions.
- b. Inadequate communication campaigns that undermine the sustainable development character of the agenda, its integrated approach or its universality. The risk posed by the trivialisation approach and messages by “the Global Goals” is underscored as an example.
- c. Dissipated civil society engagement at the national level and shift back to the global North in the drivers’ seat.
- d. Lack or inadequate funding. The weakness of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda as the outcome of the Financing for Development process puts the whole vision in a string.
- e. Kidnapping of the Agenda by the private sector with no adequate public codes of conducts and controls.
- f. Inadequate indicators at the global and national levels or absence of measurement for what we treasure. Absence of genuine localisation or adaptation to local realities and needs.

Possible actions to counterbalance the triggers:

- a. Continue the socialisation and dissemination of the SDGs across civil society organisations at the national and regional levels making smart use of Beyond 2015 existing communications strategies and tools.
- b. Enable combined mobilisation (social support) and advocacy strategies for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at all levels from global, to regional, national and local.
- c. Respect the ownership of the 2030 Agenda by governments and collaborate with them to help them improve their ownership and capacity.
- d. Support the creation of new national councils or commissions for integrated SDGs implementation.
- e. Enable national civil society shadow reports for accountability, including identification and sharing of good implementation practices at the regional level.
- f. Reconnect the SDGs and the discussions on Means of Implementation and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda at all levels.

Loss of the structure for efficient collaboration and coordinated voices that Beyond 2015 has created, particularly in a context of decreasing enabling environments for civil society and NGOs engagement in national realities.

Possible triggers:

- a. If there is no collective understanding of the unique and unprecedented legacy achieved by the campaign.
- b. If we fall in Post-2015 fatigue and let the lack of a clear strategy with critical next steps reign.
- c. If the urgency to avoid an hiatus, maintain the space and collaborative approach created by Beyond 2015 and securing funding for a successor campaign is neglected.
- d. If the mission of a successor campaign is not adjusted to what is needed and cannot offer complementarity and added value with existing structures, organisations and other campaigns.
- e. If vested interests behind CSOs and politics among them are left uncontrolled and decision-making is only left in the hands of those who also control the moneys.

Possible actions to counterbalance these triggers:

- a. Establish a relevant, focused, timely, well-funded and participatory successor campaign with clear and transparent governance structures to build upon the results achieved and address the upcoming needs and in complementarity to other existing global campaigns.
- b. Reaffirm the democratic principles, transparency, accountability and participation of the campaign
- c. Conduct meaningful and timely evaluations of the campaign' successes, failures and legacy.
- d. Build on existing campaign structures, encouraging engagement and not being afraid of constructive conflict.
- e. Identify clear strategic objectives in consultation with relevant actors and immediate outreach to communicate and also to learn. Be inclusive and transparent from day one to build fundamental anchoring alliances, even if it takes a bit longer to take off.
- f. Establish a minimum of basic funding for global, regional and national coordination.
- g. Consider the establishment of neutral and professional regional secretariats. This is an idea particularly dear to the Latin America and the Caribbean region.
- h. Achieve presence at the global, regional and national levels, with a focus on engagement in the High Level Political Forum at the global level and on rethinking the presence and networks at the national level in order to work in a more structured manner for longer-term impact.
- i. Elaborate a methodological guide for engaging with governments and multilateral entities around implementation plans, accountability mechanisms and monitoring and review systems.
- j. Better understand how to work and create alliances with subnational & local authorities.
- k. Analyse national implementation plans to find gaps and strengths.

Annex 1 – Programme

Evaluating the Beyond 2015 Campaign Agenda for participatory evaluation meeting

9:30-17:15 29th September 2015
Roger Smith Hotel, 501 Lexington Avenue, New York

Time keeping will be strictly observed

9:15 Arrival of participants

9:30 Welcome and introduction

Tour de table and review of the campaign timeline 2010-2015

By Leo Williams and Maruxa Cardama

10:10 Session 1: The impact of Beyond 2015 on participating organisations and staff

Framing question we aim to address: How civil society member organisations and their representatives have experienced participation in the campaign?

