

# Beyond2015

## Beyond 2015 Campaign Final Evaluation

December 2015

By independent consultant Maruxa Cardama  
and commissioned by Beyond 2015





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
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


# Beyond 2015: a truly global campaign



Uniting civil society organisations from the Global South and the Global North.

This map shows the 142 countries in which Beyond 2015 operated. Countries in blue indicate the presence of Beyond 2015 lead agencies / focal points.





# FOREWORD

*“Even in literature and art, no man who bothers about originality will ever be original: whereas if you simply try to tell the truth (without caring twopence how often it has been told before) you will, nine times out of ten, become original without ever having noticed it.” C. S. Lewis*



Andrew Griffiths

Philipp Schönrock

Beyond 2015 has never been too worried about whether it is original or ground-breaking; it has always been a hard-working and results-focused campaign, aiming for change and not profile. Yet, partly because of this relentless focus on what works, we believe that the Beyond 2015 campaign has broken new ground and found original solutions to the problems it has faced.

One important aspect of the campaign, highlighted in this evaluation, is that so many people have contributed to its success. If we had to list all the people who have effectively contributed this would be a very long and very dull foreword. It is also important to note that the campaign has been more than the sum of its parts – the influence we have had is almost entirely down to the ability of individual members to work constructively together to present a cohesive civil society perspective on the post-2015 process. It has been a triumph of the collective over the individual, and this was critical in gaining the respect of those we sought to influence.

However, it would not be possible to speak of the campaign without making special mention of the Secretariat. Leo Williams has been a driving and organising force, without whom the campaign would not have succeeded; but the whole Secretariat and Regional Coordinators have been the beating heart of the campaign from its inception until its end. Civil society is indebted to these hard-working and inspirational people, who have been an absolute delight to work with.

The campaign has taken many momentous decisions – the VPVC (vision, purpose, values, criteria), the “pincer movement” and “Policy to Action” are three that particularly come to mind – but we believe that the decision to have a full and honest evaluation, in order to preserve the legacy of Beyond 2015, will potentially be the most long-lasting. This evaluation has effectively captured the brilliance of the campaign, and our task now is to disseminate its findings and to make sure that the lessons we have learnt remain the property of all civil society.

We can honestly say that co-chairing Beyond 2015 has been one of the highlights of our respective careers; although we are looking forward to continuing to work together as we turn the words of Agenda 2030 into actions that change people's lives.

Andrew Griffiths and Philipp Schönrock  
**Beyond 2015 Co-Chairs**





# INTRODUCTION

## Purpose of the evaluation

To draw lessons from the successes and shortcomings of Beyond 2015 in order to (1) understand how civil society organisations (CSOs) experienced participation in the campaign, and whether this had any impact on their participation in the United Nations (UN) Post-2015 intergovernmental process, and (2) facilitate civil society collective action and influence on international decision making processes.

## Scope and methodology

This report is organised in 4 chapters: **1. Effectiveness and impact in achieving the goals of Beyond 2015; 2. Structure, governance, management and partnerships; 3. Fundraising strategy, funding model and monitoring & reporting, and 4. The threats to the legacy of Beyond 2015 and what happens next.** The questions used to structure the report are mainly extracted from the Terms of Reference (ToRs) given to the consultant by the Beyond 2015 Secretariat.

Undeniably, the critical nature of these topics could fill up several hundred pages. However, in line with the ToRs given to the consultant, substantial efforts have been made to keep this report concise. Assessing information and distilling key lessons has been challenging in this context for two main reasons. On the one hand, the considerable number of questions to be covered by the review according to the ToRs, as well the very extensive list of background reports and specific interviews indicated by the Secretariat of Beyond 2015 as a basis for this report. On the other hand, the tight time frame for conducting the review and elaborating the report.

In this context, the evaluation should not be read to the detriment of the incredible richness and depth of experiences – and phenomenal success stories – generated by Beyond 2015; and the consultant wishes to praise the plentiful reporting and assessment materials elaborated by the campaign annually, during the **mid-term review** and during the winding down phase. Their slow reading in detail is fully recommended to the reader keen on absorbing the wider and more detailed picture.

Annex **1** and **2** outline respectively the list of Beyond 2015 reporting materials used as a basis for this evaluation, and the list of interviews carried out for this evaluation among representatives of Beyond 2015's Secretariat, members and partners, the UN System, Member States (both in New York and at the capital level) and CSOs external to Beyond 2015. The expression “across all target groups of this review” used throughout the report refers to this list of interview groups, with the consultant choosing to keep their names anonymous for confidentiality reasons

## Acknowledgments

The consultant would like to express her sincere gratitude to the Secretariat for sharing a noteworthy number of background documents and supporting with the organisation of interviews. The consultant is also deeply grateful to the interviewees for the generous time and the significant intellectual engagement graciously offered during the interviews.



Photo courtesy of Save Mataberland Coalition / Beyond 2015. July 2015.

School Children from St Bernards, Lobhengula, Mzilikazi and Mckeurtan Primary Schools present Beyond 2015's advocacy postcards during a national dialogue and knowledge sharing conference on the implementation of the SDGs, organised in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 9-10 July 2015.





# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Chapter 1

### Effectiveness and impact in achieving the goals of Beyond 2015



**1. Beyond 2015 fully achieved its goals.** The campaign was decisive in pushing for and operationalising a transparent, participatory and inclusive process at the UN. It was a strong and early advocate for a single-track process (development and sustainable development together), and was instrumental in securing a Post-2015 framework responsive to the voices of those affected by poverty and injustice. At the global level, Beyond 2015 was very influential in helping the UN System engage stakeholders and civil society beyond UN Major Groups and ensure better North/South geographical balance. Beyond 2015 excelled in channeling structured, substantive and timely inputs from CSOs – elaborated on the basis of transparent and collaborative approaches – into the intergovernmental process. It helped campaign members understand their contribution as an opportunity to change the world and not just “their world”, and facilitated their ownership of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

**2.** There is a **high degree of satisfaction with the effectiveness of the campaign’s intervention approaches and tools.** **Strengths** included: (a) Galvanising a critical mass of organisations from the global South and North, while allowing for a diversity of views; (b) positioning a campaign with clear advocacy principles and values; (c) elaborating substantive, relevant and timely positions throughout the intergovernmental process; (d) operating at the international, regional and national levels in the spirit of a decentralized campaign, through the “pincer movement”. The **shortcomings** relate to: (a) English language dominance; (b) scarce face-to-face meetings; (c) limited adaptation of intervention approaches and tools; (d) lack of a structured framework for cross-fertilization across regions; (e) poor external communications, and (f) a somewhat unresolved dichotomy between an advocacy and a mobilisation campaign.

**3. Beyond 2015’s impact on civil society collective action and engagement with the UN** is mostly seen in a positive light for several reasons: (a) mobilising, empowering and improving civil society capacity to engage in complex intergovernmental processes; (b) offering Northern/Southern organisations a space in which to learn to work together and from one another; (c) showing that self-organised, cross-constituency and coordinated CSO engagement in intergovernmental processes at a global scale can deliver; (d) bringing new voices and grassroots experiences to the UN, overcoming the general fragmentation of civil society and providing a platform for CSOs unfamiliar with the sustainable development track;

(e) maximising the UN mandate for the engagement of “other stakeholders”; (f) contributing to enhancing the internal accountability of the UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders system, and (g) creating or fostering capacity to adopt new working tools. **Perceived shortcomings** around Beyond 2015’s impact on civil society collective action and engagement with the UN: (a) initial dominance by Northern NGOs, particularly from the UK; (b) absence of clear synergies or demarcations with existing campaigns; (c) finding the balance between introducing new voices and lobbying expertise; (d) at the global level, not clarifying the campaign’s relation with the UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders system and taking up space; and (e) discontinuing pressure and engagement after the September UN Summit. **These shortcomings constitute important open questions that must be addressed and resolved among civil society campaigns, UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders.**

**4.** The legacy of any advocacy campaign goes well beyond words. Having said so, UN officials and representatives of Member States seem to have genuinely welcomed and thoroughly considered the inputs of the campaign. **Critical elements of Beyond 2015’s advocacy which made instrumental contributions to the final outcome document** include: (a) the campaign’s vision for the Agenda; (b) the universal, integral, interlinked and ambitious nature of the new Agenda; (c) the strong human rights language; (d) the principles of “leaving no one behind” and of “no target can be considered until met for all segments of society;” (e) Individual SDGs on gender, inequality, sustainable consumption and production, climate, and peaceful and inclusive societies; (f) protection of the Planet as an overarching principle; (g) participation of civil society and all stakeholders as an end in itself, and (f) accountability mechanism at three levels – global, regional and national. **Advocacy shortcomings:** (a) scarce engagement with “difficult” Member States; (b) not enabling people living in poverty to participate directly in intergovernmental negotiation sessions; (c) not sufficiently closing the loop between the global, regional and national levels; (d) limited influence in the monitoring and review chapter of the Agenda, one of its less ambitious chapters; (e) meager results regarding the relationship between Means of Implementation for the SDGs and the Financing for Development track, and (f) not counterbalancing an exacerbated focus on sustained economic growth.

5. The decision to work at the international, regional and national levels is a highlight of the campaign. However, whilst Beyond 2015 is perceived as highly performing at the international level, there is little satisfaction with work at the regional level, except in Europe and Africa. Work at the national level is perceived as well performing, with varying degrees of satisfaction by country.

6. Beyond 2015 did not become a mouthpiece in the intergovernmental negotiations. This speaks volumes of both the respectful and neutral attitude of donors—Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden - and of the good management of the situation by Beyond 2015. **Challenges** evoked are: (1) Beyond 2015 created a demand to which, at times, it could not respond; (2) it endured the knock-on effect of shaking civil society's engagement with the UN and the traditional platform of UN Major Groups; (3) at moments, it was perceived as too prominent, due to critical mass and presence; (4) at moments, it did not push Member States for more progressive outcomes, and (5) it could have sharpened some advocacy positions.

7. Preserving space for stocktaking, reflection and recalculation, as well as managing innovation when operating in a fast-paced environment was incredibly challenging and at times impossible.

## Chapter 2

### Structure, governance, management and partnerships



8. Beyond 2015 achieved exceptional levels of self-organised governance, anchored in the principles of collective decision, inclusivity, transparency and accountability. The campaign devoted very substantial effort to operationalising structures at the international, global and national levels and in many instances adopted tailored-made approaches. Structural, institutional or coordination issues that hindered the campaign's effectiveness in general relate to: (a) the lack of sufficient and continuous Executive Committee leadership and its limited decisions to mitigate the coordination difficulties at the regional and national levels; (b) deficient overall coordination of regional coordinators and national structures; (c) cumbersome bureaucracy and delays in disbursement of funds to regional coordinators and to national lead agencies; (d) rough transitions and hand overs.

9. There is relative satisfaction with the performance of the Executive Committee\*, but unanimous appreciation and gratitude to its members for graciously accepting to sit on the Committee whilst managing heavy workloads.

**Strengths** of the Executive Committee relate to: (a) significant efforts towards South/North membership balance; (b) provision of financial support to Southern members. **Shortcomings** of the Committee relate to: (a) insufficient communication about its work in the initial phases; (b) lack of gender balance, particularly towards the end; (c) not fully realising the South/North balance (even with numerical balance Northern voices sometimes dominated Southern ones); (d) insufficient leadership, which impacted on mid-term strategy setting, fundraising and guidance to the Secretariat; (e) limited seniority and decision-making capacity of its members in their respective organisations; (f) loss of momentum when the new Committee was elected in 2014, despite provisions for partial membership replenishment; (g) unclear mandates; (h) insufficient action to mitigate difficulties in regional and national coordination, and (i) limited face-to-face meetings and language barriers.

10. There is a varying degree of satisfaction with the way in which the mandate of the Co-Chairs was carried out during the campaign\*; but once again unanimous gratitude to the colleagues who accepted this demanding role. **Strengths** underscored are: (a) the great political decision to have Co-Chairs for the global North and the global South, and (b) the mid-term election. **Shortcomings and challenges** evoked are: (a) lack of visibility and leadership at given moments, and (b) poor selection processes.

11. More efforts could have been made to develop clear ToRs and ensure their broad understanding. That said, avoiding over-reliance on ToRs in collaborative initiatives is critical, as is carrying out good selection processes and understanding that members get as much out of the campaign as they invest in it.

12. The Secretariat is regarded as highly professional, multicultural, multilingual, efficient and good at solving problems. It was soundly managed and it empowered its staff members.

13. High levels of satisfaction and gratitude were expressed for the work carried out by CONCORD, and then by the African Disability Alliance (ADA), as fiscal agents of Beyond 2015. The separation of powers and splitting of the role between the global North and South were valued and showed that a global campaign can have a Fiscal Agent based anywhere, provided the appointed organisation has the right skills and capacities. The principle of fiscal neutrality (no financial benefit for the Fiscal Agent) worked well for both the campaign and the Agent (no loss accrued).

14. Discussions about partnerships at the initial stages of the campaign were among the most challenging and

complex aspects of the campaign overall, with some issues remaining unresolved.

Whilst the 3 main partnerships with the Climate Action Network (CAN-International), the International Forum of National NGO Platforms (IFP) and Participate helped the campaign, they were not maximised and did not fully meet expectations. At the same time though, it is very clear that trust and friendship run deep between Beyond 2015 and these 3 actors, with unanimous recognition that the campaign implied a lot of “learning by doing” for everyone. Results must be compared to the counterfactual: what would have not been achieved without these 3 partnerships? These partnerships helped Beyond 2015 in several ways, namely in terms of policy, advocacy, research, workload alleviation, legitimacy and fundraising.

## Chapter 3

### Fundraising strategy, funding model, monitoring and reporting



**15.** The fundraising work carried out by the Secretariat is commendable. Strengths of Beyond 2015’s fundraising experience are: (a) fundraising from a mix of sources considered as sufficiently ethical and neutral; (b) getting the 3 donor countries – Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland - to constitute a single pool of funds, as this reduced reporting and offered greater spending flexibility, (c) establishing a “Donor Coordination Group” managed by the Secretariat, demonstrating the donors’ trust in the campaign and enabling both greater transparency and valuable strategizing among donors, and (d) inviting member CSOs to contribute financially. Main **weaknesses**: (a) poor initial fundraising strategy; (b) sustaining government funding for an advocacy campaign, viewed as problematic and risky to a few members as a matter of principle; (c) low contributions by CSO members. The consultant believes that, in the spirit of a membership campaign, the Executive Committee and biggest member organisations with specialised fundraising departments should have contributed from early on and more actively to setting and carrying out a fundraising strategy.

**16.** Beyond 2015 succeeded in implementing a funding model to sustain activity at the international level and to decentralize funding to the regional and national levels, with money spread across countries. The main **strengths** of the funding model are: (a) empowerment of members and opening of doors for them to further fundraise; (b) targeted funding to support Southern engagement at the national level, and (c) flexible funding for Southern leadership to participate at the regional and global levels.

The main **weaknesses** of the funding model are: (a) insufficient involvement of the Executive Committee in these decisions; (b) insufficient funds for regional coordination activities, along with delays in the approval of advocacy budgets and the difficulty in accessing funds due to bureaucracy in host organisations, and (c) limited funds and delayed disbursements for national lead agencies.

**17.** Beyond 2015 regularly produced public monitoring and reporting on its funding. However, more regular and digestible updates would have been welcome to identify and share good practices, and Beyond 2015 lacked a comprehensive mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of activities and use of funds by national lead agencies and grantees working on the “Policy to Action” initiative.

## Chapter 4

### Threats to the legacy of Beyond 2015 and what happens next



**18.** The Beyond 2015 **Exit Strategy** is a very good document on the practicalities of closing down.

**19.** The high number of deeply critical and wide-ranging views on civil society engagement with the UN indicates that the Executive Committee could have conducted the winding down phase differently, and better. A task force should have been put in place by the Executive Committee to identify scenarios and critical milestones to anchor the legacy of the campaign, and to elaborate brief guidelines for members to help maximise those milestones. A spin-off reflection group on the prospects for a potential successor campaign could have been *self-organised* by members. In a campaign that was established in 2010, there was time to foresee and plan. It is **strongly recommended** that the Executive Committee concentrate all possible efforts until the closure of the campaign (March 2016) towards: 1) strongly anchoring the legacy of the campaign and 2) identifying guidelines for member organisations to contribute to this anchoring. All members are strongly encouraged to actively support this task and to fully engage in and drive discussions on the prospects for a possible successor campaign.


