

Beyond2015

Beyond 2015 Campaign Final Evaluation

December 2015

Summary Report

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and commissioned by Beyond 2015

The full version of this report is available at <http://www.beyond2015.org/our-learning>





FOREWORD

“Even in literature and art, no man who bothers about originality will ever be original: whereas if you simply try to tell the truth (without caring twopence how often it has been told before) you will, nine times out of ten, become original without ever having noticed it.” C. S. Lewis



Andrew Griffiths

Philipp Schönrock

Beyond 2015 has never been too worried about whether it is original or ground-breaking; it has always been a hard-working and results-focused campaign, aiming for change and not profile. Yet, partly because of this relentless focus on what works, we believe that the Beyond 2015 campaign has broken new ground and found original solutions to the problems it has faced.

One important aspect of the campaign, highlighted in this evaluation, is that so many people have contributed to its success. If we had to list all the people who have effectively contributed this would be a very long and very dull foreword. It is also important to note that the campaign has been more than the sum of its parts – the influence we have had is almost entirely down to the ability of individual members to work constructively together to present a cohesive civil society perspective on the post-2015 process. It has been a triumph of the collective over the individual, and this was critical in gaining the respect of those we sought to influence.

However, it would not be possible to speak of the campaign without making special mention of the Secretariat. Leo Williams has been a driving and organising force, without whom the campaign would not have succeeded; but the whole Secretariat and Regional Coordinators have been the beating heart of the campaign from its inception until its end. Civil society is indebted to these hard-working and inspirational people, who have been an absolute delight to work with.

The campaign has taken many momentous decisions – the **VPVC** (vision, purpose, values, criteria), the “pincer movement” and **“Policy to Action”** are three that particularly come to mind – but we believe that the decision to have a full and honest evaluation, in order to preserve the legacy of Beyond 2015, will potentially be the most long-lasting. This evaluation has effectively captured the brilliance of the campaign, and our task now is to disseminate its findings and to make sure that the lessons we have learnt remain the property of all civil society.

We can honestly say that co-chairing Beyond 2015 has been one of the highlights of our respective careers; although we are looking forward to continuing to work together as we turn the words of Agenda 2030 into actions that change people's lives.

Andrew Griffiths and Philipp Schönrock
Beyond 2015 Co-Chairs



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter 1

Effectiveness and impact in achieving the goals of Beyond 2015



1. Beyond 2015 fully achieved its goals. The campaign was decisive in pushing for and operationalising a transparent, participatory and inclusive process at the UN. It was a strong and early advocate for a single-track process (development and sustainable development together), and was instrumental in securing a Post-2015 framework responsive to the voices of those affected by poverty and injustice. At the global level, Beyond 2015 was very influential in helping the UN System engage stakeholders and civil society beyond UN Major Groups and ensure better North/South geographical balance. Beyond 2015 excelled in channeling structured, substantive and timely inputs from CSOs – elaborated on the basis of transparent and collaborative approaches – into the intergovernmental process. It helped campaign members understand their contribution as an opportunity to change the world and not just “their world”, and facilitated their ownership of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

2. There is a **high degree of satisfaction with the effectiveness of the campaign’s intervention approaches and tools.** **Strengths** included: (a) Galvanising a critical mass of organisations from the global South and North, while allowing for a diversity of views; (b) positioning a campaign with clear advocacy principles and values; (c) elaborating substantive, relevant and timely positions throughout the intergovernmental process; (d) operating at the international, regional and national levels in the spirit of a decentralized campaign, through the “pincer movement”. The **shortcomings** relate to: (a) English language dominance; (b) scarce face-to-face meetings; (c) limited adaptation of intervention approaches and tools; (d) lack of a structured framework for cross-fertilization across regions; (e) poor external communications, and (f) a somewhat unresolved dichotomy between an advocacy and a mobilisation campaign.