- Question a. What have been the most rewarding and the most complex aspects of participating in the campaign from your individual perspective?
- Question b. What have been the key obstacles or barriers experienced and how did your organisation work around them? If the obstacles or barriers have persisted until now, what has been the key reasons for that?
- Question c. How did the campaign affect your work nationally and thematically?

Organisation of the session:

- 10 minutes: Time group reflection on how each organisation was involved with the campaign, e.g. taskforces, steering groups, side events etc.
- 10 minutes: Time for individual introspective reflection for each participant to articulate 3 key messages per question (i.e. 3 obstacles/barriers experienced when engaging with the campaign and the solution found or the reason for its persistence; 3 most rewarding and 3 most complex aspects at a personal/organisational level).
- 20 minutes: Sharing experience and exchanging views in breakout groups to identify collective themes/experiences
- 45 minutes: Open discussion among all participants

11:45 Session 2: The impact of Beyond 2015 on the intergovernmental process

Framing question we aim to address: What are the overall lessons learnt, both positive and negative, in terms of advocacy impact and effectiveness in securing improvements in the Post 2015 process and outcome?

- Question a. What have been main the accomplishments, both planned and unplanned, achieved by the campaign? These can be general achievements/outcomes or specific products/outputs. What have been the triggers of the unplanned successes?
- Question b. What critical shortcomings, both foreseen and unforeseen, have emerged? Have these shortcomings compromised the objectives of the campaign? What have been the triggers of the unforeseen shortcomings?
- Question c. What did the campaign influence during the intergovernmental negotiation process and its outcome document that would not have been there without the campaign's action?

Organisation of the session:

- 15 minutes: Time for individual introspective reflection for each participant to articulate the 4 key messages per question (i.e. 4 accomplishments, 2 planned and 2 unplanned, indicating 2 triggers for the unplanned; 4 shortcomings, 2 foreseen and 2 unforeseen, commenting whether any of them compromises the objectives of the campaign and indicating 2 triggers for each unforeseen shortcoming; 1 influence by the campaign).
- 75 minutes: Open discussion among all participants

13:30 Lunch break (lunch served on site)

Food for thought: What has been "the" anecdote of your involvement in the campaign that will put a smile on your face when you think back about Beyond 2015 in some years time? Think of that moment of blissful excitement or empowerment, of unexpected frustration or awkwardness, of uncontrollable laughter or defiant loss of words. Participants keep of course the personal choice of keeping it as individual introspective reflection or sharing it with colleagues at their ease.

14:15 Session 3: The impact of Beyond 2015 on the regions

Framing questions we aim to address: What is "the" difference the campaign has made in each region that would have not been achieved otherwise, both in terms of the engagement of individual organisations in the post 2015 process and of overall regional mobilisation?

- Question a. What have been the highlights achieved by the campaign in each region?
- Question b. What are the critical drivers based on campaign's accomplishments that need to be maintained in each region for participatory, inclusive and responsive multi-stakeholder partnerships for implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda to flourish and subsist?

Organisation of the session:

- 45 minutes: Discussions in breakout groups
- 30 minutes: Report from breakout groups

15:45 Session 4 - Summarising the legacy of Beyond 2015

- Question a. In retrospect, what is the “one” thing that could or should have been done differently?
- Question b. What is the key campaign’s legacy?
- Question c. What are the main threats that could compromise or destroy the legacy?
- Question d. Five key actions that can build upon and capitalise on the legacy of Beyond 2015 and pave the way for participatory, inclusive and responsive multi-stakeholder partnerships for implementation, as well as monitoring and accountability frameworks. What is the sphere of action for these actions - international, regional, national, subnational, community-based?

Organisation of the session:

- 10 minutes: Time for individual introspective reflection for each participant to articulate the key messages per question (i.e. 1 thing that could or should have been done differently; key elements/buzzwords of the legacy; main threats to the legacy; and 5 actions within June 2016)
- 60 minutes: Open discussion among all participants

16:55 Conclusions and practical next steps

By Secretariat staff

17:15 End of the meeting and farewell to participants

Annex 2 – List of participants

To be pasted by Secretariat please