**20.** Two broad threats could compromise Beyond 2015’s legacy: 1) fragmented national implementation of Agenda 2030, and 2) losing a structure for efficient collaboration and coordination.

*\*There were successive Co-chairs and iterations of the Executive Committee throughout the life course of the campaign - with variable levels of performance by the different individuals.*



Photo courtesy of Nguyen, N. September 24, 2015.

The Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean shows Beyond 2015's key advocacy messages to a full house at the UN in New York, during a high-level event organised by the Campaign in September 2015, which brought together UN Member States and civil society organisations participating in the Campaign.



# EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT IN ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF BEYOND 2015

## CHAPTER 1

### Q1. Were the campaign's goals achieved?

Beyond 2015 is a global civil society campaign rooted in the principle of partnership between CSOs from the global North and South, which has advocated for a strong and legitimate successor framework to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The campaign, created in 2010, gathered **over 1,500 CSOs from 142 countries** around two goals: 1. The adoption of a global, overarching, cross-thematic framework to follow the MDGs that reflects Beyond 2015's policy positions; and 2. A process of developing the framework that is participatory, inclusive and responsive to the voices of those directly affected by poverty and injustice.

Across all target groups of this final review the response is unanimous: **yes, Beyond 2015 fully achieved its goals**. Campaign members and Secretariat, as well as UN staff, Member States and external civil society colleagues evoke the following **reasons to justify this positive assessment**:

### 1. Vision

- ⊗ Beyond 2015 contributed to securing a UN-led process, rather than a process led by other multilateral organisations or the national level.
- ⊗ Beyond 2015 was a strong, outspoken and early advocate for the convergence of the development and sustainable development tracks, and offered an operational platform for CSOs from the two tracks to do so.
- ⊗ Beyond 2015 was instrumental in securing a Post-2015 framework responsive to the issues of those affected by poverty and injustice, and in turning the adagio of "leaving no one behind" into an overarching motto of Agenda 2030.

### 2. Process

- ⊗ Beyond 2015 was decisive in pushing for and operationalising a transparent, participatory and inclusive process at the UN, by increasing space for civil society engagement and dialogue with governments. Many Beyond 2015 members were invited by their governments to be part of the official delegations to the negotiation sessions and/or the UN Summit.
- ⊗ Beyond 2015 was very influential in helping the UN System engage stakeholders and civil society beyond the UN Major Groups, in widening the scope of CSOs participating in the Post-2015 process, and in achieving greater North/South geographical balance.
- ⊗ Beyond 2015 used social media and inclusive communications tools for outreach, although views differ on the use of Twitter. Those with direct exposure to the intergovernmental negotiations sessions at the UN headquarters in New York could perceive the considerable impact of Beyond 2015 tweets in the negotiation room. Others find the campaign could have better used social media.



### 3. Policy

- ⊙ Beyond 2015 excelled in channeling structured, substantive and timely inputs from CSOs into the intergovernmental process - elaborated on the basis of transparent and collaborative approaches.
- ⊙ Beyond 2015 helped members understand their contribution as an opportunity to change the world and not just "their world."
- ⊙ Beyond 2015 facilitated greater ownership of Agenda 2030 among CSOs by raising their awareness of the agenda and strengthening their technical knowledge of the intergovernmental process.

#### Q2. Was the campaign's intervention approach effective to achieve its goals?

Across all targets groups of this final review, there is a high degree of satisfaction with the effectiveness of the campaign's intervention approaches and tools.



**Strengths** identified below distinguish between overarching approaches (a., b., c.) and specific mechanisms / tools (bullet points).

**a.** Galvanising a critical mass of organisations from both the global North and South around an array of different topics, while allowing for a diversity of views.

- ⊙ UN System staff and Member States indicated that Beyond 2015 position papers enabled them to quickly grasp the main concerns and requests of civil society.
- ⊙ Providing the list of signatory organisations to position papers.
- ⊙ Including explicit explanations on the different range of views within the campaign for given topics.
- ⊙ Elaborating policy papers and webinars.

Interestingly, Member States mentioned "we never had clarity on who was actually behind the positions. When they showed off about the high numbers of signatory organisations, who was actually there? More importantly who was missing? Who had decided not to sign up?" The consultant points out at the disconnect between this perception by Member States and the fact that Beyond 2015's position papers included the lists of signatories. The consultant thinks this disconnect is linked to Beyond 2015's shortcomings on external communications.

**b.** Positioning a campaign with clear advocacy lines, principles and values in a highly political process.

- ⊙ Identifying 4 conceptual foundations for the Post-2015 framework via the exercise "What are the Vision, Purpose, Values and Criteria? (VPVC)" is seen as time-consuming but overall helpful, as it enabled the campaign to gain legitimacy, to frame a common vision and to consolidate its ability to operate as a whole by setting the basis for forthcoming advocacy positions, including for the Report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on Post-2015 and the subsequent intergovernmental negotiations. Members and the Secretariat of Beyond 2015 share the view that the VPVC exercise was not of particular added value to the European region, which needed to move on at a brisk pace and in connection with the work of EU institutions.

- ⊙ Making the strategic shift in 2015 from values to action through the **Toolkit** "From Policy to Action, Securing urgent & concrete commitments towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development". All voices across Beyond 2015 are proud of this shift. For instance, the Beyond 2015 **Latin America Final Regional Report** reads "this recalibration (...) was welcomed by Lead Agencies, since it emphasized the importance of the national level and (...) advocacy on implementation could yield more concrete results (...), to promote implementation". In the same line, the **Final Asia Report** indicates that "it was really useful as it offered a step-by-step guide for engagement and facilitated a process of collecting civil society opinions on SDG implementation (...) that could be shared with government, media and other stakeholders," though "it took a long time to review and could have been simpler."

- ⊙ Beyond 2015's '**Red Flags**' documents are perceived as very efficient advocacy documents for engagement with governments, since they were easier to read than other advocacy materials.

- ⊙ The final **Report of the Focus States Initiative** contains detailed findings on how Beyond 2015 organisations implemented the policy to action shift.

**c.** Elaborating substantive, relevant and timely advocacy positions during the intergovernmental process.

*"Evolving with the process and reacting directly to the latest negotiation documents, instead of restating overarching principles all along the way" is identified by Member States as a strength*



- Some members indicated, *“the consultative modalities evolved and we became very efficient in advocacy, but it was not the case in the beginning.”*
- Directing advocacy efforts towards delegates and decision makers of developing countries is seen in a positive light by UN Officials and Member States.
- Establishing transparent elaboration processes with set timelines and communicating them from the onset.
- Using Google docs as the main tool for joint elaboration of papers, as well as conference calls.
- Working in *“Task Forces”* allowed members to connect on some of the more specialized themes.

**Beyond 2015** members and Secretariat unanimously consider the establishment of transparent processes to elaborate positions, the use of Google docs and the creation of Task Forces to have paid high dividends in terms of transparency, good governance, internal trust, coordination and joint work. Seeing debates occur in real time and giving members the opportunity to resolve issues directly among them are perceived as additional positives.

- Introducing a Rapid Response Task Force to coordinate the campaign’s reaction during the last phases of the intergovernmental process. While some voices indicate that it exacerbated the disparity of capacities and time availability of members, others underscore that it *“it was used only at the very end when we faced a high risk of losing all the work we had carried out in previous years if we couldn’t guarantee timely reaction.”*
- Having an Advocacy Director in New York. The Secretariat staffing structure counted on this position since 2013, yet the consultant notes that the wide majority of interviewees across all target groups of this review – including members of the campaign – were not aware of this. The unanimous view expressed is that the officer who held the position from 2014 quickly made a significant difference through strategic thinking and actions to increase the impact of the campaign, as well through dialogue with country missions to the UN and interaction with CSOs and external stakeholders. An illustrative quote by a Member State is: *“Having somebody knowledgeable, reliable and articulate like her in New York was one of the best things the campaign did.”* UN staff underscored her analytical and strategic skills, and her rapid reactions. Some voices regret that the position was not further supported with more New York-based staff, despite having an active Supporting Consultant from January to September 2015. A review of funding provisions showed that few organisations stepped up to provide funding for this role when the campaign still had no core government funding.

For more details on Beyond 2015’s key policy positions and advocacy documents, the consultant highly recommends reading **“Review of Beyond 2015 Advocacy Positions and the Final Outcome Document of the Post-2015 Agenda”** – a document prepared by the Advocacy Director in August 2015.

**d. Identifying the strategic need to operate in sync at three levels: international, regional and national.**

- Reaching out to the national level “to loop back and forth between national NGOs and the developments of the intergovernmental process” is praised by UN staff and Member States.
- Appointing regional coordinators, national lead agencies and focal points, as well as collaborating with or setting up national hubs and NGO coordination platforms, is commended by members.
- Providing ready-made outreach materials for regional and national advocacy in three languages is highlighted by the Secretariat.
- Operating in the spirit of a “decentralised” campaign, by maintaining flexibility for the regional and national levels to adapt materials, is underscored by Beyond 2015 as a whole.
- A review by the consultant of the Report “National level influencing activities by Beyond 2015 lead agencies in 2014 and 2015” showed the different activities and formats used at the regional and national levels:
  - Meetings of the national hubs, consultation events, civil society fora, youth dialogues, tribunals for popular expression, thematic workshops;
  - Background documents explaining the Post-2015 process, newsletters, national campaigns, social media advocacy, SMS, radio broadcasts and shows, documentaries, biking tours for awareness-raising, identification of SDG Champions, media dialogues and broadcasters trainings, Peace Day TV, video clips;
  - Correspondence and meetings with members of government and parliament, as well as with candidates for federal president, state governor, city mayor and parliament.

See **Q8** and **Q9** below for more findings on Beyond 2015’s work at the international, regional and national levels.

## Shortcomings of the campaign's intervention approach identified by campaign members relate to:



### a. English language dominance

☉ Surviving the dominance of English during the intergovernmental process added a significant burden to the campaign's advocacy activities and general functioning at the global, regional and national levels.

☉ The **critical self-evaluation by the Executive Committee** indicated *"language was sometimes a barrier to understanding and participation"*. The Latin America region particularly highlights the impact of the language barrier when at the global level. The **Winding Down Report for the Pacific** identifies the lack of translation of Beyond 2015 resources into Local Pasifika language as a shortcoming. At the African level, the campaign is deemed to have had poorly mobilised and engaged francophone countries.

☉ The Secretariat committed to alleviating this burden by producing advocacy and communication materials in 3 languages (English, French, Spanish).

The consultant notes that language barrier will only become more critical as the implementation of Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development moves into tasks related to awareness-raising, adaptation to national contexts and partnerships. The consultant joins members and Secretariat staff in underscoring the necessity for future campaigns to develop fundraising strategies with solid budgets and contingency provisions for language translation.

### b. Scarce face-to-face meetings

☉ The **critical self-evaluation by the Executive Committee** stated, *"face to face meetings were very helpful; more would have been appreciated."* Similar conclusions are drawn with regards to regional coordination.

☉ For future campaigns, the ideal scenario preconized by most members is a mix of day-to-day virtual work and face-to-face meetings for specific milestones, in accordance with individual organisations' strategic plans and work programmes.

As a personal reflection, the consultant recalls how time and resource-consuming the organisation of face-to-face meetings can be. Regularly used by Beyond 2015, contemporary online tools (e.g. Google docs, webinars) and tele / videoconference facilities (e.g. Skype, Webex, Go to Meeting, classic teleconference line) are available at reasonable cost and can be very efficient for day-to-day work in any collaboration.

The initial investment in these tools and learning curve for individuals using them can also be seen as a long-term asset for those individuals and organisations which chose to incorporate these tools into their working culture.

### c. Limited adaptation of intervention approaches and tools

☉ Some voices indicated that, while proposed tools were generally useful and facilitated input, *"their potential was not maximised because not enough thought was put into translating these tools into local contexts."*

The consultant believes that in decentralised campaigns engaging at the regional and national levels, regional and national coordination positions should be responsible for adapting intervention approaches and tools.

### d. Lack of a structured framework for cross-fertilization across regions

☉ In the **final Evaluation Survey of Beyond 2015**, collaboration and cross-fertilization across regions respectively scored 6.14/10, 5.71/10 and 5/10 among English, French and Spanish respondents.

This leads to a clear recommendation that **future campaigns need to ensure collaboration and cross-fertilization across regions**. Thorough thinking, adequate arrangements, tools and budget are a must.

Please see [Q8](#) and [Q11](#).

### e. Poor external communications

☉ Members and Secretariat share the view that Beyond 2015 improved its internal communication as it evolved, as part of a natural *"learning by doing"* process, but that further tailored-made formats could have been used. A high number of voices across Beyond 2015, as well as external civil society representatives and UN staff, pointed out that the campaign was poor on external communications.

The Executive Committee and Secretariat of Beyond 2015 recommend that future campaigns **allocate specific and sufficient budgetary provisions for communications from an early stage**, to secure a full-time permanent communications officer in the Secretariat and external specialized support as needed. Another recommendation is around tailored-made approaches to information sharing (e.g. for active decision-making and coordination structures, for regional and national work, for information purposes only, etc.).

f. Dichotomy between an advocacy campaign and a mobilisation campaign

⦿ This issue is still raised by some members from different geographical areas and backgrounds, despite having been discussed at length by the Executive Committee, particularly in connection with the question of Beyond 2015's engagement in and differentiation from Action 2015.

⦿ In March 2014 the report *"Beyond 2015 - Post-2015 Public Mobilisation Scoping"* was commissioned by the Executive Committee and elaborated on the basis of interviews with members and CSO colleagues. The key recommendation was that the clearest space for Beyond 2015 to occupy was in supporting the delivery of policy and advocacy messages. This recommendation was adopted on the following grounds: it is not in Beyond 2015's mandate to deliver on public mobilization; many, both in the North and in the South, felt Beyond 2015 should play a role in policy and advocacy content; and too much focus on an active role in a complex campaign would dilute focus on policy and advocacy and risk diverting resources (staff time and finance) away from core priorities.

As a personal reflection, the consultant notes that mixed views on the notion of policy and advocacy seem to prevail across Beyond 2015's membership and could hinder efforts to determine the scope of future campaigns. Is this inevitable? Are we facing somewhat of a gap between the approaches of different generations of civil society activists? Or does it boil down to communication? These are important questions for future campaigns.

It is worth noting the following recommendation contained in the above-mentioned Mobilisation Scoping Report: *"Beyond 2015 should provide clarity on what it means by its policy and advocacy work. All Northern NGOs interviewed were clear that Beyond 2015's role was to 'Influence the political process through engaging with UN; and to put pressure on policy makers through advocacy rather than communications and campaigning.' Some of Beyond 2015's participating Southern members understood advocacy as encompassing policy, lobbying, campaigning and popular mobilisation."*

### Q3. How effective was the "pincer movement"?

According to Wikipedia *"The pincer movement, or double envelopment, is a military maneuver in which forces simultaneously attack both flanks (sides) of an enemy formation. The name comes from visualizing the action as the split attacking forces "pinching" the enemy."*

Secretariat, Executive Committee members, regional coordinators and national lead agencies underscore that operating at the global level with the ambition of impacting on the intergovernmental process required maneuvering the natural disconnect that governments experience between their country missions to the UN in New York and their departments in the capital.



*In general terms, the use of the pincer movement is seen as having had the following **strengths**:*

- ⦿ It proved to be an effective tool to overcome the aforementioned disconnect, particularly in a fast paced context.
- ⦿ It allowed coherent advocacy in New York and in the capitals through the use of the same messages, while giving the regional and national colleagues flexibility to adapt these messages.
- ⦿ UN staff and Member States praised Beyond 2015's efforts to reach out to the national level *"to loop back and forth between national NGOs and the negotiation developments."*



*As **shortcomings** of the pincer movement:*

- ⦿ A few members indicated that more solid political mapping could have helped identify where to focus effort (New York vs. capital) for given topics.
- ⦿ Numerous members indicated that the use of the technical term "pincer movement", in reference to a common advocacy strategy, provoked confusion and required a lot of explanation.

The consultant fully agrees on the principle of solid political mapping for any advocacy work. However, she wonders how medium-long-term political mapping could have been operationalized for the pincer movement and during this Post-2015 intergovernmental process, as this process was very fluid unlike other intergovernmental negotiations based on decades of talks (e.g. climate change negotiations). Most members of Beyond 2015 believe the pincer movement may be useful at particular moments of future campaigns (e.g. around the meetings of the High Level Political Forum and the presentation of national reports at the global level).