3. Beyond 2015’s impact on civil society collective action and engagement with the UN is mostly seen in a positive light for several reasons: (a) mobilising, empowering and improving civil society capacity to engage in complex intergovernmental processes; (b) offering Northern/Southern organisations a space in which to learn to work together and from one another; (c) showing that self-organised, cross-constituency and coordinated CSO engagement in intergovernmental processes at a global scale can deliver; (d) bringing new voices and grassroots experiences to the UN, overcoming the general fragmentation of civil society and providing a platform for CSOs unfamiliar with the sustainable development track;

(e) maximising the UN mandate for the engagement of “other stakeholders”; (f) contributing to enhancing the internal accountability of the UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders system, and (g) creating or fostering capacity to adopt new working tools. **Perceived shortcomings** around Beyond 2015’s impact on civil society collective action and engagement with the UN: (a) initial dominance by Northern NGOs, particularly from the UK; (b) absence of clear synergies or demarcations with existing campaigns; (c) finding the balance between introducing new voices and lobbying expertise; (d) at the global level, not clarifying the campaign’s relation with the UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders system and taking up space; and (e) discontinuing pressure and engagement after the September UN Summit. **These shortcomings constitute important open questions that must be addressed and resolved among civil society campaigns, UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders.**

4. The legacy of any advocacy campaign goes well beyond words. Having said so, UN officials and representatives of Member States seem to have genuinely welcomed and thoroughly considered the inputs of the campaign. **Critical elements of Beyond 2015’s advocacy which made instrumental contributions to the final outcome document** include: (a) the campaign’s vision for the Agenda; (b) the universal, integral, interlinked and ambitious nature of the new Agenda; (c) the strong human rights language; (d) the principles of “leaving no one behind” and of “no target can be considered until met for all segments of society;” (e) Individual SDGs on gender, inequality, sustainable consumption and production, climate, and peaceful and inclusive societies; (f) protection of the Planet as an overarching principle; (g) participation of civil society and all stakeholders as an end in itself, and (f) accountability mechanism at three levels – global, regional and national. **Advocacy shortcomings:** (a) scarce engagement with “difficult” Member States; (b) not enabling people living in poverty to participate directly in intergovernmental negotiation sessions; (c) not sufficiently closing the loop between the global, regional and national levels; (d) limited influence in the monitoring and review chapter of the Agenda, one of its less ambitious chapters; (e) meager results regarding the relationship between Means of Implementation for the SDGs and the Financing for Development track, and (f) not counterbalancing an exacerbated focus on sustained economic growth.

5. The decision to work at the international, regional and national levels is a highlight of the campaign. However, whilst Beyond 2015 is perceived as highly performing at the international level, there is little satisfaction with work at the regional level, except in Europe and Africa. Work at the national level is perceived as well performing, with varying degrees of satisfaction by country.

6. Beyond 2015 did not become a mouthpiece in the intergovernmental negotiations. This speaks volumes of both the respectful and neutral attitude of donors—Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden - and of the good management of the situation by Beyond 2015. Challenges evoked are: (1) Beyond 2015 created a demand to which, at times, it could not respond; (2) it endured the knock-on effect of shaking civil society's engagement with the UN and the traditional platform of UN Major Groups; (3) at moments, it was perceived as too prominent, due to critical mass and presence; (4) at moments, it did not push Member States for more progressive outcomes, and (5) it could have sharpened some advocacy positions.

7. Preserving space for stocktaking, reflection and recalculation, as well as managing innovation when operating in a fast-paced environment was incredibly challenging and at times impossible.

Chapter 2

Structure, governance, management and partnerships



8. Beyond 2015 achieved exceptional levels of self-organised governance, anchored in the principles of collective decision, inclusivity, transparency and accountability. The campaign devoted very substantial effort to operationalising structures at the international, global and national levels and in many instances adopted tailored-made approaches. Structural, institutional or coordination issues that hindered the campaign's effectiveness in general relate to: (a) the lack of sufficient and continuous Executive Committee leadership and its limited decisions to mitigate the coordination difficulties at the regional and national levels; (b) deficient overall coordination of regional coordinators and national structures; (c) cumbersome bureaucracy and delays in disbursement of funds to regional coordinators and to national lead agencies; (d) rough transitions and hand overs.

9. There is relative satisfaction with the performance of the Executive Committee, but unanimous appreciation and gratitude to its members for graciously accepting to sit on the Committee whilst managing heavy workloads.

Strengths of the Executive Committee relate to: (a) significant efforts towards South/North membership balance; (b) provision of financial support to Southern members. Shortcomings of the Committee relate to: (a) insufficient communication about its work in the initial phases; (b) lack of gender balance, particularly towards the end; (c) not fully realising the South/North balance (even with numerical balance Northern voices sometimes dominated Southern ones); (d) insufficient leadership, which impacted on mid-term strategy setting, fundraising and guidance to the Secretariat; (e) limited seniority and decision-making capacity of its members in their respective organisations; (f) loss of momentum when the new Committee was elected in 2014, despite provisions for partial membership replenishment; (g) unclear mandates; (h) insufficient action to mitigate difficulties in regional and national coordination, and (i) limited face-to-face meetings and language barriers.

10. There is a varying degree of satisfaction with the way in which the mandate of the Co-Chairs was carried out during the campaign; but once again unanimous gratitude to the colleagues who accepted this demanding role. Strengths underscored are: (a) the great political decision to have Co-Chairs for the global North and the global South, and (b) the mid-term election. Shortcomings and challenges evoked are: (a) lack of visibility and leadership at given moments, and (b) poor selection processes.

11. More efforts could have been made to develop clear ToRs and ensure their broad understanding. That said, avoiding over-reliance on ToRs in collaborative initiatives is critical, as is carrying out good selection processes and understanding that members get as much out of the campaign as they invest in it.

12. The Secretariat is regarded as highly professional, multicultural, multilingual, efficient and good at solving problems. It was soundly managed and it empowered its staff members.

13. High levels of satisfaction and gratitude were expressed for the work carried out by CONCORD, and then by the African Disability Alliance (ADA), as fiscal agents of Beyond 2015. The separation of powers and splitting of the role between the global North and South were valued and showed that a global campaign can have a Fiscal Agent based anywhere, provided the appointed organisation has the right skills and capacities. The principle of fiscal neutrality (no financial benefit for the Fiscal Agent) worked well for both the campaign and the Agent (no loss accrued).

14. Discussions about partnerships at the initial stages of the campaign were among the most challenging and

complex aspects of the campaign overall, with some issues remaining unresolved.

Whilst the 3 main partnerships with the Climate Action Network (CAN-International), the International Forum of National NGO Platforms (IFP) and Participate helped the campaign, they were not maximised and did not fully meet expectations. At the same time though, it is very clear that trust and friendship run deep between Beyond 2015 and these 3 actors, with unanimous recognition that the campaign implied a lot of “learning by doing” for everyone. Results must be compared to the counterfactual: what would have not been achieved without these 3 partnerships? These partnerships helped Beyond 2015 in several ways, namely in terms of policy, advocacy, research, workload alleviation, legitimacy and fundraising.

Chapter 3

Fundraising strategy, funding model, monitoring and reporting



15. The fundraising work carried out by the Secretariat is commendable. Strengths of Beyond 2015’s fundraising experience are: (a) fundraising from a mix of sources considered as sufficiently ethical and neutral; (b) getting the 3 donor countries – Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland - to constitute a single pool of funds, as this reduced reporting and offered greater spending flexibility, (c) establishing a “Donor Coordination Group” managed by the Secretariat, demonstrating the donors’ trust in the campaign and enabling both greater transparency and valuable strategizing among donors, and (d) inviting member CSOs to contribute financially. Main **weaknesses**: (a) poor initial fundraising strategy; (b) sustaining government funding for an advocacy campaign, viewed as problematic and risky to a few members as a matter of principle; (c) low contributions by CSO members. The consultant believes that, in the spirit of a membership campaign, the Executive Committee and biggest member organisations with specialised fundraising departments should have contributed from early on and more actively to setting and carrying out a fundraising strategy.