## Q4. What was the campaign's impact on civil society, and its ways of working and engaging with the UN?

**Strengths** identified by the different target groups of this review:

*"Having a broader campaign to complement the existing civil society thematic initiatives helped break the silos."*

- ⦿ Mobilising, empowering and improving the capacity of national CSOs to engage in complex intergovernmental processes; and contributing decisively to the establishment of relevant structures.
- ⦿ Offering organisations with different mandates from the global North and South a space in which to learn how to work together and from one another.
- ⦿ Showing that a self-organised and coordinated cross-constituency civil society movement can engage in a global intergovernmental process.
- ⦿ Offering a platform for dialogue with Member States and the UN System.
- ⦿ Bringing new voices and grassroots experiences into the intergovernmental process, particularly from the global South, while respecting established modalities for engagement with the UN.
- ⦿ Overcoming the general fragmentation of civil society in the follow up to Rio+20 and providing a platform for the engagement of civil society organisations that had not traditionally engaged in the sustainable development track.
- ⦿ Maximising the UN mandate for the engagement of "other stakeholders" that derived from Rio+20.
- ⦿ Contributing to enhancing the accountability of the UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders system.
- ⦿ Collecting views and generating agreements across constituencies on the full scope of Post-2015 matters.
- ⦿ Creating or fostering capacity in CSOs to adopt new working tools for virtual and remote collaboration.

*"The platform for engagement offered by the UN Major Groups at the early stages of the post Rio+20 follow up processes was saturated by the Rio+20 actors and sustainable development constituencies, and was not adapting quickly enough to accommodate the required convergence of the development and sustainable development tracks into the single Post-2015 process". (quote by a member of Beyond 2015)*

*"We saw Beyond 2015 as an important tool to help the NGO Major Group evolve." (quote from external civil society)*

*"With the Major Groups system underperforming in the immediate months after Rio+20 and not offering concrete proposals, Beyond 2015 helped convince the UN System of the capacity of civil society to self-organise." (UN staff)*

*"The interaction between Beyond 2015 and the Major Groups helped us operationalize the mandate to open up the system to Other Stakeholders that came from Rio+20. It also contributed to getting the practice of Major Groups more open and accountable and less dominated by Northern NGOs."*

*"Beyond 2015 allowed us to know the views of NGOs from the global South – and to see the South in the negotiation rooms. This was a very good contribution to overcome the dominance of Northern NGOs which has been a flaw of the engagement of civil society in the UN." (UN Member State representative)*

*"The added value of Beyond 2015 is that they presented positions already tempered among different constituencies. It was not only the partial view of a particular constituency, which we usually perceive as biased. That resulted in more credibility to the campaign". (UN Member State representative)*

**Combined shortcomings and open questions** identified by the target groups of this review.



The consultant thinks that trying to present them in strict categories would result in confusing overlaps and, more importantly, preempt the important discussions these ideas are calling for.

**a.** Being initially too dominated by Northern NGOs, particularly from the UK

This point is raised across Beyond 2015 and also UN staff. The consultant wishes to draw attention to the high risk of falling back to a "Northern bias" within the discussions and operationalisation of future global campaigns, as well as in the overall discussions of partnerships for implementation.



Beyond 2015's experience - and that of the Post-2015 Intergovernmental process in itself - offers precious lessons on the need to move away from the dynamics of the "donor-beneficiary dichotomy." Beyond 2015's lessons can inspire the partnerships, implementation, monitoring, accountability and review work ahead of all of us. provisions for language translation.

Illustrative quotes by UN staff:

*"The campaign started off clearly Northern driven, particularly from the UK. Over time it managed to respond to a true global nature and to the objective of engaging with NGOs from the global South. Their evolution in this sense was remarkable and deserves praise. However, for any future campaigns it is essential that the South is strongly involved from the conceptualisation. It cannot be just a few actors from the North if we truly want universal implementation of this universal agenda. It might take more time to conceptualise and launch but they must invest that time."*

*"The omnipresence of UK NGOs did not offer guarantees that it would be a truly global campaign. Was this going to be business as usual from the UK?"*

The **final Evaluation Survey** contained the question "How to retain the principle of shared South/North leadership in a potential future campaign". **73% of English responses and 83% in French and Spanish felt it was very important to prioritise "targeted funding to support Southern engagement at the national level"**.

Other more structural questions seem to be of less importance to members - having the Secretariat hosted in the global South, having a Southern fiscal agent or having quotas to ensure Southern participation (though 67% of Spanish responses considered this a high priority), were all considered less important than the issue of funding. It will be important for organisations planning any future campaigns to understand this. The temptation is to think that issues like having a Southern fiscal agent and having a Secretariat physically based in the South are crucial. The evidence of this questionnaire suggests otherwise.

**b. Not establishing a clear identity either synergy vis-à-vis other existing campaigns**

At the **Participatory Evaluation Meeting** in September 2015 (with Beyond 2015 members, Secretariat, regional coordinators and national lead agencies), participants highlighted that the campaign should have been better at achieving strategic synergies with existing global campaigns from early on, - particularly with the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP) and Action/2015. The consultant wonders whether these comments should be read in connection with the general perceived lack of leadership of Beyond 2015's Executive Committee. For detail, please see below **Q13**. At the same time though, members underscored the significant time and effort dedicated to these objectives at the beginning of the campaign. Executive Committee members think that, at a certain moment, discussions reached a dead end and Beyond 2015 needed to carry on in order to avoid losing space and impact, and to respond to the priorities of its participating organisations.

*"At the initial stages, the efficiency of the campaign was seriously limited by continuous controversy on identity - is it Beyond2015 or is it GCAP?" (Beyond 2015 member)*

*"At the beginning Beyond 2015 was poor at engaging and establishing frank dialogue with ongoing initiatives such as GCAP. For us it looked as if they were trying to recreate what GCAP was doing." (UN staff member)*

**c. Endorsing and perpetuating inefficient multilateral processes**

Some campaign members faced the conundrum of engaging in a multilateral UN-led process. The debate was particularly intense in the Latin America region. At the **Participatory Evaluation Meeting** in September 2015, participants highlighted the benefits of Beyond 2015 in that regard, in "overcoming the prevalent skepticism around global UN intergovernmental processes" and "helping organisations identify how the global process could impact locally and how engaging in it could facilitate their mission." The consultant notes the interesting connection with the dichotomy between an advocacy campaign and a mobilisation campaign (please see **Q2**).

A quote from a Beyond 2015 member reads: "We struggled with the question of whether we should engage with the institutions and the multilateral approach that have been perpetuating and incentivising perverse realities in the fight against poverty and social exclusion."

Quote by a Member State representative: “Some Member State delegates and civil society representatives initially approached the Post-2015 intergovernmental process with the traditional mindset of two camps that oppose NGOs to governments and vice-versa. Practice over the recent years is showing that this is no longer the reality in the UN. Besides, we all know that sustainable development needs collaboration among stakeholders. *We are all stakeholders in the same boat and it will be essential for the implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda that we all continue to see things in this way and behaving accordingly. Beyond 2015 has been a very important actor to change the mindset in us Member States but also in civil society.*”

d. Not assessing when the introduction of new faces at intergovernmental negotiations was detrimental to lobbying

*“My advice for future campaigns would be that they are not afraid of prioritising certain individuals during negotiation moments. This is a real politik and if you have individuals with lobby skills and traction, use them. Basically, don’t risk your outcomes for your principles.” (quote from a Member State)*

A good number of civil society representatives external to Beyond 2015 found that, at times, the introduction of new voices was detrimental to substantive debates and maneuvering around the intergovernmental process. The consultant notes that interesting words of caution on this point were included in the **Mid-term review** of the campaign in February 2014. Campaign members and Secretariat underscore that, politically speaking, it was very important to show the diversity inherent to the campaign. Moreover, in the opinion of the Secretariat, the occasions during which the official intergovernmental process improvised substantive debates with civil society representatives were so few that there was no real drawback. Several members strongly underscored that allowing colleagues to directly engage in the New York process empowered them and opened doors to them after returning home, both vis-à-vis their governments and their civil society peers.

*Many voices within Beyond 2015 argue that the campaign could have benefited from having more colleagues with “professional” advocacy and lobbying skills operating at all three levels: global, regional and national.* Some voices recurrently observed that Beyond 2015 did not actually lobby in the negotiation rooms, due to lack of sufficient human power (numbers) and limited capacity (average skills of those present in the rooms).

*“The UN is a space for symbols, so it was essential to make visible the diversity so inherent to the campaign” (illustrative quote by the Secretariat)*

*“We all agree most profoundly on the need to engage with and offer speaking opportunities to new voices, in particular from the global South. But it is equally essential that we are selecting the right skills and profile for each type of event.” (quote from a civil society representative external to the campaign)*

The consultant underscores that some of the imminent follow up discussions at the UN in the next 12 months will call for civil society representatives with solid advocacy and lobbying skills and experience. An example is the recent retreat for Member States to discuss the operationalization of the High Level Political Forum that was organised by the President of the ECOSOC in New York and for which the Beyond 2015 Advocacy Director was selected to participate as one of 3 civil society participants. The anticipated short, medium and long-term work in the areas of partnerships, implementation, monitoring, accountability and review over the next years will offer a mix of venues and moments. Some will require solid advocacy and lobbying competencies. Others will require opening up to grassroots voices. What seems clear for the consultant is that civil society will have to carefully assess the skills required to maximise each opportunity for engagement.

e. At the global level, not clarifying the campaign’s relationship with the UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders system, and taking up space

This is strongly underscored by UN staff, as well as by civil society representatives external to Beyond 2015 and some Member States. A few members of the campaign have also raised this issue.

At this point, the consultant remembers that the campaign counted on a “UN Working Group” in New York and wonders whether it delivered sufficiently on this matter. Taking a step back, it is the view of the consultant that the practices around civil society, Major Groups & Other Stakeholders engagement during the Post-2015 intergovernmental process offered space to these different configurations of stakeholders. However, these practices have not managed to address the crucial overarching question of the institutional arrangements required for the coexistence and interaction between the UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders system, civil society campaigns and multi-stakeholder coalitions.



The consultant believes that this overarching question needs to be urgently addressed and resolved directly by colleagues operating within campaigns, coalitions, UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders in order to prevent hindering prospects for engagement with the UN at the global level.

Equally important to the consultant's eyes is the need to address this question from the wider perspective of the ongoing discussions towards long-term, self-organised, strategic coordination mechanisms of UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders for sustained strategic engagement with the UN.

Illustrative quotes from UN staff:

*"There was too much complexity involved in separating the identity between Beyond 2015 and the NGO Major Group. We couldn't understand why a campaign of NGOs couldn't work with the NGO Major Group. For us it was very frustrating and we perceived that it went in detriment to everybody's effective engagement in the process."*

*"The question of how campaigns and coalitions work in synergy and complementarity with Major Groups & Other Stakeholders clearly remains open. If it is not addressed properly and very soon by civil society representatives themselves, it will result in going back again to fragmentation and inefficiency."*

Quotes from Beyond 2015 members:

*"In late 2012 after Rio+20, Major Groups started to recognise the need to adapt and reach out to Other Stakeholders around the discussions for engagement in the High Level Political Forum. At that time Beyond 2015 was not involved in these important discussions. The campaign was over-focused on the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons."*

*"It is worth also highlighting the resistance at the start of the campaign – some of the old hats felt that Beyond 2015 was fragmenting civil society - by not acting under GCAP's banner for example. And some felt that the campaign was not doing or saying anything new, which begs the question (...) why did we still need to say it all again? Because the (old structures) had failed to win the necessary changes to the system?"*

*"It would be important for each of us to keep a certain degree of humility. Many people and organisations were brainstorming on how to engage with the Post-2015 process. Even prominent members of Beyond 2015 were having conversations with others and in other places different to Beyond 2015. And that was a very good thing that reflects the variety and self-organisation of civil society and also the flexibility the campaign offered to members."*

Quotes from external civil society representatives:

*"At the beginning, the positions were unfortunately very territorial, also within Beyond 2015, which seemed to assume the role of representing only Other Stakeholders and didn't want to discuss collaboration with Major Groups."*

*"For some Major Groups members, Beyond 2015 was sounding as 'anti Major Groups' and this was fragmenting us vis-à-vis Member States."*

*"The perception that the Major Groups were against Beyond 2015 was an exaggeration. Major Group representatives proactively reached out to some Beyond 2015 members to collaborate on specific areas."*

*"The UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders system exists in the intergovernmental space. It's very important for recognition and engagement by the system. Of course civil society exists outside that intergovernmental space. Many of us work in organisations whose vision is to empower civil society. But we must not underestimate how many doors would close for civil society at the UN if we dismantled the system of Major Groups & Other Stakeholders."*

Quote from by a UN Member State: *"By talking to Beyond 2015 we would have the self-fulfilling sense that we had spoken to all civil society. But this is not true. They seemed to have a certain monopoly of civil society space so I worry about what happened to those who didn't sign up to Beyond 2015."*

#### f. Discontinuing pressure and engagement in New York after the UN Summit in September

This is expressed as an area of high concern not only within Beyond 2015 in general and by civil society colleagues external to the campaign, but also by UN staff and Member States. The consultant draws attention to the need to read these observations in connection with the last chapter of this report.

Quote from a Beyond 2015 member: *"We shook up the system and improved it. I'm concerned to see this legacy being thrown out of the window because of trust issues among civil society organisations and because the campaign is not organising structures to continue its legacy before it disappears."*

Another quote from a Member State representative:

*"Beyond 2015 should have done more to help consolidate and follow up the new channels for civil society engagement they helped to open."*

*It is confusing to see that everybody disappeared after the Summit. They invest so much and then leave completely. (...) If the UN does not remain a platform for more than Member States as it was during the intergovernmental process, this (2030 Sustainable Development) Agenda will be the first victim."*

The consultant underscores again that shortcomings presented above constitute important open questions that require ample discussions among civil society campaigns, UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders. Though their complexity and difficulty are undeniable, the consultant strongly believes that further postponing discussions will have very negative consequences on the ability of civil society to self-organise and engage effectively in the implementation, monitoring, accountability and review of Agenda 2030.

## Q5. Did the campaign link to social movements?

The plain answer across all target groups of this review is that, in general terms, **the campaign did not engage effectively with social movements**. Some question whether it could have possibly done so; while others believe it would have been a clear asset. Many believe that future campaigns will need better engagement with social movements for legitimacy and impact.

Some voices go as far as questioning whether this would have at all been possible. *"Civil society organisations and social movements are two different beasts"*, is an illustrative quote. Other voices argue that in terms of representative character and legitimacy it would have been of clear added value. Others argue that, since the campaign was decentralised to the national level, it was up to that level to assess the opportunity and feasibility. For instance, in Asia, national consultations involved social movements and in the Pacific, they built upon indigenous peoples' rights and decolonisation movements. Some consider that the campaign should have at least maintained better dialogue channels with social movements. This group considers that *"for a successor campaign with increased devolution to the national level, we need social movements in order to be honestly rooted in the national level and influence it"*. They call for any successor campaign to make efforts from its inception stages to involve the widest possible range of actors from civil society organisations to social movements, trade unions and think tanks.

The following quote from a Member State representative is an illustrative summary of the complexities behind this

question: *"I never heard of Beyond 2015's engagement with social movements. Certainly in Latin America these are the real influencers and working with them brings strong legitimacy and relevance. How to bring the movements into the intergovernmental picture in practical terms is the real difficulty. I see a lot of potential at the national level, particularly working with the urban connection."*

For the consultant, **the experience of Beyond 2015 shows the huge complexity and potentially divisive nature of this question** – in as much as the decision on how diverse the multi-stakeholder membership of a campaign can be complex. The elucidation is somewhat connected to the choice between having an advocacy or a mobilisation focus. Equally important is the question of how much trade off between compromise and consensus building, on the one hand, and efficiency and impact on the other hand, the campaign can afford while remaining loyal to its mission. To what extent specific partnerships or specific collaborations (instead of direct membership) constitute a pragmatic approach to reinforce the multi-stakeholder approach is also an important consideration.

## Q6. To what extent did decision makers use Beyond 2015 contributions during the negotiation process? Where does coincidence between the campaign's positions and the Post-2015 outcome finish and become true influence?