16. Beyond 2015 succeeded in implementing a funding model to sustain activity at the international level and to decentralize funding to the regional and national levels, with money spread across countries. The main **strengths** of the funding model are: (a) empowerment of members and opening of doors for them to further fundraise; (b) targeted funding to support Southern engagement at the national level, and (c) flexible funding for Southern leadership to participate at the regional and global levels.

The main **weaknesses** of the funding model are: (a) insufficient involvement of the Executive Committee in these decisions; (b) insufficient funds for regional coordination activities, along with delays in the approval of advocacy budgets and the difficulty in accessing funds due to bureaucracy in host organisations, and (c) limited funds and delayed disbursements for national lead agencies.

17. Beyond 2015 regularly produced public monitoring and reporting on its funding. However, more regular and digestible updates would have been welcome to identify and share good practices, and Beyond 2015 lacked a comprehensive mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of activities and use of funds by national lead agencies and grantees working on the “Policy to Action” initiative.

Chapter 4

Threats to the legacy of Beyond 2015 and what happens next



18. The Beyond 2015 **Exit Strategy** is as a very good document on the practicalities of closing down.

19. The high number of deeply critical and wide-ranging views on civil society engagement with the UN indicates that the Executive Committee could have conducted the winding down phase differently, and better. A task force should have been put in place by the Executive Committee to identify scenarios and critical milestones to anchor the legacy of the campaign, and to elaborate brief guidelines for members to help maximise those milestones. A spin-off reflection group on the prospects for a potential successor campaign could have been self-organised by members. In a campaign that was established in 2010, there was time to foresee and plan. It is strongly recommended that the Executive Committee concentrate all possible efforts until the closure of the campaign (March 2016) towards: 1) strongly anchoring the legacy of the campaign and 2) identifying guidelines for member organisations to contribute to this anchoring. Beyond 2015 member organisations are strongly encouraged to fully engage in and drive discussions on the prospects for a possible successor campaign.

20. Two broad threats could compromise Beyond 2015’s legacy: 1) fragmented national implementation of Agenda 2030, and 2) losing a structure for efficient collaboration and coordination.

**There were successive Co-chairs and iterations of the Executive Committee throughout the life course of the campaign - with variable levels of performance by different individuals.*



KEY LESSONS FROM THE BEYOND 2015 EXPERIENCE

Effectiveness and impact in achieving the goals of Beyond 2015

1. It is possible to achieve self-organised, cross-constituency and coordinated civil society engagement in intergovernmental processes at a global scale and to deliver a common vision for sustainable development.
2. A thoughtful mix of traditional and innovative intervention approaches can be very effective.
3. When operating in an intergovernmental process, using coherent messages vis-à-vis UN missions and capitals can help bridge the natural gap between the two, provided there is solid political mapping.
4. The way in which civil society engages with the UN has evolved dramatically since Rio+20, opening unprecedented opportunities for engagement through the UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders system and cross-constituency collaboration. But these improvements ought not be taken for granted. Civil society and UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders must assume individual and collective responsibility in self-organising and collaborating towards non-partisan coordination for sustained strategic engagement with the UN. Crucial open questions must be addressed and resolved among colleagues involved in civil society campaigns, coalitions and the UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders groups so as not to hinder prospects for engagement with the UN.
5. The questions of social movements participating in civil society campaigns and their interaction are extremely complex and potentially divisive. These questions remain open and beg for sustained dialogue and pragmatic thinking in relation to ownership, legitimacy, operationalisation and sustained efficiency of future campaigns.
6. A well-organised and managed global and cross-constituency civil society advocacy campaign can achieve strong levels of engagement and directly influence an intergovernmental process - provided it claims a specific strategic space early on, recognises itself as an actor among others, does not soak up space from other actors, and allows its own members to equally contribute and shine individually.
7. Establishing, operationalising and sustaining structures and arrangements for a civil society campaign to operate at the international, regional and national levels is a very difficult task. It is time-consuming and requires a lot of flexibility, considerable levels of human and financial resources, as well as efficient coordinating structures and overarching frameworks to support this coordination.
8. An advocacy-focused civil society campaign that operates in a political intergovernmental environment and receives funding from governmental sources must remain highly aware of the risk of instrumentalisation.
9. Preserving space for stocktaking, reflection and recalculation, as well as managing innovation when operating in a fast-paced environment, can end up being incredibly challenging for individuals and for collaborative initiatives as a whole. Collaborating with academia and think tanks can open new horizons and solutions.