These questions are highly sensitive for any UN staff and Member State representatives, since any intergovernmental process is inherently a so-called "Member State-driven process." Moreover, very few Beyond 2015 members were capable of articulating detailed answers. Illustrative quotes follow:

By Member State representatives:

*"We were exposed to many different views from civil society besides those of Beyond 2015. We always took into account the views of the campaign. The fact that they were already the product of an agreement among different constituencies gave them credibility. And they were always able to react quickly as the process evolved, which made it easy to assess their inputs. But that doesn't mean that we could endorse all their positions. It was a political negotiation with many stakeholders involved." "Beyond 2015 was an influential actor of the process. Many others too."*

*“No doubt that our narrative our language was at some instances influenced by Beyond 2015 but we did not use specific language from any external sources.”*

By UN staff: *“That is not the right question to ask. This was a political process and one with an unprecedented level of engagement from many different stakeholders. Beyond 2015 had a clear influence in the outcome but one of the best achievements of this process is that it rallied a plethora of actors from across the globe to work together on a common vision. Beyond 2015 was among those prominent in helping civil society come together.”*

*“Beyond 2015 was a best practice in terms of organised, timely and relevant input. But the final Agenda is the product of the whole panorama of actors working intensely over a couple of years.”*

By Beyond 2015 members:

*“With this question we run the risk of reducing the campaign to its impact on a piece of paper”*

*“CSOs have the bad habit of taking credit but I’m convinced that the campaign was a game changer. It showed that it is possible to achieve self-organised and global civil society coordination for an intergovernmental process, as well as to efficiently engage with decision-makers.”*

Overall, non-Beyond 2015 members interviewed by the consultant also cautioned strongly about measuring impact solely by comparing Beyond 2015’s positions against the final wording of the outcome document. They recall that the final wording resulted from intense political negotiation and a myriad of civil society and stakeholder contributions.

The consultant fully agrees with the idea that **the legacy of any advocacy campaign goes well beyond words**. Having said so, she finds that several sources offer a good basis to identify the strong influence that Beyond 2015 had on the outcome of the Post-2015 process. These are for instance: the **“Review of Beyond 2015 Advocacy Positions and the Final Outcome Document of the Post-2015 Agenda”** prepared by the Advocacy Director in August 2015, the **results of the Evaluation Survey** compiled across the membership, the **annual Influencing reports**, the national and regional Assessment Reports, the statements made by countries during the negotiation sessions, and the correspondence established between members and Secretariat and government representatives.

*The following are central points to Beyond 2015’s advocacy that are included in the final Post-2015 outcome document:*

- ⑥ The campaign’s vision for the Agenda
- ⑥ A strong commitment towards the universal, integral and interlinked nature of the new Agenda, as well as to a high level of ambition.
- ⑥ The principles of **“leaving no one behind”** and of **“no target can be considered met until it is met for all social and economic groups.”** The latter could only survive political negotiation with the rewording “all segments of society”.
- ⑥ **Anchorage in human rights.** Several references were either not strong enough or watered down during the negotiations. However, all in all, Beyond 2015 is satisfied, and very proud of having firmly advocated for this from the early stages of the process, engaging with the UN Secretary General High Level Panel of Eminent Persons for Post-2015. The inclusion of a human rights perspective in a “sustainable development” agenda was one of the major political challenges of the process. The consultant recommends the **deeper analysis of human rights commitments**, prepared by the Center for Economic and Social Rights CESR.
- ⑥ Individual Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on **gender, inequality, sustainable consumption and production, climate, and peaceful and inclusive societies.**
- ⑥ Protection of the **Planet** as an overarching principle.
- ⑥ **Affordable, reliable and sustainable energy**, instead of just “modern energy.”
- ⑥ Sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, instead of only “growth”.
- ⑥ Commitment to develop **broader measures of progress** to complement gross domestic product (GDP).
- ⑥ Within Means of Implementation, **labour and child rights protection and environmental and health standards.**
- ⑥ A Technology Facilitation Mechanism (TFM) based on multi-stakeholder collaboration between Member States, civil society, the private sector, the scientific community, UN entities and other stakeholders.
- ⑥ **Participation** of civil society and all stakeholders as an end in itself.
- ⑥ **Accountability** at three levels – global, regional and national.

Below are examples of Beyond 2015's influence on the basis of country/group statements during the negotiation sessions, as well as on the feedback - sometimes informal - received during the negotiations by Beyond 2015 members and Secretariat from the UN System and Member States:

- ⊙ National works on the principle of "leaving no one behind."
- ⊙ Articulation of the negotiations among Member States towards a stand-alone SDG on climate change.
- ⊙ Use of paragraphs from Beyond 2015 documents in country and group statements.

Here are quotes by Member States from email exchanges with the Secretariat seen by the consultant: *"At this (early) stage of the process, you have managed to do much more than most Member States, in terms of coordinating positions."*

*"Congratulations on the superb work Beyond 2015 did during the final two weeks of negotiations! You were really active, the messages were simple and focused and really made a significant difference to the outcome!"*

The following are **shortcomings** of the campaign's advocacy that Beyond 2015 members and Secretariat identified at the Evaluation Meeting held in September 2015, during interviews conducted by the consultant for this review, and in the **final Evaluation Survey**:

Scarce engagement with "difficult" Member States. Some Members States noted: *"Beyond 2015 did not seem as empowered to criticize difficult countries - particularly from the developing world - as it seemed to do with Western nations."*

- ⊙ Not enabling people living in poverty to participate directly in intergovernmental negotiation sessions.
- ⊙ Not closing the loop between influencing the intergovernmental process and acting nationally and regionally.
- ⊙ Not influencing enough the monitoring and review chapter of the Agenda, which in general does not match the level of ambition of the other chapters.
- ⊙ Obtaining meager results regarding the relationship between Means of Implementation for the SDGs and the Financing for Development track. Overlaps between organisations working on both intergovernmental tracks could have been coordinated and better exploited.

- ⊙ Not managing to counterbalance the perceived exacerbated focus on sustained economic growth.

## Q7. Beyond 2015's impact on member organisations

In the **final Evaluation Survey** conducted in October 2015, participants were asked to rate **how they enjoyed participating in Beyond 2015**, on a scale of 1-10 (10 being the best experience, 1 being the worst), and rated Beyond 2015 quite highly. The average response was 7.52 for English responses, 7.00 for Spanish responses and 6.36 for French responses. Less than 10% of English and Spanish responses, and less than 8% of French responses, rated their enjoyment at 4/10 or below.

In the same Survey, respondents were asked **how they most benefited from the campaign**. An increased understanding of the Post-2015 process came out on top in with 74%, 83% and 50% in English, French and Spanish respectively. English and French responses rated political intelligence gained from the campaign as highly beneficial (68% and 58% respectively), along with the opening of spaces for increased participation in and access to official conversations at national, regional or international level (67% and 62% respectively). Spanish responses did not share the same opinion: only 10% of respondents considered these two outcomes to have been highly beneficial.

## Q8. Was the campaign able to sustain activities at national, regional and international levels with the same level of efficiency and impact?

Across the different target groups for this final review, opinions differ as shown by these illustrative quotes:

By a Beyond 2015 member: *"No, but it is not fair to evaluate the three levels with same measure without taking into consideration the different contexts and their timeframes."*

By a Member State representative: *"I never knew Beyond 2015 operated at regional level. It was difficult to engage at regional during the negotiations. For instance in Latin America there was no platform as such to engage with and we were not making CELAC (regional) statements during the negotiations"*.



This review does not seek to assess results achieved at the regional or country level. The consultant believes that such an assessment must be made on the basis of specific knowledge and direct experience in a given region or country. Moreover, the consultant sought to avoid duplication with the final Regional and National Assessment Reports, as well as with the **annual Influencing Reports**. The consultant commends the thoroughness of these reports and highly recommends their reading. They detail the positive impact and inspiring success stories that Beyond 2015 obtained. In this context, the paragraphs that follow constitute primarily a collection of the strengths and shortcomings strictly related to the question addressed here, and can be read in connection with **Q11**.



### **Strengths** identified by all target groups of this final review:

⊗ **The decision to expand the campaign from the initial international level to the regional and national, in terms of political strategy and of civil society inclusiveness and ownership.**

⊗ Beyond 2015 was highly performing at the international level.

⊗ Having regional coordinators take part in advocacy meetings and in Secretariat team meetings to improve the delivery at the regional level. Many regret that this was not the standard practice from the beginning.

⊗ Regional coordination achieved highest levels of performance in Europe.

⊗ The African coordination resulted in great support from African CSOs, closing with a membership of over 600 members. The coordination of a **Common African Position** on Post 2015 Development Agenda was an instrumental stepping-stone to secure civil society engagement in the African Union.

⊗ The **Final Asia Report** of November 2015 notes, “*The campaign was very effective in building networks of small organisations (...and) was able to strengthen national coalitions. It worked closely with the regional and global and was able to connect with the grassroots, policy makers and private sector.*”

⊗ The European coordination is regarded as highly successful in engaging with European Union institutions; and very helpful in policy analysis and content development, and good at linking with like-minded organisations.

⊗ The **Latin America Final Regional Report** indicates that the Campaign “*has raised the profile, degree of knowledge and buy-in of the Agenda in the region, and has enabled the creation of unprecedented cross-cutting spaces for civil society organisations to interact with their governments (...) at the national and regional levels – and has set the stage in a positive way (...) to bring about meaningful implementation.*”

⊗ In North America there was no regional coordination.

⊗ The **Pacific Winding down report** of October 2015 indicates that “*all national lead agencies and focal points were especially appreciative of how the campaign gave them the ability to understand complex UN processes (...), as well as linking the national level to regional and finally to the global level.*”

⊗ Leaving flexibility to the national level was key for the campaign to remain relevant.

⊗ The national level, in general terms, is perceived as well performing, with various degrees of satisfaction in members depending on countries.

⊗ UN staff and Member States praise Beyond 2015’s approach, in reaching out to the national level “*to loop back and forth between national NGOs and the developments of the intergovernmental process.*”

### **Shortcomings** identified by Beyond 2015 members:



⊗ There is little satisfaction with the work at the regional level, with the exception of the Europe region and the regional positions from the national deliberations elaborated back in 2013.

⊗ Selection and power mapping of which organisations to connect to at the international and regional levels should have been better.

⊗ Selection of campaign representatives to attend meetings should have been more thorough and in accordance to the skills and profiles required for each meeting.

⊗ Changes in staff in charge of regional and national coordination took a very high toll on the campaign.

⊗ The Executive Committee managed to keep abreast of difficulties at the regional and national levels but did not do enough to mitigate them. Some voices said that Executive Committee member from their region were not actually representative of that area or were only representing the interests of their organisation. From a different perspective, some said that certain regions (Latin America and the Pacific) were not always able to self-select their representatives for the Executive Committee. The consultant has reviewed the **Terms of Reference** for Executive Committee members. Their mandate does not contain provisions regarding regional representation. However, it is obvious to the consultant that membership of a governance body in a global campaign must be geographically balanced – something the campaign bore highly in mind.

⊗ The overall coordination of regional coordinators did not bring the expected and required results. Please see [Q17](#) for the details.

⊗ The selection of regional coordinators could have been improved. Some feel strongly that *“to be more strategic, the campaign needed at the regional level people with experience in political analysis and power mapping.”*

⊗ Some consider that one single coordinator per region was not enough.

⊗ In Asia, in general terms, members would have wanted to see more strategic and functional coordination. The **Final Asia Report** of November 2015 reads: *“The Asian Steering Committee did not maximize their leadership (neither) provide a greater direction to the campaign.”* The fact that national hubs did not take part in all campaign task forces is evoked as a missed opportunity with clear links to the lack of regional positions. *“It was difficult to engage with regional bodies such as (the UN regional commission) ESCAP or SAARC without a position that was specifically Asian, so we got diluted into the Asia Pacific Regional Civil Society Organisations Coordination Mechanism (RCEM). This is the region where 60% of the world’s poorest live so we cannot miss the opportunity to influence ESCAP”*, said a Beyond 2015 member.

In Africa, the creation of a strong regional civil society  
⊗ coordination mechanism is identified as an outstanding task. Some voices caution that mobilisation in big numbers in Africa is not always a form of legitimacy and does not automatically entail advocacy capacity or influence.

⊗ In Europe, it is perceived that, in certain occasions, instead of the time-consuming and demanding elaboration of position papers among a very wide membership, it could have been more efficient to send targeted advocacy messages with a brief contextualisation.

⊗ In North America, there was little coordination between Canada and the US; the US not wanting to be seen as pushing the process and Canada remaining skeptical about the UN. Besides, the rapport between governments and civil society organisations/NGOs remained complex.

⊗ In Latin America, the **Final Regional Report** states that it was difficult for the Steering Committee to remain relevant given “the nature and characteristics of the regional process in LAC - made of fragmented and weak institutions.” The Report also indicates “given the language and time constraints, as well as the intricacy of the process, establishing our regional coordination was not easy at first. Regarding the advocacy aspects of it, the uneven capacities of our lead agencies proved to be a challenge, as well as the uneven disposition of governments in the region towards participation and engagement with civil society.”

⊗ In the Pacific, the **Winding Down Meeting Report** states *“the Regional Steering Committee (was) not functional.”* Besides, it is perceived that the lack of Pacific-friendly approaches was a burden. The lack of sufficient funds to gather all actors together in face-to-face meeting more than once is evoked as another root cause.

**For future global campaigns operating regionally, some suggests the official allocation of regional portfolios among Executive Committee members**, with responsibility for regular public strategy and reporting sharing. Another suggestion made by a few is for the person specification (skills and competences) of regional coordinators to be similar to that of the Beyond 2015 New York-based Advocacy Director. In the Pacific, the **Winding Down Meeting Report** states as a lesson learnt that allocating at least 3 fully paid staff for the region should have been made. The consultant agrees that in the future substantive support for regional coordinators will be key and perhaps for some regions one coordinator will not be enough. However, the consultant cautions the risks of over-complicating the structure of a campaign (which is not an organisation) and inter-regional coordination with a potential total staff of 15 regional coordinators (3 x 5).



**For future campaigns, there is unanimous agreement across all target groups of this final review on the need to empower the national level in order for Agenda 2030 to become a reality.** A strong majority underscore that the regional level will become more relevant than during the negotiations and therefore insist on any future global campaigns to place strong efforts in operationalising efficient regional coordinating structures. The scenario of eliminating the regional level from the scope of future global campaigns is deemed “foolish” by the UN System and Member States. This quote from a UN staff illustrates why: *“the regional will emerge more clearly in the implementation phase so it should be an important level in future campaigns. It (the regional level) will turn into a venue where countries are among peers and will feel more comfortable with exposing the challenges and learning lessons.”* Quote by a Member State representative talking about reporting towards the High Level Political Forum: *“regional reviews must become a bridging mechanism between different levels of action.”*

### Q9. Did the Focus States Initiative work? Did it encourage selected States to take progressive positions and push for an ambitious agenda during the intergovernmental negotiation process?

Across the target groups of this final review, in general terms the initiative was welcomed and is perceived to have carried good traction and obtained positive results, even in challenging political national contexts.

The first phase – then called “Supportive States Project” – ran from March to December 2014 and focused on championing the campaign’s conceptual values for the Post-2015 framework. The second phase from April to September 2015 – renamed the “Focus States Project” to avoid the misconception that Beyond 2015 favoured the governments of certain countries – focused additionally on securing government support for the campaign’s positions, building political will to implement the new agenda, and creating opportunities for civil society to participate in its delivery. The work was now being guided by Beyond 2015’s strategic **“Policy to Action”** shift.

It is not the objective of this final evaluation to assess in detail the results of this initiative. The latest version of the **Global report** on the Focus States Project initiative contains mappings and tables indicating how the campaign’s values and policy positions were reflected in government statements, and how the Focus States Project activities contributed to building

political will for the implementation of the agenda; as well as to facilitating civil society participation in the implementation phase.



The following **strengths** of this initiative are identified:

- ⊙ Catalysing relationship building between civil society and government in the capitals, in New York and in several countries at the sub-national level, by means of strategic meetings with government representatives.
- ⊙ Evolving from the advancement of the campaign’s positions and values during intergovernmental negotiation sessions to pushing governments to set up the implementation phase before the formal adoption of the Agenda.
- ⊙ Contributing to building political will for the implementation of the SDGs at the national level, including through the initiation and the strengthening of institutional processes and through broad advocacy for the participation of civil society. Some example are:

**Zimbabwe:** Creation of a **national coordination mechanism** for the implementation of the SDGs with a leading role awarded to the Beyond 2015 lead agency to coordinate monthly meetings with local authorities in order to track progress in implementing the SDGs in all provinces.

**Kenya:** Inclusion of 8 civil society representatives in the newly formed tripartite group (government, UN Development Programme and CSOs) that is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the SDGs.

**Indonesia:** Government and Parliament backing the proposal by the lead agency to establish a joint multi-stakeholder secretariat for the implementation of the SDGs, involving civil society.

**Kiribati:** Radio shows with live Q&A sessions involving members of Parliament (both current and aspiring) to share their strategies for the implementation of the SDGs.

- ⊙ Providing additional funding to work across geographical areas and typology of countries, and taking advantage of planned elections (local and national) to secure electoral promises for the implementation of the Agenda.
- ⊙ Consolidating as part of the working culture of the campaign the idea of working more strategically with countries.

In general terms, the **shortcomings** identified in the initiative are as follows:



- ⊙ It did not work that well vis-à-vis Beyond 2015's Vision, Purpose, Values and Criteria and got more traction with the shift to Policy to Action.
- ⊙ It added an extra layer of complexity to the New York-based advocacy work.
- ⊙ It implied an advocacy risk to call out a Member State as supportive in the middle of an intergovernmental process of eminent political nature that was a moving target – hence the decision to rename the initiative in 2015.
- ⊙ It was difficult for national lead agencies to integrate the initiative in their work plans due to separate work plans being drawn up for national lead agency and supportive/focus states contracts.

## Q10. Did the campaign pay any price for the influence it gained?

As indicated above in [Q7](#), Beyond 2015 Secretariat and members were aware of the risk of becoming the mouthpiece of governments. Executive Committee members and the Secretariat underscore that this was largely debated when the campaign decided to accept core funding from 3 countries: Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland.

All target groups of this review – members, Secretariat, UN System, Member States and civil society colleagues external to the campaign – are unanimous in saying that the risk never materialised. **At no moment did the campaign become a mouthpiece in the intergovernmental negotiations.** In general terms, across all target groups of this review, the perception is that **the campaign did not pay a price for the influence it gained.** When pushing for answers, **these are the findings:**

- ⊙ Beyond 2015 created a demand and an expectation to which, at times, it could not respond due to financial and human resources, the slow reaction from its governance, or simply the need to prioritise its mandate.
- ⊙ Beyond 2015 had to endure the knock on effect of shaking the system of civil society engagement with the UN and the traditional platform of UN Major Groups. For more details on this please see above [Q4](#).
- ⊙ Beyond 2015 could at moments be perceived as too prominent in the wider civil society space at the global level due to its critical mass and presence.

⊙ Beyond 2015 was over-compromising and did not push Member States for more progressive outcomes. Please read in connection with the advocacy shortcoming of “scarce engagement with ‘difficult’ Member States”, identified under [Q6](#).

⊙ Beyond 2015 could have internally sharpened positions on certain issues (instead of using general statements) through further work with constituencies who already supported their issues. This is identified both by some Member States and campaign members, and is attributed to the compromise inherent to any multi-stakeholder collaborative.

These are quotes from Member State representatives: *“The added value of Beyond 2015 is that they were able to bring to the table reactions to the negotiations in real time and that were already a balance among different interests and constituencies, while their remain progressive.”*

*“Yes, they were easy to work with. But I never thought about that as a consequence of them compromising externally with Member States, but rather as the result of their own internal compromises. That is proof of maturity if you want to influence a process.”*

*“They were not ready to become clearer and snappier on certain points.”*

*“I would turn the question into: Did other civil society pay a price for the visibility of Beyond 2015? I wonder if they did not soak up all the space.”*



Lessons learnt and recommendations on the effectiveness and impact of global civil society advocacy campaigns

1. It is possible to achieve self-organised, cross-constituency and coordinated civil society engagement in intergovernmental processes at a global scale and to deliver a common vision for sustainable development.
2. A thoughtful mix of traditional and innovative intervention approaches can be very effective.
3. When operating in an intergovernmental process, using coherent messages vis-à-vis UN missions and capitals can help bridge the natural gap between the two, provided there is solid political mapping.
4. The way in which civil society engages with the UN has evolved dramatically since Rio+20, opening

unprecedented opportunities for engagement through the UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders system and cross-constituency collaboration. But these improvements ought not be taken for granted. Civil society and UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders must assume individual and collective responsibility in self-organising and collaborating towards non-partisan coordination for sustained strategic engagement with the UN. Crucial open questions must be addressed and resolved among colleagues involved in civil society campaigns, coalitions and the UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders groups so as not to hinder prospects for engagement with the UN.

**5.** The questions of social movements participating in civil society campaigns and their interaction are extremely complex and potentially divisive. These questions remain open and beg for sustained dialogue and pragmatic thinking in relation to ownership, legitimacy, operationalisation and sustained efficiency of future campaigns.

**6.** A well-organised and managed global and cross-constituency civil society advocacy campaign can achieve strong levels of engagement and directly influence an intergovernmental process - provided it claims a specific strategic space early on, recognises itself as an actor among others, does not soak up space from other actors, and allows its own members to equally contribute and shine individually.

**7.** Establishing, operationalising and sustaining structures and arrangements for a civil society campaign to operate at the international, regional and national levels is a very difficult task. It is time-consuming and requires a lot of flexibility, considerable levels of human and financial resources, as well as efficient coordinating structures and overarching frameworks to support this coordination.

**8.** An advocacy-focused civil society campaign that operates in a political intergovernmental environment and receives funding from governmental sources must remain highly aware of the risk of instrumentalisation.

**9.** Preserving space for stocktaking, reflection and recalculation, as well as managing innovation when operating in a fast-paced environment, can end up being incredibly challenging for individuals and for collaborative initiatives as a whole. Collaborating with academia and think tanks can open new horizons and solutions.



## Recommendations for future civil society advocacy campaigns

- ⑥ Common understanding across members of the identification as an advocacy or a mobilisation campaign.
- ⑥ Avoiding being dominated by Northern NGOs, not even at initial stages;
- ⑥ Establishing clear synergies and identity demarcations with other existing campaigns;
- ⑥ For the global level, clarifying relations vis-a-vis the UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders system and establishing channels for collaboration.
- ⑥ Ad hoc assessment of when it is appropriate to carry out solid advocacy and lobbying, and when it is better to open up to grassroots voices.
- ⑥ Openly and thoroughly discussing the question on whether –and if so, how to– incorporate social movements in its membership.
- ⑥ Solid budgets and contingency provisions for language translation in fundraising strategies.
- ⑥ A mix of daily virtual work and face-to-face meetings for specific milestones, in accordance with strategic plans and work programmes.
- ⑥ Regional and national levels taking full ownership of adapting global intervention approaches in global campaigns that are decentralized.
- ⑥ Specifically skilled communications officers at all times in Secretariat teams. Specific and sufficient budgetary provisions for professional support for external communications.
- ⑥ Substantial funds for meaningful and efficient regional coordination structures and influence.
- ⑥ Thorough thinking, adequate arrangements, tools and budget for collaboration and cross-fertilization across regions.
- ⑥ Official allocation of regional portfolios among Executive Committee members, with responsibility for regular public strategy and reporting sharing.
- ⑥ Person specifications (skills and competences) for regional coordinators with robust advocacy profiles.
- ⑥ Considering practical applications of the risk of becoming instrumentalised through government funding when operating in a political intergovernmental process: What is the percentage of government funding? What measures will be established to protect the campaign from instrumentalisation? If there are similar percentages of government funding and funding from other sources, can government funding be used as activity grant instead of as operating grant?
- ⑥ Being prepared for success leading to higher demand and work expectations, through adequate provisions for financial and human resources.
- ⑥ Encouraging, protecting and curating individual and collective reflection, recalculation, creativity and innovative thinking. Collaborating with academia and think tanks can open new horizons and bring solutions.



Photo courtesy of Beyond 2015. 2013.

Beyond 2015 members gather in Nairobi in June 2013 for a workshop on the post-2015 vision, purpose, criteria, values.



# STRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE, MANAGEMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS

## CHAPTER 2

### **Q11. Did structural and governance issues help or impede campaign effectiveness? Were regional and national coordination mechanisms and institutional arrangements adequate?**

The consultant finds that **Beyond 2015 achieved exceptional levels of self-organised governance, anchored in the principles of collective decision-making, inclusivity, transparency and accountability.** The campaign devoted very substantial effort to operationalising structures at the regional, global and national levels and in many instances used tailored-made approaches.

Below are key findings regarding structural and governance issues, mainly from the final Evaluation **Survey**, the Regional Reports and the **Mid-Term Review** - many of which are evoked in **Q2, Q4, Q7** and **Q8** and further in this chapter.

#### **a. Executive Committee**

- ⊗ The lack of sufficient and continuous leadership in the Executive Committee impacted negatively on the overall mid-term strategy setting and fundraising, as well as on the Secretariat.
- ⊗ The Executive Committee managed to keep abreast of the campaign's difficulties to sustain efficient impact at the regional and national levels but did not do enough to mitigate these difficulties.

Please refer to **Q13** for more detail and some reflections.

#### **b. Regional and national structures and their coordination**

- ⊗ The overall coordination of regional coordinators did not bring full satisfaction. Reasons evoked are (i) lack of specific regional strategies; (ii) changes in regional coordinators; (iii) colleagues not working full-time on the Post-2015 dossier; (iv) the complexity of contracts and their arrangements, and (v) the reflection, in retrospect, that the role of Coordinator of Regional Coordinators should have resided in the Secretariat (please see **Q8** and **Q17**), and should have focused less on clarifying decisions from the international level and more on discussing key issues, sharing good and bad practices and intelligence.
- ⊗ Some regional steering committees were inefficient, either due to lack of true regional coordination or to the impact of the weak and fragmented multilateral regional institutions. Please refer to **Q8**.
- ⊗ 25% of respondents to the final Evaluation Survey said they did not know how effective regional hubs and national lead agencies had been – indicating a low level of awareness of these structures' role. Regional hubs and lead agencies were thus not seen as highly effective, revealing a rating of 5.8/10. The fact that the effectiveness of national lead agencies received an average rating of 5.85/10 is worrying given that 46% of respondents represent lead agencies and therefore are very well placed to provide this information.
- ⊗ National hubs could have linked more with grassroots organisations.



The consultant finds that these deficiencies are mainly linked to insufficient funds (evoked in [Q19](#)) and to deficient mapping and selection at the national and regional levels, regarding which organisations to link up with at the regional and global levels (evoked in [Q8](#)), or to the recurrent factor of differing capacity. In Latin America, for instance, capacity constraints of lead agencies is evoked:

*“Organizations in the region rarely have funds available to invest in human resources to work specifically on the Post-2015 agenda. (...) This is why we welcomed the Secretariat’s decision on establishing a new provision on lead agencies contracts, which allowed them to allocate 50+% of their lead agency resources for human resources to work specifically on the agenda. (It resulted in being able) to hire dedicated staff (...).”* Asia indicated: *“Asia Development Alliance could have integrated the Beyond 2015 Asia planning into their overall structure. However, since the engagement happened late, they were not able to do this and it added another separate layer of activity.”*

#### c. Bureaucracy and disbursement of funds

- ⊗ There were delays in the approval of advocacy budgets for Regional Coordinators, and difficulty in accessing the funds due to bureaucracy in the decision-making processes by host organisations of regional coordinators. This led to important advocacy activities being cancelled, but got progressively better.
- ⊗ There were also delays in the disbursement of funds to national lead agencies. In the Pacific, for instance, the allocation of funds to national leads is seen to have relied too heavily on the submission of individual reports that then had to be consolidated into one report. This approach was originally adopted to ease the burden of national lead agencies and place it on regional coordinators. However, an unintended consequence was that the disbursement of funds relied too heavily on the submission of a first report by national agencies. Delayed reporting by one agency alone thus delayed the whole report and hence the allocation and eventual distribution of funds.

The consultant cannot underscore enough the importance of resolving these issues in future campaigns. **The relevance of the regional and national levels and the potential for decentralising more funds to these levels in the coming years to implement Agenda 2030 are critical factors.**

#### d. Transitions

- ⊗ Transitions (Executive Committee, regional coordinators, national leads etc.) were not always smooth.

The consultant recognises that a deeper review of this issue is required to assess its root causes. Still, it is recommended that future campaigns put in place concrete mechanisms to mitigate the loss of individuals – e.g. structured hand over reports and files; closer supervision of handovers by line management; detailed orientation/induction for all new staff; facilitation of interviews between outgoing and incoming officers, even before the change is effective; budgetary provisions to facilitate induction visits for incoming officers.

#### e. Terms of Reference and selection processes

- ⊗ The importance of Terms of Reference and job descriptions is recurrently raised (Executive Committee, Co-chairs, Regional Coordinators, etc.).

The consultant finds that ensuring clear ToRs and their equal understanding across members is essential. However, ToRs are no silver bullet. Scrupulous selection processes, as well as the individual responsibility of the organisation/campaign member that puts forward a given candidate, come strongly into play. In a membership campaign, members get as much from the campaign as they invest in it, and ultimately, it may all boil down to each individual’s sense of responsibility and self-awareness.

### Q12. What was the balance between the campaign’s ‘internal’ and ‘external’ work?

The majority of campaign members would describe these dimensions along the following broad lines:

- ⊗ Internal work: strategy setting, political mapping, fundraising, decisions on funding allocations, Executive Committee duties, collection and synthesis of civil society contributions to develop advocacy positions.
- ⊗ External: taking advocacy positions to the intergovernmental process; meeting with government officials, parliamentarians, country missions to the UN in New York and UN staff; connecting the global, regional and national levels; communications.

Members hesitate where to place aspects related to partnership and institutional relations.



In general, members highlight that both dimensions were carried out in a balanced and mutually reinforcing manner, while a majority of Executive Committee members feel that, at times, there was excessive focus on internal work.

The consultant points out the need to read this in connection with **Q13** below dedicated to the Executive Committee. From the strategy setting and inception phases, a future global advocacy campaign and its governing body should not underestimate allocating significant time and efforts to internal work in order for external activities to be successful - and hence for the campaign to be effective as a whole.

### Q13. Executive Committee

**It is important to note that there were several iterations of the Executive Committee throughout the life course of the campaign, with variable levels of performance by individual members.**

In general terms, interviewees across the target groups of this final review were relatively satisfied with the performance of the Executive Committee. There was unanimous gratitude to the individuals with heavy workloads who graciously accepted this addition to their daily duties, and in many cases pro bono. The **Critical Self-Evaluation of the Executive Committee** in 2015 underscored, “good personal relationships built on trust enabled this group to work well.” There is unanimous recognition that not all members could approach the task from the same context – some had full-time portfolios on Post-2015 within their organisations, while others had only partial exposure to the dossier.



Beyond 2015 members identify the following **strengths** in the performance of the Executive Committee:

- ⦿ Significant efforts to remain geographically South/North balanced.
- ⦿ Financial support for each of the seven Southern members, with the aim of strengthening Southern capacity to engage and lead on Post-2015 discussions. The support – up to €9,500 – was for advocacy activities and travel in relation to Beyond 2015 activities and priorities.
- ⦿ There is unanimous praise to the Secretariat for sharing online all meeting minutes and other detailed notes pertaining to the work of the Committee. There was also a direct channel via email.

The final Evaluation **Survey** carried out among members

members of the campaign complained about the lack of information on what the Committee was doing. The final Evaluation **Survey** carried out among members contained the question “How could structures be improved in a potential future campaign?” Recommendations from respondents included “a more democratic Executive Committee which leads but democratically and with more explanation and communication around decisions taken” and “make them more participatory and inclusive and accountable to members.” The consultant does not have a firm opinion on this matter because she does not have enough information to ponder on the percentage of members who would subscribe to the above comments. She commends the efforts made by the Secretariat to make Executive Committee materials available and wonders why this issue was not raised by these members directly with the Secretariat, or even directly with the Executive Committee in what was a campaign of peers.

### Challenges and shortcomings



identified in the functioning of the Executive Committee:

- ⦿ Lack of gender balance and difficulty to maintain it due to lack of candidates.
- ⦿ The high difficulty inherent to maintaining geographical and gender balances, while securing the right profile of individuals in the interest of both a representative and efficient campaign.