Structure, governance, management and partnerships

1. Effective structure and management, as well as sound, inclusive and transparent governance are the lifeblood of any collaborative initiative. Finding the right measure between chaos, opacity or cumbersome processes is not a straightforward adventure. It is easy to fall into the temptation of transposing structures or arrangements that work in other situations.
2. The significant time and effort needed to carry out internal work in order for the campaign's external activities to unfold successfully – and hence for the campaign to be effective as a whole – should not be underestimated.
3. A representative, geographically and gender balanced, democratic and transparent governing body – for instance an Executive Committee – capable of offering appropriate and continuous leadership, is crucial.
4. Having Co-Chairs can be beneficial for representation, profile and leadership, provided geographical and gender balance is respected, and that the right profile and level of skills is ensured.
5. An independent, professional, multicultural, multilingual efficient and problem-solving Secretariat that is soundly managed and empowers staff members with flexibility is the backbone of the campaign.

6. The importance of having a solid fiscal agent that manages grants, contracts and providers cannot be sufficiently underscored. Organisations considering this role should not underestimate the fiduciary responsibility.

7. Any campaign must be strategic and realistic about the partnerships it concludes. A strategic and realistic approach must be taken on both sides, and each side must have clear a vision of what they can bring to the partnership, and must conduct a thorough self-assessment of their capacity to do so before entering

into any agreement. The principle of a partnership is to try and get the best of all worlds. It requires compromises. It should anticipate difficulties and be based on sound and collegial risk assessment.

The **very important efforts and overall good results obtained** by Beyond 2015 in developing an effective structure and management system, together with sound, inclusive and transparent governance – which at moments may seem intended to mirror those of an organisation more than a campaign – are commendable.

Fundraising strategy, funding model, monitoring and reporting

1. The world of NGOs and civil society initiatives know the importance of clear, timely, ethical and realistic fundraising strategies and the pressures of fundraising needs. On the upside, critical masses can use their potential for strong impact and legacy as levers to fundraising, as well as the pool of fundraising experience and skills that members can bring to a campaign.

2. A transparent and scrupulously managed funding model, commensurate with the vision and the objectives

of a campaign, is vital and even the best models will demand tough prioritisation.

3. Transparent and regular monitoring and review of spending is a must for accountability and can also offer useful peer learning opportunities (if the information is presented in an adequate format).

Threats to the legacy of Beyond 2015 and what happens next

1. Civil society advocacy campaigns must have exit strategies on the practicalities of closing down.

2. The winding down phase of any collaborative initiative – particularly one that is successful, visible, large and personally enriching for those involved – revolves as much around practicalities as around feelings; and as much around stocktaking and identifying lessons learnt as around anchoring the legacy.

3. The governing body of a campaign must take responsibility for initiating early enough the task of anchoring the legacy of campaign during the winding down phase.

4. The following 2 broad blocks of threats could compromise the legacy of Beyond 2015. Each has potential triggers and counterbalancing actions:

- Fragmentation Agenda 2030 in terms of national implementation;

- Loss of the structure for efficient collaboration and coordinated voices that Beyond 2015 has created, particularly in a context of decreasing enabling environments for civil society.



KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE CIVIL SOCIETY CAMPAIGNS

Effectiveness and impact

- ⊙ Common understanding across members of the identification as an advocacy or a mobilisation campaign.
- ⊙ Avoiding being dominated by Northern NGOs, even at initial stages;
- ⊙ Establishing clear synergies and identity demarcations with other existing campaigns;
- ⊙ For the global level, clarifying relations vis-a-vis the UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders system and establishing channels for collaboration.
- ⊙ Ad hoc assessment of when it is appropriate to carry out solid advocacy and lobbying, and when it is better to open up to grassroots voices.
- ⊙ Openly and thoroughly discussing the question on whether –and if so, how to– incorporate social movements in its membership.
- ⊙ Solid budgets and contingency provisions for language translation in fundraising strategies.
- ⊙ A mix of daily virtual work and face-to-face meetings for specific milestones, in accordance with strategic plans and work programmes.
- ⊙ Regional and national levels taking full ownership of adapting global intervention approaches in global campaigns that are decentralized.
- ⊙ Specifically skilled communications officers at all times in Secretariat teams. Specific and sufficient budgetary provisions for professional support for external communications.
- ⊙ Substantial funds for meaningful and efficient regional coordination structures and influence.
- ⊙ Thorough thinking, adequate arrangements, tools and budget for collaboration and cross-fertilization across regions.
- ⊙ Official allocation of regional portfolios among Executive Committee members, with responsibility for regular public strategy and reporting sharing.
- ⊙ Person specifications (skills and competences) for regional coordinators with robust advocacy profiles.
- ⊙ Considering practical applications of the risk of becoming instrumentalised through government funding when operating in a political intergovernmental process: What is the percentage of government funding?. What measures will be established to protect the campaign from instrumentalisation? If there are similar percentages of government funding and funding from other sources, can government funding be used as activity grant instead of as operating grant?
- ⊙ Being prepared for success leading to higher demand and work expectations, through adequate provisions for financial and human resources.
- ⊙ Encouraging, protecting and curating individual and collective reflection, recalculation, creativity and innovative thinking. Collaborating with academia and think tanks can open new horizons and bring solutions.

Structure, governance, management and partnerships

- ⊙ Thoroughly conceptualising regional and national coordinating structures and establishing arrangements for direct line management and/or supervision by the independent professional secretariat of the campaign.
- ⊙ Anticipating and minimizing issues around cumbersome bureaucracy and delays in funding disbursements.
- ⊙ Putting in place concrete mechanisms to mitigate the loss of individuals and the impact of transitions – e.g. structured hand over reports and files; closer supervision of handovers by line management; detailed orientation/induction for all new staff; facilitation of interviews between outgoing and incoming officers, even before the change is effective; budgetary provisions to facilitate induction visits for incoming officers, etc.
- ⊙ Ensuring that all appointees equally understand Terms of Reference and that these are clear.
- ⊙ Avoiding over-reliance on Terms of Reference. Understanding that good selection processes are equally crucial; and that in a membership campaign consisting of peers, members get from the campaign as much as they invest in it. Ultimately, it may all boil down to the sense of responsibility and self-awareness of each member organisation / individual.
- ⊙ Thoroughly reflecting on how to prevent and overcome geographical or gender imbalance in an Executive Committee. Scenarios of trade-offs between balance and efficiency must be discussed from the onset.

- ⊙ Putting in place, from the conceptualisation phase, mechanisms to create capacity across members for geographically and gender balanced leadership.
- ⊙ Thoroughly reflecting on ways to prevent and overcome deficient leadership or transparency from an Executive Committee.
- ⊙ Considering the official allocation of regional portfolios among Executive Committee members, with responsibility for regular public strategy and reporting sharing.

- ⊙ Factoring in budgetary provisions for sufficient face-to-face meetings of the Executive Committee.
- ⊙ Putting in place solid peer-review systems for the Co-Chairs. For instance, ensuring each candidate presents his/her vision and detailed roadmap for the duration of the mandate; as well as regular reporting obligations for the Co-Chairs in terms of specific results achieved and strategic issues moving forward.