The **Critical Self-Evaluation of the Executive Committee** indicated that “despite all efforts the power imbalances were not fully overcome. The Exec Com remained often dominated by Northern voices, and it still seemed that Southern members engaged less than Northern members.” Executive Committee members wonder “how the capacity of organisations and individuals from the global South could have been better built. Was enough done to enable effective participation in the Exec Com by Southern members without having to rely on the campaign to finance this participation? Flexible funding helped, but was it enough?”

Across the campaign’s membership, including colleagues who sat on different incarnations of the Committee, **there is unanimous agreement on the non-negotiable character of geographical and gender balances for a global campaign.** The consultant notes that further debate and identification of solutions will be vital for future campaigns.

A good number of voices perceived a general lack of leadership from the Executive Committee.

They argue that this impacted negatively on two fronts. Firstly, the overall mid-term strategy setting and fundraising suffered. Secondly, the Secretariat was sometimes left without instructions or feedback, and therefore had to overcome this by somewhat overstretching its functions. **The Critical Self-Evaluation by the Executive Committee** threw that “It was not clear that the big political issues were really considered in the Executive Committee; maybe this group did not take the politics seriously enough” and “the Executive Committee should have been better at strategically selecting Co-Chairs.” Revealing quotes from Beyond 2015 members: “The Ex com had merely a repeating temporary existence. In between meetings it didn’t really exist” and “all the burden was left to the Secretariat, which still managed to remain very respectful of the decision-making authority of the Ex Com.”

***“The right ideas were there but not the right level of hierarchy for bold decision-making”***

- ◉ Linked to insufficient leadership is the limited seniority and decision-making capacity of Executive Committee members in their respective organisations.

At the same time, it is acknowledged that senior decision-makers from different organisations serving in a time-consuming and fast-paced endeavour like Beyond 2015 – often without remuneration (only Southern members received financial support) – may have resulted in frequent unavailability and untimely decision-making.

- ◉ The **Critical Self-Evaluation** concluded, “we lost momentum in changeover of the Executive Committee in 2014.”
- ◉ The Critical Self-Evaluation concluded “mandates for individual members were not clear enough.”

The consultant notes, nevertheless, that, in order to retain institutional memory, only a partial change in members was carried out – 50% of Northern and 50% of Southern members remained. Is this again a case of shared responsibility among campaign members in selecting the right individuals for crucial governance positions?

- ◉ The Executive Committee managed to keep abreast of the campaign’s difficulties to sustain efficient impact at the regional and national levels but did not act accordingly to mitigate them.

Put in the own words of the Critical Self-Evaluation by the Executive Committee “the Committee did not have a great grip on the regions.” Please see **Q8** and **Q13**.

The consultant has reviewed the **Terms of Reference for Executive Committee** members. Their mandate does not contain provisions regarding regional representation. However, it is obvious to the consultant that the governance body of a global campaign must be geographically balanced – something the campaign bore highly in mind. For a future campaign, some Beyond 2015 members suggest the official allocation of regional portfolios among Executive Committee members, with responsibility for regular public strategy and reporting sharing.

In terms of the Executive Committee’s working methods, the **Critical Self-Evaluation** concluded that more face-to-face meetings would have been appreciated and that language was sometimes a barrier to understanding and participation.

The consultant recommends future campaigns factor in adequate budgetary provisions.

## Q14. Co-Chairs

**It is important to note that there were several co-chairs throughout the life course of the campaign, with variable levels of performance.**

In general terms, interviewees showed quite a varying degree of satisfaction with the way in which the mandate of co-chairs was carried out during the campaign, while there is unanimous gratitude to those colleagues who accepted this demanding role. A quote by a Member State very familiar with the campaign reads: “I never knew exactly who was the highest political authority of Beyond 2015.”

### **Strengths** underscored in general terms by members:

- ◉ Having Co-Chairs.
- ◉ Having geographical balance (a co-chair for the global North and another from the global South).
- ◉ **Their existence was useful for representation, profile, daily decision-making and leadership in interacting with the Secretariat, as well as for facilitation of Executive Committee meetings.**
- ◉ Mid-term election for transparency and inclusiveness.

### **Shortcomings and challenges** identified in general terms:

⊗ *“The Executive Committee should have been better at strategically selecting Co-Chairs,”* is a reflection of the **Critical Self-Evaluation by the Committee**, which the consultant can confirm is shared almost unanimously by members.

⊗ Some pointed out that Co-Chairs were not always as supportive of the Secretariat as needed.

⊗ Maintaining Co-chairs both for the global North and the global South was challenging. Nevertheless, as indicated above for the Executive Committee, there is also absolute unanimity on the non-negotiable character of this.

⊗ A number of campaign members said that, in collaborative campaigns of this kind, revoking a mandate in the event of unsatisfactory performance is delicate in terms of trust-building and may result in disruptive situations; while the cost of inaction can be high in terms of leadership and efficiency.

It is delicate for the consultant to make a judgment call. After all, the Executive Committee and the campaign as a whole was a coalition of the willing; a collaborative effort among organisations committed to the campaign through direct membership to it. **The importance of clear ToRs and the need to ensure that these are equally understood by serving members is undeniable.** But ToRs are not to be taken for granted. **Scrupulous selection processes, as well as organisations/campaign members taking responsibility for putting forward candidates, also come strongly into play.** And ultimately, it all boils down to the sense of responsibility and self-awareness of each individual.

Having said so, the consultant strongly believes that future campaigns must put in place a more solid peer-review system for their Co-Chairs. No single option can be comprehensive and one-size will not fit all campaigns. Simple actions could be, for instance, ensuring each candidate presents his/her vision and a detailed roadmap for the duration of the mandate; as well as introducing regular reporting obligations for the Co-Chairs in terms of specific results achieved and strategic issues moving forward.

## Q15. Secretariat

*“A team of highly committed and professional individuals,”* is a very illustrative quote of what the consultant heard during the interviews with members, UN colleagues and Member States.

Members underscored the following aspects:

⊗ **Having a professional and independent Secretariat was very valuable for the campaign.**

⊗ All Secretariat staff worked proactively and went the extra mile to mobilise members, even less active ones; to increase members’ capacity to engage in the campaign; keep information flowing in three languages, including via uploading translations of key documents on the Campaign’s website; to improve collaborative approaches for elaborating positions; identify and help members exchange good practices for intervention approaches; keep the campaign’s reporting structure and monitoring mechanisms alive, and identify pragmatic solutions to problems.

⊗ Members express a debt of gratitude to campaign Director Leo Williams for his *“professionalism”, “endless energy and driving force”, “availability and support around the clock”, “ability to keep us focused”, “capacity to anticipate problems and be problem-solving.”* Executive Committee members underscore Leo’s *“respect to the Executive Committee and the Co-Chairs even when he was not getting appropriate leadership from them.”*

⊗ Members share high praise for Advocacy Director Naiara Costa. An illustrative quote of how she is perceived by Member States is: *“Having somebody knowledgeable, reliable and articulate like her in New York was one of the best things the campaign did.”* Executive Committee members pointed out that she was a source of crucial intelligence and vital strategic thinking to them. Some voices regret that the position was not further supported with more staff (although a Supporting Consultant was hired from January - September 2015). The review of funding provisions by the consultant showed that few organisations stepped up to provide funding for this role at a time where the campaign did not count on core government funding.

⊗ The lack of leadership by the Executive Committee sometimes left the Secretariat without instructions or feedback. The Secretariat was forced to overcome the situation by somewhat overstretching its functions beyond normal for a civil society campaign. Colleagues offering these comments thank the Secretariat for regularly prodding the Executive Committee and finding ways to push dossiers forward. They underscore that the critical issue here is the root cause (the question of the Executive Committee’s leadership) and not the consequence (the question of overstretched Secretariat functions).

- Specifically skilled communications officers should have been secured at all times in the team. This must be read in connection with the overall poor assessment given to Beyond 2015's external communications (Please see [Q2](#)).

- Many believe that the overall coordination of regional coordinators should have resided in the Secretariat and not in a partner, by virtue of its regular contact with them.

The consultant deems equally important to share the perspective of the devoted Secretariat staff. The paragraphs below reflect key findings identified by the consultant in the anonymous summary of the staff exit interviews that the Secretariat kindly made available to her. Secretariat, Regional Coordinators as well as the International Forum of National NGO Platforms (IFP) – as partner tasked with the overall coordination of regional coordinators – , assessed their experience.

Working conditions (e.g. workload and content, supervision, etc.) were rated largely between above average and excellent. They find that salaries could have been better, considering the workload. Some secretariat staff on consultancy contracts, as well as some regional coordinators, had no social security benefits or health insurance.

As regards the organisation of work and the supervision, the working environment (e.g. recruitment and induction, administrative/procedures, support for work/life balance, etc.) were rated between above average and excellent. The supervision for the Secretariat by line managers was rated between above average and excellent (e.g. performance feedback, fair/respectful treatment, clear communication of expectations). Supervision for regional coordinators was rated below average. Dual reporting lines to the host organisation as well as to IFP were not clear or effective and Secretariat staff and Regional Coordinators did not receive the same level of induction. Tools were provided to facilitate work (e.g. laptop computers, credit cards for key staff, mobile phones and 3G dongles in Pretoria where Internet connectivity is challenging); and consultants brought in to try to alleviate workloads. Colleagues working in Southern organisations faced some challenges, e.g. Internet connectivity. Monthly check-ins to agree on priorities and timescales were very useful and team meetings were not too cumbersome.

Some of the most enjoyable aspects about the job and being at Beyond 2015 identified by staff are:

- A unique opportunity to work in a very diverse and

action-oriented environment with a clear mandate, direction and strategy.

- The diversity of the team across five continents and its motivation to pull in the same direction.

- The high level of collaboration and trust among colleagues and partners.

- The freedom and autonomy to lead streams of work and to be creative.

- Watching all different pieces come together, and finally the UN Summit.

Some of the least enjoyable aspects about the job and being at Beyond 2015 identified by staff are:

- The very heavy workload during certain stages.

- The very short deadlines resulting many times in working too much on the surface.

- The delay in approval of advocacy budgets for Regional Coordinators, and the difficulty in accessing the funds from their host organisations.

- Striking a balance between participatory leadership and effectiveness.

- Managing expectations between different structures.

## Q16. Fiscal Agent

The conclusion from the interviews conducted by the consultant specifically for this review is that across Beyond 2015 there is **good degree of satisfaction and high gratitude** for the work carried out initially by CONCORD and later on by African Disability Alliance (ADA) as fiscal agents.

Members underscored the following aspects:

- The separation of powers between the Executive Committee, the Fiscal Agent and the Secretariat was a great idea to prevent the concentration of power in a single group of individuals or organisation.**

- A strong and skillful Fiscal Agent is key for a global campaign of this nature.

- Sharing the responsibility in turns between North and South was another great idea. It showed that a global campaign can have a Fiscal Agent based anywhere, provided the Agent has the right skills and capacities.

The consultant commends the mid-term appointment of a Fiscal Agent following a competitive process based on submission of tenders. The consultant also suggests the reader to triangulate this comment with the one made above under [Q4](#) on ways to continue North/South leadership.

④ ADA believes the truly unique element they brought to the campaign was not necessarily being an organisation from the South, but rather being managed by people with disabilities. To their eyes, for a campaign that focuses on poverty and exclusion to be led by such people sent a strong signal.

④ ADA finds that, in retrospect, they should have taken more time to assess the risks associated with the fiduciary responsibility of the Fiscal Agent role. At the same time they emphasize, they “rode the wave and enjoyed it. Subcontracting over 35 CSOs throughout the world that had nothing to do with disability gave us great personal satisfaction and empowerment. Actually we have now embedded fiscal agent tasks in our activity. We have just accepted a similar new role and have submitted a tender for another one. This is proof of Beyond 2015’s legacy and of our capacity.”

④ The principle of fiscal neutrality – by which the Fiscal Agent was not to benefit financially from its role – worked well for both sides: the campaign was not charged with a fee and no loss was accrued to the Fiscal Agent.

④ The time commitment and the fiduciary responsibility absorbed by the Fiscal Agent were very high. Beyond 2015 contributed €20.000 per year to help offset ADA’s costs. Both sides found the amount correct, while it was underscored that it was not just a question of budgetary allocation and coverage of overhead costs because the role of fiduciary entails risk and high responsibility.

④ Having 2 staff seconded to ADA helped alleviate the workload.

④ The Memorandum of understanding between Beyond 2015 and the Fiscal Agent and its level of detail worked very well. With Beyond 2015 having no legal personality, Director Leo Williams was held accountable for the campaign.

For future campaigns, Executive Committee members, Secretariat and the Fiscal Agent strongly underscore the **importance of having a solid fiscal agent and thoroughly assessing this highly demanding role**. The Fiscal Agent highlights the importance of not underestimating the

fiduciary responsibility and recommends any organisation considering taking up this role not to underestimate the difficulties when trying to fundraise for their own organisation with the same donors who would be funding the campaign. The consultant could not agree more with these recommendations.

## **Q17. What were the challenges and successes on partnerships? How did relationships with key partners work?**

Across Beyond 2015 there is almost unanimous agreement that the *discussions about partnerships at the initial stages of the campaign were among the most challenging and complex aspects of the campaign overall*. Illustrative quotes by members are:

*“We have to give credit to the Executive Committee for the painful discussions and their serious engagement to decide about partnerships.”*

*“We should have cut the time we spent in trying to engage with those with whom there was no shared understanding and invested more quality time in planning how to maximise the 3 key partnerships we finally concluded with the 3 organisations with whom we had things in common.”*

Main points raised by members and partners at the interviews conducted by the consultant are:

④ Achieving and operationalising strategic synergies with existing global campaigns from early on, in follow up of the efforts that were put into dialogue towards this - particularly with the Global Call to Action Against Poverty GCAP and Action/2015 – was very complex and time consuming; and issues remained unresolved.

④ **It was essential to partner “with those who had more in common with Beyond 2015 and in the end the decision went to the right places.”**

The vast majority of interviews indicated that, overall, the 3 main partnerships concluded by Beyond 2015 – with the Climate Action Network (CAN-International), the International Forum of National NGOs Platforms IFP and Participate – were not maximised and did not bring full satisfaction. At the same time, there is almost unanimous recognition that the campaign implied a lot of “*learning by doing*” for everyone. Besides, some voices emphasised the need to compare results to the counterfactual: what would have not been achieved without these 3 partnerships?



The main points raised by members and partners are:

⑥ It is unanimously perceived that CANInternational brought in policy and advocacy expertise in climate change, hence the environmental dimension and membership that the traditional group of development NGOs did not have. This legitimated the campaign's advocacy for a stand-alone SDG on climate change. In general, it also allowed members to better understand the interface between working on climate and social policies. Besides, several voices pointed out that, had Beyond 2015 not worked with CAN-International while advocating for an SDG on climate change, donors, civil society and governments in general would have immediately raised questions.

⑥ CAN-International's regional and national engagement is perceived as less fruitful than expected. Some reasons evoked are: the limited funds dedicated; the fact that Beyond 2015 members were not always conscious of their overlapping membership with CAN-International; or the fact that CAN-International and Beyond 2015's regional coordinating structures were not always in the same countries. In retrospect, CAN-International suggests investing more in capacity building - for instance in an "ambassador" who would visit/interact directly with the national lead agencies.

⑥ Overall coordination of regional coordinators by the IFP is generally perceived as having alleviated the workload of the Secretariat.

⑥ There is unanimous assessment that the overall coordination of regional coordinators did not achieve the expected and required results. IFP identifies the lack of specific regional strategies, the changes in regional coordination post holders and the fact that colleagues were not dedicated full time to the Post-2015 process as structural inefficiencies with big negative impact. In retrospect, many find that the coordination of regional coordinators should have resided in the Secretariat.

⑥ There is unanimous high appreciation of the research brought by Participate, which is also perceived to have resulted in legitimacy and strengthened policy and advocacy capacity. **The Mid-Term Review** of the campaign in February 2014 indicated: ***"There is some evidence that the Participate initiative has brought the perspectives of the poorest into the Post-2015 debate by engaging with UN and Governments as well as policy makers at different levels."***

⑥ Many regret the disengagement with Participate once its research and budgetary provision ended.

⑥ Some voices think partners should have been given observer status in the Executive Committee, in order to facilitate the rapport with the campaign.

From the consultant's perspective, partnerships concluded with CAN-International, the IFP and Participate essentially institutionalised trust and friendship – and it is very clear that trust and friendship run deep between these 4 actors. **The consultant subscribes the approach suggested by some members of comparing results to the counterfactual of what would not have been achieved without these 3 partnerships. From that perspective, she considers the 3 partnerships to have helped Beyond 2015 in terms of policy, advocacy, research, workload alleviation, legitimacy and fundraising.** The consultant finds that the campaign and partners shared sufficient common ground to partner. However, she sees deficiencies in the choice of activities/tasks for each partnership and the approaches to operationalize them.

The consultant emphasises the vital importance for any campaign or organisation to be strategic and also realistic about partnerships. A strategic and realistic approach must be taken on both sides, and each side must have clear a vision of what they can bring to the partnership, and conduct a thorough self-assessment of their capacity to do so before entering into any agreement. But perhaps the best way to finish this section is with a quote from a Beyond 2015 member; to which the consultant would be happy to subscribe: ***"The principle of partnership is that you are trying to get the best of all worlds. It requires compromises. It should anticipate difficulties and be based on a sound risk matrix."***



Lessons learnt and recommendations about structure, governance, management and partnerships for global civil society advocacy campaigns

1. Effective structure and management, as well as sound, inclusive and transparent governance are the lifeblood of any collaborative initiative. Finding the right measure between chaos, opacity or cumbersome processes is not a straightforward adventure. It is easy to fall into the temptation of transposing structures or arrangements that work in other situations.

2. The significant time and effort needed to carry out internal work in order for the campaign's external activities to unfold successfully – and hence for the campaign to be effective as a whole – should not be underestimated.

3. A representative, geographically and gender balanced, democratic and transparent governing body – for instance an Executive Committee – capable of offering appropriate and continuous leadership, is crucial.

4. Having Co-Chairs can be beneficial for representation, profile and leadership, provided geographical and gender balance is respected, and that the right profile and level of skills is ensured.

5. An independent, professional, multicultural, multilingual efficient and problem-solving Secretariat that is soundly managed and empowers staff members with flexibility is the backbone of the campaign.

6. The importance of having a solid fiscal agent that manages grants, contracts and providers cannot be sufficiently underscored. Organisations considering this role should not underestimate the fiduciary responsibility.

7. Any campaign must be strategic and realistic about the partnerships it concludes. A strategic and realistic approach must be taken on both sides, and each side must have clear a vision of what they can bring to the partnership, and must conduct a thorough self-assessment of their capacity to do so before entering into any agreement. The principle of a partnership is to try and get the best of all worlds. It requires compromises. It should anticipate difficulties and be based on sound and collegial risk assessment.

The **very important efforts and overall good results obtained** by Beyond 2015 in developing an effective structure and management system, together with sound, inclusive and transparent governance – which at moments may seem intended to mirror those of an organisation more than a campaign – are commendable.



### Recommendations for future civil society advocacy campaigns

⌚ Thoroughly conceptualising regional and national coordinating structures and establishing arrangements for direct line management and/or supervision by the independent professional secretariat of the campaign.

⌚ Anticipating and minimizing issues around cumbersome bureaucracy and delays in funding disbursements.

⌚ Putting in place concrete mechanisms to mitigate the loss of individuals and the impact of transitions – e.g. structured hand over reports and files; closer supervision

of handovers by line management; detailed orientation/ induction for all new staff; facilitation of interviews between outgoing and incoming officers, even before the change is effective; budgetary provisions to facilitate induction visits for incoming officers, etc.

⌚ Ensuring that all appointees equally understand Terms of Reference and that theses are clear.

⌚ Avoiding over-reliance on Terms of Reference. Understanding that good selection processes are equally crucial; and that in a membership campaign consisting of peers, members get from the campaign as much as they invest in it. Ultimately, it may all boil down to the sense of responsibility and self-awareness of each member organisation / individual.

⌚ Thoroughly reflecting on how to prevent and overcome geographical or gender imbalance in an Executive Committee. Scenarios of trade-offs between balance and efficiency must be discussed from the onset.

⌚ Putting in place, from the conceptualisation phase, mechanisms to create capacity across members for geographically and gender balanced leadership.

⌚ Thoroughly reflecting on ways to prevent and overcome deficient leadership or transparency from an Executive Committee.

⌚ Considering the official allocation of regional portfolios among Executive Committee members, with responsibility for regular public strategy and reporting sharing.

⌚ Factoring in budgetary provisions for sufficient face-to-face meetings of the Executive Committee.

⌚ Putting in place solid peer-review systems for the Co-Chairs. For instance, ensuring each candidate presents his/her vision and detailed roadmap for the duration of the mandate; as well as regular reporting obligations for the Co-Chairs in terms of specific results achieved and strategic issues moving forward.



Photo courtesy of Conor Healy Photography. January 2015.

Eoin Gormley, UNICEF Youth Delegate, meeting Amina Mohammed in January 2015.



# FUNDRAISING STRATEGY, FUNDING MODEL, MONITORING AND REPORTING

## CHAPTER 3

### Q18. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the campaign's fundraising strategy?

The consultant **commends the Secretariat on the very significant annual budget increase from €20,000 in 2011 to a peak of €1.3 million in 2014**, and a cumulative total income of **€3.4 million** by the end of the campaign.

*Main **strengths** of the fundraising strategy suggested by Beyond 2015 members and UN staff*



- ⊗ Fundraising from a mix of sources considered to be ethical and neutral after thorough discussions.
- ⊗ Getting the 3 donor countries – Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland - to constitute a single funding pool reduced the reporting burden and offered great flexibility to use the total €2.5 million pooled for the final phase of the campaign.
- ⊗ Establishing a Donor Coordination Group managed by the Secretariat demonstrates the donors' trust in the campaign and enabled both greater transparency and valuable strategizing among donors.
- ⊗ Inviting CSOs participating in the campaign to contribute financially. By the end of 2015 a total of €447,000 was received from about 30 CSOs.

*Main **weaknesses** of the fundraising strategy suggested by Beyond 2015 members:*



- ⊗ The strategy was initially poor and the Executive Committee should have been more proactive.
- ⊗ Sustaining an advocacy campaign through government funding remained problematic and risky to a few voices across the membership, as a matter of principle.
- ⊗ Contributions by members could have been higher.

The consultant believes that, in the spirit of a membership campaign, **the Executive Committee and biggest member organisations with specialised fundraising departments should have contributed from early on and more actively to setting and carrying out a fundraising strategy**. Raising additional funds and enhancing funding predictability would have allowed Beyond 2015 to support its members sooner and help build their capacity. The consultant recalls that, as evoked in other sections of this report, regional and national coordinating structures would have clearly benefited from extra funding and this would have better balanced results across the 3 levels at which Beyond 2015 operated.

The consultant would like to recall the recommendation made by the **Mid-Term Review** in February 2014 to incorporate a full time fundraiser to the Secretariat – which she knows was considered by Beyond 2015. She would need more comprehensive assessment to establish the cost-benefit analysis of such appointment at the late stage of the second quarter of 2014. However, the consultant sees added value in having such a position from

the early stages of the campaign. For instance, in line with the idea expressed in the paragraph above, the biggest member organisations could have contributed some of their fundraising officers' time to the campaign each week.

**It is very important for future campaigns to operationalize proper fundraising support from the inception stage.**

As regards threats to the independence of a campaign that relies heavily on government funding, the consultant agrees that such a risk exists. As for Beyond 2015, the findings of [Q7](#) and [Q10](#) demonstrate that the Secretariat and Executive Committee largely debated this issue before accepting core funding from Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. Beyond 2015 followed the principle of no single funder accounting for more than 30% of the overall budget. All target groups of this review – members, Secretariat, UN System, Member States and civil society colleagues external to the campaign – agree that the risk never materialised. At no given moment did the campaign become a mouthpiece in the intergovernmental negotiations. The consultant believes that this speaks volumes of both the **respectful and neutral attitude of donors**, and the **good management of the situation by Beyond 2015**. Future campaigns should consider practical applications of such a risk: what is the overall percentage of funding from government sources? If the percentage is very high, what measures will be established to protect the campaign against instrumentalisation? If there is a mixed use of funding from governments and other sources in similar percentages, can government funding be used as activity grant instead of as operating grant?

**Future campaigns, in the opinion of the consultant, should also focus on mapping and reaching out to possible philanthropy donors.** Their potential should not be underestimated since the philanthropy sector is also reorienting portfolios towards this new and universal Agenda 2030. Besides, it is important to recall that philanthropies come in all formats and sizes, including community foundations.

## **Q19. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the campaign's funding model?**

Over its full life-span, Beyond 2015 provided sub-grants, ranging from **€4,000 to €19,500 per year**, to 33 lead agencies in Africa (6), Asia (6), Latin America (9), Europe (5), North America (1) and the Pacific (6) for national level advocacy. Regional coordination was also supported. The choice between concentrating money in a few places and spreading it out as much as possible while remaining effective was complex.



Main strengths of this funding model suggested by Beyond 2015 members :

- ④ **Overall it was a good idea to spread the money across as many countries as possible.**
- ④ Money given to members, despite being of a small amount, empowered them and opened doors for them to further fundraise.
- ④ The **final Evaluation Survey** showed that 73% of English responses and 83% in French and Spanish felt it was very important to prioritise “targeted funding to support Southern engagement at the national level”, as well as flexible funding for Southern leadership, funding to participate at the regional and global level as well.



Main weaknesses:

- ④ A few think the Executive Committee should have been more involved in decisions on budgetary allocations, though they did not specify how.
- ④ **Regional coordination activities were hit by insufficient funds, as well as by delays in approving advocacy budgets** and the difficulty in accessing the funds due to bureaucracy in the decision-making processes by host organisations of regional coordinators.
- ④ **National lead agencies were also hit by limited funds and by delays in funding disbursement.**

The consultant commends the efforts made by Beyond 2015 to decentralize funds to the regional and national levels. She recommends the triangulation with [Q8](#). In a nutshell, a future campaign must empower the national level in order for Agenda 2030 to become a reality. Many within Beyond 2015 underscore that the regional level will become more relevant; and therefore insist on future campaigns placing strong efforts in operationalising efficient regional coordination structures. Adequate levels of funding and smooth processes should follow.

The consultant commends the financial and in-kind contributions made by CSOs members. She believes it would have been difficult to make financial contributions a membership principle given relative skepticism of CSOs in engaging in an intergovernmental process that Beyond 2015 had to – and managed to – progressively overcome. That said, with Agenda 2030 now a reality, and given the new focus on adapting it to regional and national realities, **future campaigns should revisit and enhance the idea of a system of membership fees structured in thresholds commensurate with members budgets.**



## Q20. What is the degree of satisfaction with the monitoring and reporting on the use of funds?

**Beyond 2015 regularly produced public monitoring and reporting on its funding.** However, Beyond 2015 members feel that **more regular and digestible updates** to the full membership would have been useful, **also as a tool for the identification and sharing of good practices.**

Several voices expressed the opinion that **Beyond 2015 lacked a comprehensive mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of activities and use of funds by national lead agencies and Policy to Action grantees.** The **final Africa Report** indicated: “the monitoring and evaluation of Lead Agents activities has not been very effective. We relied heavily on written reports and telephone conversation to verify and get a feel on what has been going-on on the grounds. Complaints by campaign members in some countries where we had lead agencies clearly indicated that there were gaps here and there.” In this line, the Report emphasised the importance of field visits or monitoring and evaluation by a third party.

The consultant stresses the need to assess reporting obligations in light of the size of the grants (€4,000 - €19,500 per year). That said, future campaigns, which are likely to allocate more funds than Beyond 2015 to the national and regional levels, must from the very onset flesh out fully comprehensive mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of activities and use of funds. Costs inherent to operationalising such mechanisms must therefore be factored into the fundraising strategy and budget. It is also recommended to include field visits and external evaluations. These should be deployed immediately when lack of compliance with agreed spending provisions is suspected.



Lessons learnt and recommendations about fundraising, funding and monitoring & reporting for global civil society advocacy campaigns

**1.** The world of NGOs and civil society initiatives know the importance of clear, timely, ethical and realistic fundraising strategies and the pressures of fundraising needs. On the upside, critical masses can use their potential for strong impact and legacy as levers to fundraising, as well as the pool of fundraising experience and skills that members can bring to a campaign.

**2.** A transparent and scrupulously managed funding model, commensurate with the vision and the objectives of a campaign, is vital and even the best models will demand tough prioritisation.

**3.** Transparent and regular monitoring and review of spending is a must for accountability and can also offer useful peer learning opportunities (if the information is presented in an adequate format).



### Recommendations for future civil society advocacy campaigns

- ⦿ Operationalising proper fundraising support from early on in the conceptualisation stage.
- ⦿ Ensuring that the main governing body, as well as the biggest member organisations of the campaign with specialised fundraising departments or officers, contribute from early on to the elaboration and deployment of the fundraising strategy.
- ⦿ Considering the incorporation of a full-time fundraiser within the independent professional secretariat. Alternatively, the biggest member organisations should make in-kind contributions in the way of time commitments from their fundraising officers.
- ⦿ Considering practical applications of the risk of instrumentalisation through government funding, when operating in a political intergovernmental process: what overall percentage of funds come from government sources? If the percentage is very high, what measures will be established to protect the campaign from instrumentalisation? If there is a mixed use, in similar percentages, of funding from governments and other sources, can government funding be used as activity grant instead of as operating grant?
- ⦿ Operationalizing a system of membership fees structured in thresholds commensurate with members' budgets.
- ⦿ Mapping and reaching out to possible donors from the philanthropy sector.
- ⦿ Placing solid budgetary effort in operationalising efficient regional coordinator structures.
- ⦿ Establishing comprehensive mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating activity implementation and spending. Costs inherent to operationalising such mechanisms must be factored into the fundraising strategy and budget, while field visits and external evaluations are recommended and should be deployed immediately if lack of compliance with spending provisions is suspected.



Photo courtesy of Nguyen, N. September 24, 2015

The Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean moderates a high-level event at the UN organised by Beyond 2015 in September 2015, which brought together UN Member States and civil society organisations participating in the Campaign.



# THREATS TO THE LEGACY OF BEYOND 2015, THE WINDING DOWN PHASE AND WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

## CHAPTER

# 4

### Q21. Main threats that could compromise or destroy Beyond 2015's legacy

Findings from the **Participatory Evaluation Meeting** in September, the **final Evaluation Survey** and the interviews conducted by the consultant identified the following 2 blocks of threats, each with potential triggers but also potential counterbalancing actions.

#### Block a. Fragmented implementation of Agenda 2030 at the national level.



Possible **triggers** for this fragmentation are:

- ⊗ Perverse mainstreaming of issues; cherry picking beyond national prioritisation; and reverting back to silos.
- ⊗ Inadequate communication campaigns that undermine the sustainable development character of the agenda, its integrated approach or its universality. The risk posed by the trivialisation approach and messages by “the Global Goals” is underscored as an example.
- ⊗ Dissipated civil society engagement and shifting back to the global North in the driver's seat.
- ⊗ Lack of or inadequate funding. The weakness of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda as the outcome of the Financing for Development process puts the whole vision on a string.
- ⊗ Kidnapping of the Agenda by the private sector with no adequate public codes of conduct and controls.
- ⊗ Inadequate indicators at the global and national levels. Absence of genuine localisation or adaptation to local realities and needs.

Possible **actions to counterbalance the threat** are:

- ⊗ Continue socialising and disseminating the SDGs across civil society organisations at the national and regional levels, making smart use of Beyond 2015 existing communications tools.
- ⊗ Combining mobilisation and advocacy strategies for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at all levels from international, to regional, national and local.
- ⊗ Respecting ownership of Agenda 2030 by governments and collaborating with them.
- ⊗ Supporting the creation of new national councils or commissions for integrated implementation of the SDGs.
- ⊗ Enabling national civil society shadow reports for accountability, including identification and sharing of good implementation practices at the regional level.
- ⊗ Reconnecting the SDGs, the discussions on Means of Implementation and the Addis Ababa Action Accord at all levels.
- ⊗ Linking up with academia and think tanks.

## Block b. Loss of the structure for efficient collaboration and coordinated voices that Beyond 2015 created, particularly in a context of decreasing enabling environments for civil society.