Fundraising strategy, funding model, monitoring and reporting

- ⊙ Operationalising proper fundraising support from early on in the conceptualisation stage.
- ⊙ Ensuring that the main governing body, as well as the biggest member organisations of the campaign with specialised fundraising departments or officers, contribute from early on to the elaboration and deployment of the fundraising strategy.
- ⊙ Considering the incorporation of a full-time fundraiser within the independent professional secretariat. Alternatively, the biggest member organisations should make in-kind contributions in the way of time commitments from their fundraising officers.
- ⊙ Considering practical applications of the risk of instrumentalisation through government funding, when operating in a political intergovernmental process: what overall percentage of funds come from government sources? If the percentage is very high, what measures will be established to protect the campaign from instrumentalisation?

If there is a mixed use, in similar percentages, of funding from governments and other sources, can government funding be used as activity grant instead of as operating grant?

- ⊙ Operationalizing a system of membership fees structured in thresholds commensurate with members' budgets.
- ⊙ Mapping and reaching out to possible donors from the philanthropy sector.
- ⊙ Placing solid budgetary effort in operationalising efficient regional coordinator structures.
- ⊙ Establishing comprehensive mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating activity implementation and spending. Costs inherent to operationalising such mechanisms must be factored into the fundraising strategy and budget, while field visits and external evaluations are recommended and should be deployed immediately if lack of compliance with spending provisions is suspected.

Threats to the legacy of Beyond 2015 and what happens next

- ⊙ The Executive Committee should concentrate all possible efforts until the closure of the campaign (March 2016) towards: 1. Strongly anchoring the legacy of the campaign and 2. Identifying guidelines for member organisations to contribute to this anchoring. The consultant strongly encourages all members to actively support this task within their respective remits.
- ⊙ Beyond 2015 member organisations should fully engage in and drive discussions on the prospects for a possible successor campaign.
- ⊙ Civil society, UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders must assume their individual and collective responsibility

in self-organising and collaborating towards non-partisan coordination for sustained strategic engagement with the UN.

- ⊙ Important outstanding questions on synergies and collaboration between civil society campaigns and the UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders system remain open. They require ample discussion among civil society campaigns, UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders. Though the complexity and difficulty of these questions are undeniable, further postponing discussions will have very negative consequences on the ability of civil society to self-organise in future campaigns as well as to engage with the UN.



PHOTO CREDITS

1. Front cover (top left): photo courtesy of HoFoSe / Beyond 2015 Tanzania. Editors from media houses in Tanzania at a workshop to raise awareness on the need for political will to implement Agenda 2030 on SDGs at national level.
2. Front cover (bottom left): photo courtesy of Conor Healy Photography. January 2015. Eoin Gormley, UNICEF Youth Delegate, meeting Amina Mohammed in January 2015.
3. Front cover (bottom right): photo courtesy of Nguyen, N. September 24, 2015. Standing ovation at the end of a high-level event organised by Beyond 2015 at the UN in September 2015, during which representatives of civil society and Member States gathered to discuss how to build political will for the implementation of Agenda 2030 at the national level.
4. Back cover (top right): photo courtesy of HoFoSe / Beyond 2015 Tanzania. Editors from media houses in Tanzania at a workshop to raise awareness on the need for political will to implement Agenda 2030 on SDGs at national level.
5. Back cover (bottom left): Photo courtesy of Beyond 2015. May 2015. Participants at a breakfast event co-hosted by Beyond 2015 in New York, on the role of youth within the post-2015 monitoring and review framework, May 2015.
6. Back cover (bottom right): photo courtesy of Nguyen, N. September 24, 2015. The Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean moderates a high-level event at the UN organised by Beyond 2015 in September 2015, which brought together UN Member States and civil society organisations participating in the Campaign.

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