Possible **triggers** for this loss are:

- ⦿ If there is no collective understanding of the unique and unprecedented legacy achieved by the campaign.
- ⦿ If we fall into Post-2015 fatigue and don't strategise.
- ⦿ If we neglect the urgency to avoid a hiatus, maintain the space and collaborative approach created by Beyond 2015, and secure funding for a successor campaign.
- ⦿ If the mission of a successor campaign is not adjusted to what is needed and cannot offer complementarity and added value with existing structures, organisations and other campaigns.
- ⦿ If vested interests behind CSOs and politics among them generate mistrust and decision-making is only left in the hands of those who also control funds.

Possible **actions to counterbalance** this are:

- ⦿ Establishing a relevant, focused, timely, well-funded and participatory successor campaign with clear and transparent governance structures to build on the results achieved and address future needs, which complement other existing global and thematic campaigns.
- ⦿ Reaffirming the campaign's democratic principles, transparency, accountability and levels of participation.
- ⦿ Building on existing campaign structures, encouraging engagement and not being afraid of constructive conflict.
- ⦿ Identifying clear strategic objectives in consultation with relevant actors. Be inclusive and transparent from day one to build fundamental anchoring alliances.
- ⦿ Conducting meaningful and timely evaluations of the campaign's successes, failures and legacy.
- ⦿ Establishing a minimum of basic funding for international, regional and national coordination.
- ⦿ Considering the establishment of independent professional regional secretariats, besides an international secretariat.
- ⦿ Achieving presence at the international, regional and national levels, with a focus on engagement in the High

Level Political Forum at the global level and on rethinking the presence and networks at the national level in order to work in a more structured manner for longer-term impact.

- ⦿ Elaborating a methodological guide for engaging with governments and multilateral entities around implementation plans, accountability mechanisms and monitoring and review systems.
- ⦿ Better understanding how to work and create alliances with state/regional/provincial and local authorities.
- ⦿ Analysing national implementation plans to find gaps and strengths.

***"CSOs must make an effort to realise how big the pie is. There is plenty of space for everybody in the implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda but we cannot afford fragmented civil society. We need everybody to take part in it. So each of us must find our place and collaborate with others."***

Interesting quotes on the prospects for global civil society advocacy campaigns are:

By UN staff:

*"Beyond 2015 members should take individual and collective responsibility in being an honest broker in wide CSO discussions and help bringing actors together in one or as many credible campaigns as needed."*

By a Beyond 2015 member:

*"Beyond 2015 was a CSOs movement. We must now reflect on what does this mean? Who was left out that now we need in for implementation? Is it a "community of practice"- involving civil society, academia, philanthropies and even aspects of the private sector like social entrepreneurship - that we need for the implementation phase."*

By UN Member States:

***"There is indeed a strong case for global campaigns and also for structured engagement. If the UN does not remain a platform for more than Member States as it was during the intergovernmental process, this (2030 Sustainable Development) Agenda will be the first victim."***

*"There is certainly a case for future cross-constituency campaigns of civil society. There is an acute need for sustained and structured engagement of civil society - particularly for aspects where we are still fleshing out the details like is the case of the High Level Political Forum."*

*“The case for future civil society advocacy campaigns - both thematic and general - around the implementation of the Agenda is undeniable. If civil society and UN Major Groups don’t engage in the discussions towards the next High Level Political Forum, there will be a loss. They have to keep up the pressure, wake up Member States to challenges and accountability and should conduct their own implementation reviews. They will also have a role in awareness-raising and mobilisation in order to keep the vitality of the SDGs and show to people the impact on their daily lives.”*

## **Q22. Perceptions around the wind down phase**

It will probably come as no surprise to the reader that the decision to close down Beyond 2015 generated many views. These are some illustrative quotes by Beyond 2015 members:

*“A campaign with an end date is a maturing exercise for civil society engagement in the UN.”*

*“Campaigns, by nature, have a beginning, a middle and an end. Closing Beyond 2015 down honours the fact that it is a campaign.”*

*“Closing down the campaign was inherent to its concept. It was reiterated one year down the campaign, when the last Executive Committee came on board in 2014 and over the past months.”*

*“We’ve been confronted with accomplished facts with no space to entertain a discussion. This raises questions of transparency. Who had the right of closing the campaign? Why does the Executive Committee interpret they have that right? The decision should have been put out to consultation with the broad Beyond 2015 constituency in 2014. The game can continue with the players who still want to play.”*

*“It’s a big mistake to discontinue advocacy when the process is going on. We have experienced the first negative impact at the meeting of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on indicators for the SDGs held in Bangkok in October. The lack of civil society coordination impacted negatively on the ability to influence.”*

*“It takes courage to close something that is working well. But the decision was not well executed. When the decision was taken back in time, it was on the basis of assumptions that don’t hold anymore: the process still continues, it’s not over. The decision did not factor in any flexibility to assess at a later stage if a little bit more time would be needed to truly finish off the task.”*

*“The Executive Committee needs to assume their responsibility for jeopardising the legacy of the campaign. They cannot wash their hands off on the grounds that the decision was taken from the beginning. They need to do what needs to be done in the limited time that is left.”*

*“It’s good to close down, it gives accountability and also a sense of accomplishment but I think that an extension till the end of 2016 would have helped anchor the legacy of the campaign.”*

As indicated in **Q4**, “discontinuing pressure and engagement in New York after the September UN Summit” is identified as a shortcoming and an area of high concern within Beyond 2015 in general and by civil society colleagues who are external to the campaign, but also by UN system staff and Member States. The illustrative quote by a Member State representative referred to above is still relevant here: “Beyond 2015 should have done more to help consolidate and follow up the new channels for civil society engagement they helped to open. It is confusing to see that everybody disappeared after the Summit. They invest so much and then leave completely (...)”

The consultant has taken the personal decision of not expressing views on whether Beyond 2015 should or should not close and will express solely her assessment on the way the winding down phase has been conducted it. **The consultant commends the Exit Strategy for Beyond 2015**, set in March 2015 (as recommended by the **Mid-Term Review** in February 2014), **as a very good document covering the practicalities of closing down a campaign**. However, in her humble opinion, the high number of deeply critical views expressed by individuals with wide-ranging perspectives on the engagement of civil society in the UN, indicates that the Executive Committee should have conducted the winding down phase differently and better. The winding down phase of any collaborative initiative revolves as much around practicalities as around feelings; and as much around stocktaking and identifying lessons learnt as around anchoring the legacy. This takes even bigger proportions in campaigns that have been very successful, highly visible and very big like Beyond 2015; and which have been as personally enriching as members consider Beyond 2015 to have been.

A task force should have been put in place by the Executive Committee to identify scenarios and critical milestones - in an 18 month horizon after the 2015 UN Summit - to anchor the legacy of the campaign, and to elaborate brief guidelines for members to help maximise those milestones. The scenario of a successor campaign



is one among others. A spin-off reflection group on the prospects for a potential successor campaign, on how to transition to it and mitigate the negative impact of a possible hiatus, could have been self-organised by members. Arguably, the intensity and fast-pace which the campaign had to deal with made this task complex and difficult. In a campaign that was established in 2010, there was time to foresee and plan. External facilitation could have been brought in.

The consultant strongly believes that membership campaigns are collective endeavours and that all members must therefore show collective responsibility and engagement to turn the overall campaign into more than the sum of its individual parts. This is why members could have taken the driver's seat early on, on the discussions of what happens after Beyond 2015. At the same time, in the view of the consultant, this does not equate to executive committees eluding the responsibility of anchoring the legacy of a campaign during its winding down phase and of orienting members on how best to contribute.

**The consultant strongly recommends that the Executive Committee members concentrate all possible efforts until the date set for the closure of the campaign (March 2016) towards: 1. strongly anchoring the legacy of the campaign and 2. identifying guidelines for member organisations to contribute to this anchoring.** The consultant strongly encourages all members to actively support this task within their respective remits.

**The consultant also strongly recommends Beyond 2015 member organisations to fully engage in and drive discussions on the prospects for a possible successor campaign** – in light of critical ongoing discussions towards long-term self-organised strategic coordination mechanisms for the UN Major Groups & Other Stakeholders, for sustained strategic engagement in the UN at the global level.



Lessons learnt about Beyond 2015's winding down phase and the threats that could compromise its legacy

1. Civil society advocacy campaigns must have exit strategies on the practicalities of closing down.
2. The winding down phase of any collaborative initiative – particularly one that is successful, visible, large and personally enriching for those involved – revolves as much around practicalities as around feelings; and as

much around stocktaking and identifying lessons learnt as around anchoring the legacy.

3. The governing body of a campaign must take responsibility for initiating early enough the task of anchoring the legacy of campaign during the winding down phase.

4. The following 2 broad blocks of threats could compromise the legacy of Beyond 2015. Each has potential triggers and counterbalancing actions:

- Fragmentation of Agenda 2030 in terms of national implementation;
- Loss of the structure for efficient collaboration and coordinated voices that Beyond 2015 has created, particularly in a context of decreasing enabling environments for civil society.



### Recommendations related to the anchoring of Beyond 2015's legacy

- ⑥ The Executive Committee should concentrate all possible efforts until the closure of the campaign (March 2016) towards: 1. Strongly anchoring the legacy of the campaign and 2. Identifying guidelines for member organisations to contribute to this anchoring. The consultant strongly encourages all members to actively support this task within their respective remits.
- ⑥ Beyond 2015 member organisations should fully engage in and drive discussions on the prospects for a possible successor campaign.
- ⑥ Civil society, UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders must assume their individual and collective responsibility in self-organising and collaborating towards non-partisan coordination for sustained strategic engagement with the UN.
- ⑥ Important outstanding questions on synergies and collaboration between civil society campaigns and the UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders system remain open. They require ample discussion among civil society campaigns, UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders. Though the complexity and difficulty of these questions are undeniable, further postponing discussions will have very negative consequences on the ability of civil society to self-organise in future campaigns as well as to engage with the UN.



# ANNEX 1

## List of Beyond 2015 reporting materials used as a basis for this evaluation

1. Presentation “Brief History of Beyond 2015”
2. [“What are the Vision, Purpose, Values and Criteria?” \(VPVC\).](#)
3. [Toolkit “From Policy to Action, Securing urgent and concrete commitments towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”](#)
4. 2014 Evaluation Survey among Beyond 2015 members, institutions and influential individuals.
5. [2015 Evaluation Survey among Beyond 2015 members, institutions and influential individuals.](#)
6. [Mid-term review](#), February 2014.
7. [Policy to Action Innovation Fund: Summary of achievements by CSOs supported.](#)
8. [Global Report on the Focus States Project initiative 2015.](#)
9. [Narrative Report on Focus States Project Initiative 2014-2015.](#)
10. Briefing [“Review of Beyond 2015 Advocacy Positions and the Final Outcome Document of the Post-2015 Agenda”.](#)
11. Presentation [“A Review of the 2030 Agenda Outcome Document: Gains and Gaps for Beyond 2015.”](#)
12. [2011 Annual Influencing Report.](#)
13. [2012 Annual Influencing Report.](#)
14. [2013 Annual Influencing Report.](#)
15. [2014 Annual Influencing Report.](#)
16. [Africa Final Project Closure Report.](#)
17. [Asia Final Regional Assessment.](#)
18. Draft Europe Final Evaluation Report.
19. [Latin America Final Regional Report.](#)
20. [Pacific Final Regional Narrative Report.](#)
21. [Report of Pacific Regional Wind Up Meeting.](#)
22. [Report on national level influencing activities by Beyond 2015 lead agencies in 2014 and 2015.](#)
23. Compilation of successes and challenges at the national level.
24. [Evaluation of the Swedish Steering Group for Beyond 2015’s joint work 2013-2015, first part.](#)
25. Beyond 2015 – Post-2015 Public Mobilisation Scoping.
26. [Terms of Reference of Beyond 2015’s UN Working Group.](#)
27. [Meeting notes of the May 2014 Executive Committee.](#)
28. [Terms of Reference of the Executive Committee.](#)
29. [Summary of Critical Self-Evaluation of the Executive Committee.](#)
30. Support to Southern Members of the Executive Committee: Summary from final reports.
31. Beyond 2015 Partnerships Logical Framework 2014.
32. [2014 Annual Narrative Report to Donors.](#)
33. Correspondence with Denmark.
34. Correspondence with Sweden.
35. Correspondence with Switzerland.
36. Consolidated Financial Report: January - December 2014.
37. Anonymous Summary of Beyond 2015 Staff Exit interviews.
38. [Minutes of Wind Down Meeting, 28 September 2015.](#)
39. [Report of the Participatory Evaluation Meeting, 29 September 2015.](#)
40. [Exit Strategy, March 2015.](#)



## ANNEX 2

List of interviews specifically carried for this evaluation. (Alphabetical order)

- African Disability Alliance (Beyond 2015 Fiscal Agent)
- Beyond 2015 Secretariat
- Brazil, Permanent Mission to the UN
- Campaign 2015+
- Canada, Permanent Mission to the UN
- CAFOD (Catholic aid agency for England and Wales)
- CAN-International (Climate Action Network International)
- CESR (Center for Economic and Social Rights)
- CEPEI (Centro de Pensamiento Estratégico Internacional)
- CIVICUS (interviewed in its dual capacity as member of Beyond 2015 and the UN NGO Major Group)
- CONCORD Sweden
- CCC (Cooperation Committee for Cambodia)
- Education international (UN Major Group Trade Unions and Workers)
- IDA (International Disability Alliance)
- IFP (International Forum of National NGO Platforms)
- INFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesia Development)
- JDPC (Justice, Development and Peace Commission of Nigeria)
- Mexico, Permanent Mission to the UN
- Participate
- PhilSEN (Philippine Social Enterprise Network)
- PIANGO (Pacific islands association of non-government organisations)
- Sightsavers
- Republic of Korea, Permanent Mission to the UN
- Save Matabeleland Coalition
- Save The Children
- Switzerland, Permanent Mission to the UN
- UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs
- UN Secretary General Office
- United Kingdom, Department for International Development (DFID)
- UWASNET (Uganda Water and Sanitation NGO Network)
- VSO (International Volunteer Service Overseas)
- World Vision International
- WWF (World Wildlife Fund)



# PHOTO CREDITS

1. Front cover (top left): photo courtesy of HoFoSe / Beyond 2015 Tanzania. Editors from media houses in Tanzania at a workshop to raise awareness on the need for political will to implement Agenda 2030 on SDGs at national level.
2. Front cover (bottom left) and page 40: photo courtesy of Conor Healy Photography. January 2015. Eoin Gormley, UNICEF Youth Delegate, meeting Amina Mohammed in January 2015.
3. Front cover (bottom right) and Table of contents: photo courtesy of Nguyen, N. September 24, 2015. Standing ovation at the end of a high-level event organised by Beyond 2015 at the UN in September 2015, during which representatives of civil society and Member States gathered to discuss how to build political will for the implementation of Agenda 2030 at the national level.
4. Page 8: photo courtesy of Save Matabeleland Coalition / Beyond 2015. July 2015. School Children from St Bernards, Lobhengula, Mzilikazi and Mckeurtan Primary Schools present Beyond 2015's advocacy postcards during a national dialogue and knowledge sharing conference on the implementation of the SDGs, organised in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 9-10 July 2015.
5. Page 12: photo courtesy of Nguyen, N. September 24, 2015. The Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean shows Beyond 2015's key messages to a full house at the UN in New York, during a high-level event organised by the campaign in September 2015, which brought together UN Member States and civil society organisations participating in the Campaign.
6. Page 30: photo courtesy of Beyond 2015. 2013. Beyond 2015 members gather in Nairobi in June 2013 for a workshop on the post-2015 vision, purpose, values and criteria.
7. Page 44 and back cover (bottom right): photo courtesy of Nguyen, N. September 24, 2015. The Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean moderates a high-level event at the UN organised by Beyond 2015 in September 2015, which brought together UN Member States and civil society organisations participating in the Campaign.
8. Back cover (top right): photo courtesy of HoFoSe / Beyond 2015 Tanzania. Editors from media houses in Tanzania at a workshop to raise awareness on the need for political will to implement Agenda 2030 on SDGs at national level.
9. Back cover (bottom left): Photo courtesy of Beyond 2015. May 2015. Participants at a breakfast event co-hosted by Beyond 2015 in New York, on the role of youth within the post-2015 monitoring and review framework, May 2015.

[www.beyond2015.org](http://www.beyond2015.org)

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**Author:** Maruxa Cardama

**Graphic design:** [Savitzky Brand Building \[SBB\]](#)

**Proofreading and editing:** [Beyond 2015 International Secretariat](#)

**Publication coordinator:** Ella Masle-Farquhar [Beyond 2015 International Secretariat]

